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Cognitive anthropology, according to i t s  advocates, describes a 
new theoretical orientation and approach to  ethnography. The term covers 
a variety  of studies which aim to reveal the manners in  which d ifferent 
peoples organize and u til iz e  th e ir cultures. More exp lic itly , the 
methods of cognitive anthropology focus on discovering the organizing 
principles underlying behavior by gaining access to the cognitive cate­
gories which constitue these organizing principles. In essence cognitive 
anthropology seeks to answer two questions: What material phenomena are 
significant for the people of a particu lar culture; and how do they 
organize these phenomena (Tyler, 1969:3).
The term "cognitive anthropology" is herein used as a descriptive 
supercategory which includes those ethnographic and lingu istic  investi­
gations presented in  the lite ra tu re  under such terms as folk taxonomy, 
e thnoscience, new ethnography, ethnosoiiantics, componential analysis, and 
formal analysis. These various t i t l e s  denote types of studies which re ­
present defin ite  sim ila rities  in basic a p rio ri assumptions, general 
methodology, and desired goals. In th is  study I m i l  employ as a s ty lis ­
t ic  aid the terms "cognitive anthropologist" and "cognitivist" as labels 
for those who practice cognitive anthropology because I feel that the 
cultural and social insights which represent the goals of the cogn itiv is t's  
methodology res t basically  on the ir conclusions concerning some manner of 
interpretation of the cognitive structures of the culture under study as
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revealed by the ir methodology.
The fie ld  of cognitive anthropology has arisen only in  the la s t
ten to f if te en  years. As yet no comprehensive critique of th is  area of
inquiry has been attempted. In 1964 William C. Sturtevant (1964:101)
wrote regarding the ethnoscientific approach:
. .  .most previous discussions and exemplifications have been couched 
in  such terms that many anthropologists assume that idiat is  being 
described is  not ethnography but some kind of lingu istics of 
’kinship algebra’ or both, so that there may now be room for a 
more informal, less technical characterization.
In Cognitive Anthropology, the most recent general work dealing
with the area, Tyler (1969:1) adds:
Assessment of such new departures is  always d if f ic u lt . What are 
the h is to rica l antecedents and vMt do they augur for the future of 
anthropology? Are these genuinely viable reformulations or are they 
simply short-lived fads and blind alleys, detrimental in  the long 
run to significant research?
In response to the suggestions of Sturtevant and Tyler, I pro­
pose to o ffer a critique of cognitive anthropology. I'-ly evaluation and 
assessment w ill be directed toward several problem areas, including those 
stated above by Tyler. Perhaps the best means of explaining my approach 
and the various explanatory models I intend to  employ w ill be b riefly  
outline than.
Evaluation is inherently a re la tive  operation. Something must be 
evaluated in  terms of something else, fiy f i r s t  problem w ill be to de­
rive a type statonent of cognitive anthropology. This generalized s ta te ­
ment w ill be the core with which I w ill work in the subsequent portions 
of th is  paper. I w ill abstract the type from the lite ra tu re  on cognitive 
anthropology u tiliz in g  a structure which equates with the co g n itiv is t’s 
view of h is f ie ld  and i t s  major components. This model w ill be the frame 
of relevance by which I w ill evaluate cognitive anthropology for the
3
puiposes of contructing a typical or general series of propositions.
The second procedure m i l  be the assessment of cognitive anthro­
pology in  rela tion  to a history of re la tive  anthropological, psycho­
logical, and sociological theory. This step w ill involve tracing the 
influence of such theoretical orientations as structural lingu istics 
and Gestalt psychology and such w riters as Sapir, Boas, Opler, Benedict, 
and KLuckhohn on cognitive anthropology. A related evaluation w ill deal 
with cognitive anthropology in terms of a sociology of knowledge : Why 
cognitive anthropology? and why now?
The th ird  evaluating position v i l l  be couched in  teims of the 
philosophy and psychology of perception. Certain kinds of assumptions 
pertaining to  the nature of perception l ie  at the very foundation of 
methodology in cognitive anthropology. Many of these assumptions I be­
lieve to be false  and misleading. I w ill attempt to demonstrate my 
contentions in the material to follow.
The fourth section of the critique w ill deal with an evaluation 
of cognitive anthropology from the viewpoint of the philosophy of science. 
This broad philosophical perspective w ill deal with the philosophy of 
science, sc ien tific  methodology, and epistemology, and i t  w ill o ffe r a 
special focus on the nature of discovery procedures. To th is  extent i t  
w ill be a general critique. Sturtevant (1964:111) notes that i f  an 
ethnography is  to reflec t the cognitive system of the bearers of a cul­
ture, the v a lid ity  of the description depends on the discovery procedures.
A final consideration w ill deal with the u t i l i ty  of cognitive 
anthropology for anthropological theory in general. For example: Of 
what heuristic  value and theoretical usefulness is  the theory of culture 
implied in  cognitive anthropology? In what ways can cognitive anthropology
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contribute to ethnological theory? Is cognitive anthropology ultim ately 
detrimental to  the growth of viable theory in anthropology?
I am aware that any one of these topics is  po ten tially  amenable 
to near in fin ite  treatment. However, the length with which I choose to 
deal with any particu lar problem w ill be a reflex  of the level of gener­
a li ty  and inclusiveness I employ for the specific task. Obviously, 
every problem area re la ted  to cognitive anthropology and psychology, the 
philosophy of science, ethnological theory, lin g u is tic  theory, ethno­
graphic methodology, and the history of anthropological theory cannot 
be surveyed in d e ta il. Two major foci of in te res t and orientation, 
however, w ill pervade the various discussions to  follow and decide those 
areas to which I w ill give the lio n 's  share of attention.
The f i r s t  of these foci is  methodology. I intend the tern  to  
have a wider extension of meaning than is  usually given i t :  v iz . , the 
specific procedures u tilized  by a particu lar science in the pursuit of 
the goals of i t s  inquiry. Kaplan's (1964) notion of methodology and 
Kuhn's (1962) concept of "sc ien tific  paradigms" most closely approximate 
the parameters of the conception of methodology th a t I w ill anploy as a 
guiding in te res t in th is  study.
Kaplan (1964:18-23) writes:
The word 'methodology', like  the words 'physiology', 'h is to ry ',  and 
'lo g ic '. . . . i s  also one which is  used both fo r a certain  discipline 
and for i t s  subject-matter. I mean by 'methodology' the study--the 
description, the explanation, and the ju s tif ic a tio n --o f methods, and 
not the methods them selves....! shall mean by 'methodology' a concern 
with midrange techniques and principles, which I shall correspondingly 
designate 'methods'. Methods are techniques su ffic ien tly  general to 
be common to a l l  sciences, or to a significant part of them. A lter­
nately, they are logical or philosophical principles su ffic ien tly  
specific to re la te  especially to science as distinguished from other 
human enterprises and in te rests . Thus, methods include such proce­
dures as forming concepts and hypotheses, making observations and 
measurements, performing experiments, building models and theories.
providing explanations, and making predictions. The aim of method­
ology, then, is  to  describe and analyze these methods, throwing 
lig h t on th e ir lim itations and resources, c larify ing  the ir presup­
positions and consequences, rela ting  th e ir p o ten tia litie s  to the 
tw ilight zone a t the fron tie rs  of knowledge.
Kaplan's "methodology" perfectly  compliments Kuhn's view of
"sc ien tific  paradigms" for my purposes. Kuhn (1962:viii) s ta tes:
. . . th e  practice of astronomy, physics, chemistry, or biology normally 
f a i ls  to evoke the controversies over fundamentals that today often 
seem endemic among, say, psychologists or sociologists. Attempting 
to  discover the source of that difference led me to recognize the 
ro le  in  sc ien tific  research of what I have since called 'paradigms.' 
These I take to  be universally recognized sc ien tif ic  achievements 
that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community 
of practitioners.
The methodology inherent in the paradigmatic focus of a particu lar 
science defines and describes in a most fundamental manner the nature and 
lim its of the "real world" fo r that science. Reality is  tested  and allowed 
only within the c r i te r ia l  boundaries prescribed by the paradigm. I t  is  the 
world view of a science. A d ifferen t methodological orientation and para­
digmatic stress portray a profoundly d ifferent world and rea lity . Min 
argues that the paradigm of a science, through the train ing of students of 
the science, becomes the description of re a lity  which is  internalized by the 
sc ien tis t. Kuhn u tiliz e s  th is  notion to account for the often non-rational 
defenses employed by the advocates of one sc ien tific  paradigm when th e ir  
paradigm is  threatened by the advocates of another--defenses involving social 
power and dcminance rather than rational persuasion and demonstration.
In th is  paper I am interested in questions raised by the paradigm 
vhich is  implied., though seldom expounded in the lite ra tu re  which deals 
with anthropological studies of cognition, and what they bode for the devel­
opment of anthropological theory in general. What is  the nature of the 
world that is  assumed by the cognitive anthropologist? How does th is  
world " f i t"  the perspectives offered by the c lassic  methodology and
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philosophy of science and recent studies in  the psychology of perception? 
Does cognitive anthropology represent a theoretical and philosophical 
advance or a te tre a t from Kaplan's "tw ilight zone a t the fron tie rs  of 
kiowledge?"
As can be understood from the preceding discussion, I w ill be 
lea s t concerned with the m aterial content of the various studies which 
are subsumed under the rubric "cogi.it ive anthropology" and most concerned 
with matters of methodology. I am not as in terested in Brake's (1961) 
presentation of how the Subanun of Mindanao diagnose disease or 
Conklin's (1955) description of Hanunoo color categories as I am in how 
and Wiy these researchers arrived a t th e ir  particu lar analyses.
A second major orientation of th is  study is  best described by a 
p a rtia l and re s tr ic tiv e  use of the tern  "pragmatism." Philosophical and 
metaphysical cul de sacs often render methodological investigations 
s te r ile . Throughout th is  paper I w ill attempt to  avoid an appeal to the 
irreducible and irreconcilable. I agree with Pierce (in Sahakian,1968:256) 
that a major function of thought is  to produce habits of action. I t  is  my 
intention in  th is  paper to investigate cognitive anthropology as a live  
issue rather than a dead one and to discuss problems and phrase conclusions 
in  a manner relevant to  what I consider to be the most valid  direction 
for the continuing and positive growth of theory in anthropology. I do 
not wish to belabor the tern "pragmatism" in  an e ffo rt to make exp lic it 
the basic underlying concerns which w ill permeate the succeeding sections. 
Pragmatism can be understood as both a method and as a theory of tru th .
A pragmatic stance ( i .e . ,  concern with consequence and action) w ill guide 
my selection of issues which I consider relevant in a critique  of cogni­
tive  anthropology, and to that degree I can claim a pragmatic methodology.
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However, I re jec t the pragmatic theory of tru th , i . e . ,  the notion that 
i f  an idea "works" when applied to the concrete fac ts of experience, then 
i t  is  a true idea. As the body of th is  study w ill reveal, I consider 
"concrete facts of experience" to be not so concrete a t a l l  and, fu rther, 
a s ta tic  conception of tru th  to be anathana to a science of anthropology.
The term "science", however, presents another problem. Most con­
temporary philosophers of science forgo the task of attempting to concisely 
foimulate a defin ition  of science (e .g ., Kaplan, 1964:27; Weatherall, 1969: 
v i i ) .  Weatherall (1969:v ii) suggests tha t the foundation of science is  
not any particu lar body of factual knowledge but a manner of thinking and 
acting. Cohen and Nagel (1934:191-192) write t l a t  "in  essence, sc ien tific  
method is  simply the pursuit of tru th  as determined by logical consider­
a tions." All writers in th is  f ie ld  would agree, I believe, th a t the 
basic orientation of any science is  toward a logically  formulated sys­
tematic knowledge of i t s  universe of inquiry. I t  is  th is  deceptively 
simple notion of science that I w ill hold when speaking of a "science of 
anthropology."
The question of the nature of science and anthropology is  a valid
one to ra ise  in  a discussion of cognitive anthropology. I t  is  continually
stated by cognitive anthropologists tl^at a distinguishing characteristic
of th e ir manner of ethnographic description and investigation is  i t s
sc ien tic ity . Furthermore, Tyler, for example, fee ls that cognitive
anthropology raises th is  crucial question: Is cu ltural anthropology a
natural or a formal science? He (Tyler,1969:14) notes :
Traditional cultural anthropology is  based on the assumption that i t s  
data are discrete material phenomena which can be analyzed like  the 
material phenomena of any other natural science. Cognitive anthro­
pology is  based on the assumption that i t s  data are mental phenomena 
which can be analyzed by formal methods sim ilar to those of mathe­
matics and logic.
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In sunmary, ray main concern in  the following is ,  to paraphrase 
Broom (1963:xviii), with problems that are in trin s ica lly  important and 




In the following section I w ill attempt to  characterize and 
describe the methodological, epistemological, and theoretical system 
which is  cognitive anthropology. An analysis of the roots of th is  orien­
ta tion  w ill be approached in the succeeding chapter. At th is  point 1 
merely seek to identify  and explicate the goals and concepts of the so- 
called "New Ethnography" (Sturtevant, 1964:99).
Cognitive anthropology is  a movement within anthropology dedicated 
to the improvement of standards of ethnographic description and analysis, 
and having as i t s  source and inspiration the techniques of lingu istics 
(Harris, 1968:568). Because cognitive anthropology represents an ethno­
graphic methodology, a major portion of i t s  essen tia l characterization 
must deal with conception of culture held by the cognitiv ists as well 
as th e ir  appreciation of the purposes and goals of ethnography. The more 
specific assumptions and techniques employed by researchers in th is  area 
of in te rest flow from and are bounded by the sets imposed by the p a r ti­
cular notions of the nature of culture and ethnography which they u til iz e  
both overtly and covertly in th e ir  research and analyses. Further, a 
f i r s t  step in the characterization of cognitive anthropology must attend 
to the cogn itiv is ts ' position concerning the relationship of language and 
culture, as well as th e ir  stance concerning the d esirab ility  and fea s i­
b i l i ty  of the u tiliz a tio n  of the techniques of structural lingu istics  
in  th e ir  search for relevant and valid ethnographic description.
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Ward H. Goodenough is  unquestionably the major h ig h -v is ib ility  
figure in  the recent florescence of anthropological studies of cognition. 
With Floyd Lounsbury, Goodenough is  the most often quoted cogn itiv ist, 
particu la rly  with regard to  the cognitivist*s position on the nature of 
culture, the proper aim of ethnography, and the method of componential 
analysis. His a rtic le s  "Property, Kin, and Community on Truk" (1951), 
"Componential Analysis and the Study of Meaning" (1956), and "Cultural 
Anthropology and Linguistics" (1957) are noteworthy in th is  respect. How­
ever, in  a private ccmmunication, Goodenough (1970) writes:
I tru s t th a t in  looking a t my work you w ill look at more than compo­
nential analysis, which fran my point of view is  ju s t a method for 
trying to  describe systematically sign ificational (as d is tin c t from 
connotational) aspect of meaning. The kind of cultural theory that 
i t  f i t s  fo r me is  se t fo rth  a t greatest length in the ten th  and 
tw elfth chapters of my book Cooperation In Change (1963). Various 
w riters have attribu ted  to me views regarding the nature of culture 
which they deduced from reading two or three of my a r tic le s ; but 
with one or two exceptions anthropologists have fa iled  to consider 
what I said a t considerable length in Cooperation In Change on the 
nature of culture, custom, in s titu tio n , and especially the re la tion  
of the individual to  cultural change.
To honor Goodenough*s suggestion above I w ill present what i s ,  in 
his opinion, his most cogent statement concerning h is vision of the nature 
of culture and the relationsM p of an individual to  his culture. I t  is  
infoimative to commence with a presentation of what might be termed 
Goodenough*s (1963:253) cosmological view as stated in his Cooperation In 
Giange, (1963).
All of nature, indeed, can be conceived as containing more or less 
in ternally  stable systems which are the components of larger and 
yet larger ones, fran atoms to  s te lla r  galaxies, from individual 
ce lls  to  complex organism, and from single species to ecological 
systems. No part of the rea l world, of course, is  perfectly  stable , 
though i t  may appear to  hang in a s ta te  of balance for some time, 
especially when viewed microscopically. But the repetition  of events 
within i t  is  never exact, merely a modal clustering of tracks. These 
modal clusterings, however, are essential to human cognition, for 
in  th e ir  absence people would be unable to discern discontinuities
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in  th e ir  surroundings by which to  discriminate categories of pheno­
mena and thus build the percepts and concepts with which they d is­
cern the real world, cognitively organize i t ,  and orient themselves 
to i t .
A key to Goodenough's anthropology, as well as cognitive anthro­
pology generally, l ie s  in  i t s  psycho-biological or "drive" orientation. 
This "drive" orientation is  one of the features viiich led George and 
Louise Spindler (1963:548) to  conclude that " . . . th e  cognitive model is  
one of high potential u t i l i t y . . . (because) of the p o ss ib ility  i t  affords 
of doing research on comparatively limited sets of relationships between 
operationally definable v a r ia b le s ... ."  An individual has a certa in  range 
of needs which inexorably re la te  him to a re a lity  which is  given him by 
his culture. I t  is  the nature of the juncture, according to Goodenough, 
that is  the crucial concern of cognitive anthropology. Goodenough 
(1963:54, 65, 147) continues :
What people see as needed to g ra tify  a want is  not necessarily vdiat 
is  needed in fac t. What they see depends on th e ir  cognitive knowledge; 
viiat sta tes of a ffa irs  they liave learned to discern, what they believe 
to be the rela tions between them, and what they understand to be the 
processes by which one s ta te  can be transformed into ano ther...In  
order to do something about th e ir  wants, people need to have sensory 
contact with the ir surroundings. They need a vocabulary of constructs 
by Wiich to discriminate things around them, feelings within them­
selves, and ways in  which they interconnect. They need to be oriented, 
in short, in  terns of some coherent and in ternally  consistent cogni­
tive  system.. . (People) come to perceive things in terms of classes 
or categories of phenanena. We operate with sets of color categories, 
shape categories, ta s te  categories, and so on, whose combinations 
provide the basis for a perceptual taxonmy of our world. Cognitive 
organization also includes those ways in which the phenomena we d is ­
cern appear to us to be mutually associated or arranged, and i t  in­
cludes the transfom at ions from one to another perceptual category 
that phenanena appear to undergo as th e ir mutual associations change. 
These discriminations of phenomena and process are our percepts, as 
psychologists have called them.
With regard to "culture," Goodenough (1963:258-265) writes:
All that we can see of a culture is  i t s  products or a r t i fa c ts ,  the 
things people make, do, and say. Because we are able to make in fer­
ences about a c u ltu re 's  content only through the study of i t s  a r t i ­
fac ts , we rather easily  confuse i t  with than;...anthropologists
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frequently define culture as the shared products of human learning. 
More precisely these may be said to comprise: (1) The ways in
which people have organized th e ir  experience of the rea l world so 
as to give i t  structure as a phenomenal world of forms, that is ,  
th e ir  precepts and concepts. (2) The ways in which people have 
organized th e ir  experience of th e ir  phenomenal world so as to give 
i t  structure as a system of cause and effect relationships, that is ,  
the propositions and beliefs by which they explain events and de­
sign tac tic s  for accomplishing th e ir purposes. (3) The ways in 
vhich people have organized th e ir  experience of th e ir  phenomenal 
vrorld so as to structure i t s  various arrangements in hierarchies of 
preference, that is ,  th e ir  value or sentiment system. These pro­
vide the principles for selecting and establishing purpose and 
for keeping oneself purposefully oriented in a changing phenomenal 
world. (4) The ways in  \diich people have organized th e ir  experience 
of th e ir  past efforts to accomplish recurring purposes into opera­
tional procedures for accomplishing these puiposes in the future, 
that i s ,  a set of 'grammatical' principles of action and a series 
of recipes for accomplishing particu lar ends. They include opera­
tional procedures for dealing with people as well as for dealing 
with material things.
In a sim ilar vein Sturtevant (1964:99) s ta te s , " . . . a  culture i t ­
se lf amounts to the sum of a given society 's folk c lassifica tions, a l l  
of that society 's ethnoscience, i t s  particu lar ways of classifying i t s  
material and social universe." Tyler (1969:3) adds:
Cultures are not material phenomena; they are cognitive organizations 
of m aterial phenomena. Consequently, cultures are neither described 
by mere arb itrary  l i s t s  of anatanical t r a i ts  and in stitu tions such 
as house type, family type, kinship type, economic type, and person­
a li ty  type, nor are they necessarily equated with some over-all 
integrative pattern of these phenomena.
Frake (1964:133), echoing Goodenough, Sturtevant, and Tyler, con­
ceives of culture in  terms of a system of communicable codes by which the 
bearers of a particu lar culture make sense of the world around them. 
Concerning the "code" conception, D'Andrade and Rcsnney (1964b:231) write:
In saying that the primary in te rest of anthropologists who are studying 
cognition consists of socially  learned codes, we are not implying 
that codes are the primary type of data for a l l  anthropologists. 
However, i f  "culture" were to be defined within the communicative 
vocabulary, perhaps 'code', rather than ' signal' or ' infoim ation,' 
describes most accurately what most anthropologists in tu itive ly  
feel is  the proper object of study.
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Perhaps the most often quoted cognitivist defin ition  of culture 
is  found in Goodenough’s (1957:167-168) "Cultural Anthropology and 
Linguistics":
A society’s culture consists of whatever i t  is  one has to know or 
believe in  order to operate in  a manner acceptable to i t s  members, 
and to do so in  any role tha t they accept for any one of themselves.
I t  is  the foms of things that people have in mind, the ir models of 
perceiving, rela ting , and otherwise interpreting than.
The cogn itiv is ts’ notion of culture can be more fu lly  understood 
by a discussion of the ir views concerning the nature and aims of ethno­
graphy, the description of a culture. I feel that an insight into the 
temper of cognitive anthropology is  offered by the fact th a t, with the 
exception of Goodenough's relevant chapters in his Cooperation in  Change, 
the concept of culture (as well as the concept of cognition) is  more often 
assumed, in aspects more favorable to  the goals of cognitive anthropology, 
than demonstrated.
With regard to the aims of ethnography, Frake (1964:132-133) notes:
Ethnography. . .  is  a discipline which seeks to account for the be­
havior of a people by describing the socially acquired and shared 
knowledge, or culture, that enables members of the society to 
behave in ways deaned appropriate by th e ir  fellows. The discipline 
is  akin to lingu istics; indeed, descriptive lingu istics is  but a 
special case of ethnography since i t s  domain of study, speech 
messages, is  an integral part of a larger domain of socially  
interpretable acts and a r tifa c ts . I t  is  th is  to ta l  donain of 
’messages’ (including speech) that is  the concern of the ethno­
grapher. The ethnographer, like the lingu ist, seeks to describe 
an in fin ite  set of variable messages as manifestations of a f in ite  
shared code, the code being a set of rules for the socially  appropri­
ate construction and interpretation of messages.
In "Cultural Anthropology and L inguistics," Goodenough (1957:167-168)
writes concerning ethnography:
Ethnographic descrip tion.. .requires methods of processing observed 
phenomena such that we can inductively construct a theory of how 
our informants have organized the same phenomena. I t  is  the 
theory, not the phencmena alone, which ethnographic description 
aims to present.
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In his Cooperation in Change, Goodenough (193:284) adds:
Ethnographic method in anthropology is  necessarily concerned with 
developing techniques for allowing an anthropologist to have the 
range and kinds of experience needed for constructing a v a lid  model 
of a public culture within the constraints imposed by time and by 
his not having been bom and reared a member of the community under 
study.
A valid  ethnography, according to Tyler (1969:5), would answer the 
questions: How would the people of some other culture expect me to be­
have i f  I were a manber of th e ir  culture; and what are the rules of 
appropriate behavior in  th e ir  culture?" Tyler (1969:5) adds:
. . . t h i s  description i t s e l f  constitutes the 'theory* for tha t culture, 
fo r i t  represents the conceptual model of organization used by i t s  
manbers. Such a theory is  validated by our a b ility  to predict how 
these people would expect us to  behave i f  we were members of th e ir 
culture.
In his "A Structural Description of Subanun Religious Behavior"
(1964), Frake (in Tyler, 1969:470) writes:
The problem is  not to sta te  what someone did but to specify the con­
ditions under which i t  is  cu ltu rally  appropriate to anticipate that 
he, or persons occiçying his ro le , w ill render an equivalent per­
formance. This conception of a cultural description implies that 
an ethnography should be a theory of cultural behavior in  a p a r t i ­
cular society, the adequacy of which is  to be evaluated by the 
a b ili ty  of a stranger to the culture to  use the ethnography's 
statements as instructions for appropriately anticipating the scenes 
of the society. I say 'appropriately an tic ipate ' rather than 'p re­
d ic t ' because a fa ilu re  of an ethnographic statement to predict 
correctly  does not necessarily imply descriptive inadequacy as long 
as the members of the described society are as surprised by the 
fa ilu re  as the ethnographer. The te s t  of descriptive adequacy must 
always refer to  informants in terpretations of events, not simply 
to the occurrence of events.
In his paper concerning a program for an ethnography of communi­
cation, Hymes (1964:13-14) writes :
Ethnography here is  conceived in  reference to the various e ffo rts  of 
Conklin, Frake, Goodenough, Metzger, Romney and others to advance the 
techniques of ethnographic work and to conceptualize i t s  goal, such 
that the structural analysis of cultural behavior generally is  viewed 
as the development of theories adequate to  concrete cases, ju s t  as the 
struc tu ra l analysis of behavior as manifestation of a lin g u istic  code
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is  viewed. One way to phrase the underlying outlook is  as a 
question of v a lid i ty .. . analysis of cultural capab ilities  generally 
must determine what sets of features are to  be taken as relevant 
to iden tification  and contrast of cu ltu ral behavior on the part 
of the participants in  same.
The major c rite rion  of va lid ity  for an ethnographic description, 
frcm the cogn itiv is t' s point of view, re flec ts  the dictum of Lévi-Strauss 
(1966:113): "Against the theoretician, the observer should always have 
la s t  word; and against the observer, the native." Colby (1966:12) notes 
tha t with regard to cognitive anthropology, the primary means of establish­
ing descriptive v a lid ity  is  simply informant response. He (Colby, 1966:12) 
adds as an example, "When Hymes speaks of prediction, he means mainly 
an affiim ative informant response to the correct naming of objects in 
the environment showing that the meaning has been attained by the 
investigator." Conklin (in Tyler, 1969:93-94) writes :
C riteria  for evaluating the adequacy of ethnographic statements, 
with reference to the cultural phenanena described, include;
(1) productivity (in terms of appropriate anticipation i f  not 
actual prediction), (2) rep licab ility  or te s ta b ili ty , and (3) 
economy.
The "native orientation" as a foundation for tes ting  and validating 
stands as a diagnostic feature of a l l  recent anthropological studies of 
cognition. This position stems, to  a great degree, from the co g n itiv is ts ' 
view of the role of language in th e ir  studies. Cognitive anthropology 
seeks to reveal how the bearers of a culture c lass ify , categorize, and 
generally make socially  and psychologically significant discriminations 
in the range of th e ir  cu ltu rally  given experience. For the cognitiv ists 
the main evidence for the existence of a category is  the fac t tha t i t  is  
named (Sturtevant, 1964:106).
Tyler (1964:6) s ta tes:
...we are interested in the mental codes of other peoples, but how 
do we infer these mental processes? Thus fa r , i t  has been assumed
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th a t the easiest entry to such processes is  through language, and 
most of the recent studies have sought to  discover codes that are 
mapped in  language. Nearly a l l  of th is  work has been concerned 
with how other peoples 'name' the 'th ings' in  th e ir  environment 
and how these names are organized into larger groupings. These 
names are thus both an index to  wliat is  significant in  the environ­
ment of some other people, and a means of discovering how these 
people organize th e ir  perceptions. Naming is  seen as one of the 
chief methods fo r imposing order on perception.
Goodenough (1963:148) examines his notion of the importance of
language in  cognitive studies in the following excerpt from his
Cooperation in Change.
Our language provides us with a set of behavioral precepts that 
serve as a code for our other precepts. I t  enables us to  reduce 
the rest of experience to  a set of coded itans and propositions 
about them. By substituting one item of the code for another in 
various propositions, we can symbolically create new arrangements 
of phenomena by analogy with old ones, new arrangements that we
have not experienced d irec tly  a t a l l  Such analogies bring us to
new discernments that we have not perceived in  d irect experience 
but have conceived as products of the manipulation of coded exper­
ience. These products, our concepts, may be perceivable in sensory 
experience or may remain, like  one's more remote ancestors or like  
the ether of the nineteenth-century physics, things Wiose existence 
can be postulated but never d irectly  observed. Our concepts, once 
coded as part of our language, can be manipulated along with our 
precepts to produce even more concepts.
In his a r tic le  "Notes on Queries in Ethnography," Frake (1964:133)
sta tes :
There are a varie ty  of methods one might use to discover those aspects 
of cultural situations relevant to rendering appropriate perfom ances...  
The method considered here attends to the way people ta lk  about what 
they do. Since the knowledge tha t enables one to behave appropriately 
is  acquired from other people, i t  must be communicable in some symbolic 
system which can travel between one mind and another as code signals 
in a physical diannel. The procedures of th is  paper seek to reveal 
the knowledge tha t is  communicated by talking. This may not include 
everything a person knows Wiich is  relevant to  his cultural perform­
ances, but i t  w ill certain ly  include a sizable chunk of i t .
Regarding the basic assumptions of cognitive anthropology,
Lounsbury (1963:570) w i t  es:
The referen tia l c lass ifica tion  made through lexicon often vary 
strik ing ly  from language to language and are seen to exhibit c la ss if i-  
catory principles in  d ifferen t languages. I t  is  posited that the
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principles of referen tia l c lassifica tion  embodied in  lexical usage 
in a given speech community bear some re la tion  to th e ir  rela tive  
u t i l i ty  in  communication in  that community and to the frequency 
with which the distinctions implied by them are of crucial s ig n ifi­
cance. This, in  turn, i t  is  posited, may be a function of the 
ways in  which a people's social interaction and th e ir  a c tiv itie s  
in  re la tion  to th e ir  natural and man-made environment are organized.
Some of the best cases in  support of th is  hypothesis come from 
special vocabularies such as those of kinship systons, numeration, 
ethnobotanical, ethnozoological, and ehtncmeteorological terminology, etc.
The importance of language to cognitive anthropology goes much 
further than the above, which is  obvious when the cognitiv ist notion of 
the nature of culture and the objectives of ethnography are considered. 
Language (more correctly , speech) as the subject matter of structural 
lin g u istics , perhaps the single most mportant stimulus to the develop­
ment of cognitive anthropology, and new approaches in  semantics more 
significantly  exhibit and explain the cognitiv ists ' abiding concern with 
language. When the basic concepts and methods of cognitive anthropology 
are discussed in  a la te r  portion of th is  section, the heritage of 
structural lingu istics w ill appear more clearly. A th is  point i t  w ill 
be advantageous to  examine exactly what the cognitivist mean when they 
claim an in terest in  the ethnographic study of meaning. When discussing 
ethnographic semantics, Colby (1966:3) states:
Ethnographic semantics can be defined...as the study of those aspects 
of meaning in  a language which are culturally  revealing. I t  is 
directed toward words as a means rather than an end. The ultimate 
goal is  an understanding of the evaluations, emotions, and beliefs
that l i e  behind word usage The a ttrac tion  given to  minute deta ils
of meaning relationships marks a new phase in  descriptive ethnography.
The techniques are popular because they show promise of solving the 
problem of ethnographic selec tiv ity ; that i s , they may lead to 
psychologically meaningful elements of a culture which are analogous 
to psychologically meaningful elements of a language (e.g. phonemes).
Two works by Charles W. Nforris, Foundations of the Theory of 
Signs (1938) and Signs, Language, and Behavior (1946), have been of p a rti­
cular significance in giving the cognitivists a terminological systan for
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indicating precisely which aspects of lingu istic  behavior hold th e ir  con-
cem. Osgood (1963:245) quotes I4orris (1946) from Signs, Language, and
Behavior with regard to a defin ition  of language:
What is  language? Morris has suggested five necessary c r i te r ia :
We have a language when (1) a p lu ra lity  of arb itrary  signs (2) having 
a common or shared significance to a group of individuals (3) regard­
less of the situation  in  which they are used (4) can be produced by 
these individuals as well as received and (5) together constitute 
a system following certain  rules of combination. When ever the 
stimuli received or the responses produced sa tis fy  these c r i te r ia , 
the psychologist can say he is  studying 'verbal' behavior.
Floyd G. Lounsbury (1956:158) in his a r tic le , "A Semantic Analysis
of the Pawnee Kinship Usage," writes :
A well known fom ulation (of the to ta l context surrounding a 
lingu istic  event) is  that of Charles W. Morris. For any sign 
system, lingu istic  or other, there are distinguished: (a) the
properties of tlie signs and th e ir systematic relations to each ■, 
other, or 'syn tactics ' ; (b) the relations of the signs to  th e ir  
areas of designation and th e ir  features of sign ification , or 
' semantics';  and (c) the rela tions of these to behavior in  re ­
sponse to signs, or 'pragmatics'.
With regard to the study of language, the f i r s t  area of Morris' 
formulation describes the in te rest of the science of lingu istics  proper.
For Lounsbury (1956:158) lingu istics " . . . i s  limited to the analysis of 
the properties of the signal systems or 'codes' themselves as inferred 
from the structure of messages, while i t  excludes on the one hand the 
primary nonlinguistic stimuli which prompt messages or are coded in 
them, and on the other hand also the nonlinguistic responses which the 
messages may evoke." For cognitiv ists, the second and th ird  portions 
of Morris' scheme, "semantics" and "pragmatics", best circumscribe the 
focus of th e ir  study.
The conception of "structure" appears often in the lite ra tu re  of 
cognitive anthropology and in discussions of th is  lite ra tu re . The term 
is  used in  several d ifferent manners; however, the assumption of patterning
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and systematic interrelatedness holds throughout the various uses of the 
tern . Indeed the dedication danonstrated by the cognitiv ists to  formal 
methods of analysis vould be d iff ic u lt to defend without the "systans" 
assumption.
Lounsbury (1959:400) sta tes that semantic structure revealed by 
the methods of cognitive anthropology can best be viewed as a model-- 
"which model in turn comes sa tis fac to rily  close to  being a facsimile or 
exact replica of the empirical data whose interrelatedness and systematic 
nature we are trying to understand" (Lounsbury, in  Tyler, 1969:212).
Colby (1966:3-3), in h is "Ethnographic Semantics: A Preliminary
Survey," writes concerning the concept of "structure":
Structure may mean e ither an overall cognitive systan with an 
encyclopedic world view behind the lingu istic  and semantic elements 
a person carries in  his head, or a sanantic structure that is  inde­
pendent of such a cognitive system. I shall speak mostly of the 
broader conception of structure--that which includes both a seman­
t ic  system and an organized world view.
The teim "structure" is  also sometimes used in the Levi-Straussian
manner of "in fra-structure"--the order behind order, the meaning behind
meaning, etc. Harris (1968:570) sta tes that structure is  the order in  a
system. Further, "structure" occurs in the cognitive lite ra tu re  in the
sense of a "formal" or "logical" account of a certa in  range of eventing.
This approximates the meaning of "structure" u tilize d  by Lounsbury.
With regard to th is  version of the conception of "structure ," Wallace
(1965:247) writes :
A set of sc ien tif ic  propositions about human behavior may be more 
or less ’true ' in  the sense that they yield accurate predictions of 
certain  future events under specified conditions.. .The c lassic  
method of componential analysis enables the ethnographer to simulate 
the taxonomic behavior of h is subjects. A successful simulation 
procedure has what I ca ll ’structural v a lid ity ’ : i t  permits accurate 
prediction of a terminological event because i t  correctly  iden tifies 
sufficient sociological, or other objectively defined, character­
is t ic s  of the reference objects.
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The over-all and self-conscious "native orientation" of cognitive 
anthropology with regard to the structure concept, the culture concept, 
notions of the nature and objectives of ethnography, and the tenor of 
validating procedures for ethnographic descriptions is  typ ically  pre­
sented and discussed by means of the "e tic  vs. emic" d istinction . The 
terns themselves were coined by the lingu ist Kenneth Pike (1954:8) on 
analogy with the "emic" in  phonemic and the "etic" in  phonetic (Harris, 
1968:569). These terns label two d ifferen t approaches to the study of 
human behavior, as well as indicate, according to Pike, the kinds of re ­
su lts  tha t can occur depending on the approach. Bnic analysis produces 
structural resu lts : e tic  analysis, non-structured resu lts .
Emic statements refer to  logico-empirical systems whose phenomenal 
d istinctions or 'th ings ' are b u ilt up out of contrasts and discrim­
inations sign ifican t, meanigful, re a l, or accurate, or in  some 
other fashion regarded as appropriate by the actors themselves...
Etic statements depend upon phenomenal d istinctions judged appropriate 
by the comunity of sc ien tif ic  observers (Harris, 1968:571-575).
The onic approach outlines the methodological objectives of cog­
n itive  anthropology: i t  is  an attempt "to discover and describe the
behavioral system (of a given culture) in  i t s  own teims, identifying not 
only the structu ra l un its but also the structural classes to which they 
belong" (French, 1963:398). Traditional ethnography, according to  the 
cogn itiv is t, exemplifies an e tic  approach to the description of culture 
(Sturtevant, 1964:102).
To summarize to th is  point: fo r cognitive anthropology, culture 
is  identified  with cognition, and thus i t s  focus is  in the minds of the 
bearers of the culture in  question. Ethnography is  conceived of as the 
discovery of the conceptual models with which a society operates. "Eth­
nographic descrip tion .. .requires methods of processing observed phenomena 
such tha t we can inductively construct a theory of how our infoimants
21
have organized the same phenomena" (Goodenough, 1957:168). Descriptive 
v a lid ity  is  insured, according to the cogn itiv is ts , by infoimant response. 
Language, therefore, is  the c r i t ic a l  avenue of access to the conceptual 
models which are the objectives of the cogn itiv ists . The means of access 
through language to the relevant conceptual models is  achieved by the 
cognitiv ists by a p a rtia l use of the lingu istic  model energized by methods 
of foimal analysis, or logical operations, gleaned from recent advances 
in such areas as set theory (a calculus of the relations between groups 
of elonents), game theory, communications theory, Boolean algebra (an 
algebraic calculus for stating  logical relationships among classes, sanan- 
t ic s , cybernetics, and topology.
The application of the lin g u istic  model in the quest for cognitive 
models is  fa c ilita te d  by a notion of language as a codable communicative 
event of wide extension G a rris , 1938:1946; Osgood, 1963). As noted, i t  
includes a stress on "semantics" and "pragmatics," in Morris’s sense.
The methods of cognitive anthropology are rationalized by adherence to 
the lingu istic  model as parameter guide and aim at discovering "...psycho­
logically  meaningful elements of a culture which are analogous to psycho­
logically  meaningful elements of a language (e .g ., phonemes). . . " (Colby, 
1966:3). Goodenough (1956:196) adds:
I t  is  an object of lingu istic  analysis by systanatically  examining 
the mutual d istribu tion  (in recorded speech) of the acoustical 
phenomena as phonetically noted, to produce the most adequate possible 
theory as to what are the language’s phonemes, i t s  elementary phono­
logical components.
Claude Lévi-Strauss (in Manners and Kaplan, 1968:532), a leading 
advocate of the u tiliz a tio n  of the methods and assumptions of structural 
lingu istics in  the solution of certain  kinds of "sociological" problems, 
writes :
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In the study of kinship problems (and, no doubt, the study of other 
problems as w ell), the anthropologist finds himself in  a situation  
which formally resembles that of the structural lingu ist. Like 
phonemes, kinship teims are elements of meaning; like  phonemes, they 
acquire meaning only i f  they are integrated into a system. 'Kinship 
systems,' like 'phonemic systems,' are b u ilt by the mind on the level 
of unconscious thought.. .Tlie problem can therefore be formulated as 
follows: Although they belong to  another order of re a lity , kinship 
phenomena are of the same type as lingu istic  phenomena. Can the 
anthropologist, using a method analogous in form ( if  not in content) 
to the method used in  structural lin g u istics , achieve the same kind 
of progress in his own science as that which has taken place in 
linguistics?
The cognitiv ists, of course, answer in  the affirmative.
As noted above, cognitivists u til iz e  methods of formal analysis 
and aim a t delivering a formal account of th e ir  subject matter. Formal 
analysis is  directed to the description of cultural phenomena in unambig­
uous culture-free language and the demonstration of relationships with 
precision and parsimony. Concerning ''formal accounts," Lounsbury (in 
Tyler, 1969:212), in his a rtic le  "A Formal Account of the Crow- and 
Omaha-Type Kinship Terminologies" (1964), writes :
We may consider that a 'formal account' of a collection of empirical 
data has been given when there have been specified (1) a set of 
primitive elements, and (2) a set of rules for operating on these, 
such that by the application of the la t te r  to the former, the elements 
of a 'model' are generated; which model in turn comes sa tis fac to rily  
close to being a facsimile or exact replica of the empirical data 
whose interrelatedness and systematic nature we are trying to under­
stand. A formal account is  thus an apparatus for predicting back 
the data at hand, thereby making them 'understandable,' i . e . ,  
showing them to be the lawful and expectable consequences of an 
underlying principle that may be presumed to  be at work at th e ir 
source.
ly ie r  (1969:191) notes with respect to formal analysis:
A formal analysis presumes that the i t  ans to be analyzed are part 
of some legitimate sonantic domain, and that the data are adequately 
described. Formal analysis is  basically a transla tion  procedure.
I t  seeks to explain the sanantic features of one language (the target 
language) by reference to  features whose values are known in some 
other language (the reference language). The aim of formal analysis 
is  to  discover and sta te  the re la tion  of features in the reference 
language as parsimoniously as possible. Since the features available
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in the reference language, th is  is  a two step procedure which en tails: 
(1) lis tin g  the features of the reference language relevant to each 
semantic category of the language to he translated: (2) elimination
of redundant features in  the reference language. A th ird  step (is) 
the arrangement of fea tu res ...
The f i r s t  step in  the application of formal, or logical analytic 
techniques as used by cognitivists is  to determine the domain or particu lar 
universe of discourse to viiich the formal methods w ill be applied. Kay 
(1966:20) sta tes:
...we assume.. . that a basic problem of ethnographic semantics is  the 
following; given a f in ite  set of lexical units ('lexemes') that share 
some feature of meaning, we say (a) that the set of lexemes form a 
domain and (b) that our task is  to discover something about the formal 
pattern of meanings underlying the domain.
Every w riter in the f ie ld  of cognitive anthropology is  compelled 
to explicate what he intends by the conception of "domain," perhaps the 
most crucial notion in  the cognitiv ists ' program. All methods and tech­
niques of cognitive anthropology are subsequent to  the determination of 
domain. Tyler (1969:8) writes :
A semantic domain consists of a class of objects a ll  of which share 
a t least one feature in common viiich d ifferen tia tes them from other 
semantic domains. Chairs, sofas, desks, end tab les, and dining 
tab les, have in common the designation 'fu rn itu re '.
Conklin (1954, 1962) and Lounsbury (1956) use the term "segregate
set" instead of "domain" and sta te  that a terminologically distinguished
array of objects is  a segregate, and that segregates represent categories.
Colby (1966:7) writes :
A ' lexical se t ' can be defined rigorously as a group of contrastive 
words with a defining feature (or component) in common... I shall use 
the word 'domain' to indicate the conceptualized re a lity  designated 
by the lexical se t--the  semantic range...By concentrating on a domain 
(e .g ., kinship) we keep meaning rather tlian word form foremost and 
exclude those meanings of the word forms that f a i l  outside the 
(kinship) domain...A domain considered in terms of i ts  conceptual 
structure may be called a semantic fie ld .
A domain, then, is  a labeled grouping of "things" that are assumed.
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largely because o£ the label, to be of a kind. Some of the domains in ­
vestigated by researchers in cognitive anthropology include kinship cate­
gories, color categoris, botanical categories, firewood categories, and 
disease categories. However, collecting the lexemes which correspond to 
the segregates of a particu lar domain presents only the beginning of th is  
kind of formal analysis. Cognitive anthropologists are in terested in 
generating emicized accounts of cognition. They therefore seek to d is ­
cover how one knows that such and such an "object" belongs to a certain  
domain: that A does or does not belong to category B.
I t  is a t th is  point that the sp ir i t  of structural lingu istics
forcefully appears in  the form of the notion of contrast, d istinc tive
features, binary opposition, and components. As Colby (1966:6) explains:
Phonemes are considered in re la tion  to other phonemes in terms of 
negative or opposing characteristics. Phoneme /x / d iffe rs  from 
phoneme /y / in a d ifferent way than i t  d iffers from phoneme /z / .  
Concepts, too, have th is  characteristic . Basic meaning resides in 
differences among concepts more than in any special inherent quality 
of the concepts themselves. This has recently been re-emphasized 
in  the analysis of contrast sets and in componential analysis.
Tyler (1969:32) notes:
In a situation  in which a person is  making a public decision about 
the category manbership of an object by giving the object a verbal 
label, he is selecting a term out of a set of a lternatives, each 
with class i f  icatory import. Wlien he asserts "This is an X," he is  
also stating tha t i t  is  not specific other things, these other 
things being not everything else conceivable, but only the a lterna­
tives among which a decision was made.. .Those cu ltu rally  appropriate 
responses which are d istinc tive  alternatives in the same kinds of 
situations--or, in lingu istic  parlance, which occur in the same 
' environment' - - can be said to contrast. A series of terminologically 
contrasted segregates forms a contrast set.
Pursuing Tyler’s (1969:8) example noted above, i t  can be said that 
chairs, sofas, desks, end tab les, and dining tables have in common the 
designation "furniture;" the domain is  the domain of "furn itu re ." The 
problem, however, is to discover how the segregates in the domain maintain
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th e ir  terminological autonomy while remaining legitim ate members of the 
same domain. IVhat are the c r i t ic a l  differences between a chair and a 
tab le, for example? I t  can be noted that chairs d iffer from tables by 
the presence of two a ttr ib u te s , a seat and a back, and the absence of a 
top. These underlying features are "components" or "features" of 
meaning, and, as Tyler notes, they are some of the dimensions of meaning 
underlying the general domain of "fu rn itu re ."  Each segregate (chair, in 
th is  example) can be defined as a d is tinc tive  bundle of components 
(Frake, in Tyler, 1969:36) or features of meaning (Tyler, 1969:8).
Cognitivists seek to describe the formal pattern or the precise
nature of the semantic arrangements or structures which are assumed to
form the meaning-foundation of a domain. Tyler (1969:25) writes:
. .  .we nest discover tha t method of arrangement which provides the 
best statement of re la tionsh ip s.. .our concern is  only with re la tio n ­
ships among fac ts  which can be demonstrated to  comprise a single 
domain.. .We are interested only in  the question of internal ordering. 
Since i t  is  evident that there are a great number of possible 
semantic features, vhich may enter into a varie ty  of re la tions with 
one another, i t  might be supposed tha t orderings too are exceedingly 
diverse. This statement is  true insofar as i t  pertains to the over­
a l l  organization of a semantic domain. Yet, i t  is  paradoxical that 
these diverse organizations appear to re su lt from re la tiv e ly  few 
principles of ordering. The principles of ordering which cognitive 
anthropologists have so fa r  dealt with most frequently are:
(1) taxonomies; (2) paradigms ; (3) trees.
Segregates within a domain may be semantically in terrelated  in 
various ways. "The kind of relationship between segregates which has so 
far received the most a tten tion  is  that of inclusion; segregates rela ted  
in th is  way form a taxonomy--a folk taxonomy in the case of folk c la s s i­
fication" (Sturtevant, 1964:110).
Frake (1963, in  Manners and Kaplan, 1968:511) writes:
Segregates in  d ifferen t contrast sets...m ay be related by inclusion. 
A system of contrast se ts  so rela ted  is  a taxonomy; th is  defin ition  
does not require a taxonomy to have a unique beginner, i . e . ,  a
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segregate viiich includes a l l  other segregates in the system. I t  
requires only that the segregates a t the most inclusive level form 
a demonstrable contrast set.
With regard to  the concept of "taxonomy," Colby (1966:21) sta tes:
A lex ical domain may be analyzed with or without reference to the 
dimensions of meaning (and th e ir component features) that underlie 
i t .  When an attempt to describe the underlying dimensions e ither is  
not made or is  not successful, the semantic analysis is  not properly 
speaking, componential. In th is  case, the major concept ordinarily  
used to  represent ' something about the formal pattern of meaning 
underlying the domain* is  the notion of inclusion of reference not 
absence of component ia l  definitions is  the distinguishing feature of 
taxonomy.. .A characteristic  of a l l  taxonomies is  that they contain 
levels of contrast.
Tyler (1969:7-10) adds:
...we subjectively groip the phenomena of our perceptual world into 
named classes. These classes are ro t disparate and singular. They 
are organized into larger groupings. To the extent that these 
groupings are hierarchiacally arranged by a process of inclusion, 
they form a taxonomy.. .two processes characteristic  of taxonomies:
(1) items a t the same level contrast with one another; (2) items at 
d ifferen t levels are rela ted  by inclusion. At the bottom level are 
the more highly discriminated classes, at the top is  the most inclu­
sive c lass...A  taxonomy typically  asserts that items in lower levels 
are kinds of items in higher levels.
In a taxonomic arrangement, segregates a t the same taxonomic 
level contrast. However, when they are included in the next more inclu­
sive level of the taxonomy they appear to be more alike. As Tyler 
(1969:26) notes, " . . . th e re  must be some reason behind th is  a rb itrary  
neutralization of difference a t higher levels. In general, th is  corres­
ponds to our in tu ition  that certain  things go together because they 
share some underlying elements." The semantic arrangement termed the 
"paradigm" accomplishes the task of identifying significant defin itive  
features of meaning within a domain.
A paradigm is  a set of segregates which can be partitioned by 
features of meaning, i . e . , a se t some members of which share features 
not shared by other segregates in the same set (Sturtevant, 1964:108).
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Contrasting "taxoncmical" and "paradimatic" arrangements w ill aid in 
revealing th e ir  d istinc tive  structures. The example which follow are 
a fte r  Tyler (1969:9-10).
TAXONOMY OF "LIVESTOCK"
ca ttle horse sheep swine
cow mare ewe sow
bull sta llio n ra%i boar
steer gelding wether barrow
heifer f i l ly lamb g il t
calf co lt shoat
foal p ig let
PARADIGM OF FEATURES FOR "IDRSE" AND "SWINE"
SEX
MALE(f FEMALE 9 NEUTER̂
Adult s ta llio n  H mare H




e adolescent f i l ly  H barrow P
1 M-2 g i l t  P
child co lt H
M-3 shoat P
baby foal H
M-4 p ig le t P
Because th is  diagram exhibits a t least two major features (maturity 
and sex) which in tersect, i t  is  a paradigm. "Features are paradigmati- 
cally  arranged when they are: (1) multiple; (2) in tersect (Tyler, 1969:10)."
As noted above, a taxonomy arranges i ts  components by contrast and inclusion;
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i t s  components are mapped hierarchically . A paradigm orders i t s  compo­
nents in terms of simultaneous intersection. Both a taxonomy and a 
paradigm, however, order th e ir  components on the basis of sameness and 
difference.
fau l Kay [1966:21] notes:
The semantic structure of a domain is  characterized by a perfect 
paradigm i f  and only i f  each componential defin ition corresponds to 
a unique minimal c lassifica tion  event, and conversely. . .  Perfect 
paradigms have zero redundancy in the sense that a change in  a 
single feature of a componential defin ition changes i t  into the 
componential defin ition  of another lexeme in the domain. I t  is  
probably for th is  reason tha t perfect paradigms are empirically 
rare.
The example used of the paradigm of features for "horse" and 
"swine" is  not a perfect paradigm in  Kay's sense because, for example.
"BiM-3" and "Ppn-3" are both componential definitions of the lexeme "shoat." 
In th is instance zero redundancy is  not achieved.
"In polar opposition to the minimally redundant (paradigmatic) 
system of feature defin itions, there is  a maximally redundant system in 
idiich no two conponential definitions contrast on more than one dimen­
sion" (Kay, 1966:21). This type of semantic arrangement is  called a 
"tree ."  Tyler (1969:26,10) writes :
. . .th e  features in a tree  do not in tersect one another simultaneously 
and they contrast on only one dimension at a time. Relationships 
in a tree  are expressed as dichotomous oppositions selected one a t 
a tim e.. .Unlike a paradigm, the features of a tree  do not in te rsec t, 
and unlike a taxonomy items a t lower levels are not included in 
higher level.
A tree  requires representation by a semantic key or branching 
structure where the f i r s t  node indicates the "root" or domain feature, 
and each succeeding node represents a selection of a single feature from 
some particu lar dimension (Kay, 1966:22).
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Livestock
c a t t le '^  —horse
cow bull mare sfa llio n
KEY DIAGRAM OF IHE TREE STRUCTURE
Kay (1966:20) makes the following in teresting  point concerning
when and why the various semantic arrangements discussed above are
u tilized  by the analyst of a particu lar domain.
IVhen the feature definitions of a l l  the lexemes are known, the basic 
problem fo r representing the cognitive structure of the domain is  
to decide Wiether, or to what extent, informants apply the semantic 
dimensions simultaneously as against sequentially ...Ihe  sinplest 
and most elegant formal structure consonant with a psychological 
theory of simultaneous application of dimensions is  the paradigm...  
Paradigms can also be represented by keys, but there is  no reason 
to  represent them unless there is  behavioral--as contrasted to 
linguistic-cultural--evidence tha t the dimensions are in  fact applied 
sequentially.
The mapping of a domain in  which the conceptual segmentation and 
hierarchical levels are indicated by lexical un its  is  a preliminary step 
for another, more detailed , analysis in which the relevant ( i .e . ,  domain 
related) sign ification  of each unit on a given level is  analyzed into 
conponents or d istinc tive  features (Colby, 1966:8). This kind of opera­
tion is  called "conponential analysis." Regarding conponential analysis, 
Paul Kay (1966:20) writes:
Componential analysis is  best conceived as an analytic process in 
which the investigator searches for (1) the dimensions of meaning 
underlying the domain and (b) the mapping of the values on these 
dimensions (the features of meaning) onto the set of lexemes. The 
process of looking for these mappings is  not to  be confused with 
particu lar types of such mappings such as paradigm and tree .
The f i r s t  use of componential analysis in cognitive anthropology 
was by Goodenough (1956) and Lounsbury (1956). The domain of kinship 
has been the realm most often attacked by cognitiv ists u tiliz in g  th is  
method. Wallace and Atkins (1960:60) note that the conponential analysis
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of a kinship lexicon commonly consists of the following steps:
(1) the recording of a complete set (or a defined sub-set) of the 
terms of reference or address, using various boundry-setting c r i te r ia , 
such as a constant syntactic context, a type of pragmatic situa tion , 
or common inclusion within the extension of a cover tern  for ’kins­
men’ ; (2) the defin ition  of these terns in  the trad itiona l kin-type 
notions ( i .e . .  Fa, FaBr, DaHuBr, e tc ); (3) the iden tifica tion , in 
the principles of grouping of kin-types, of two or more conceptual 
dimensions each of whose values ( ’components’) is  signified  (not 
connoted) by one or more of the terns; (4) the defin ition  of each 
tern  by means of a symbolic notation, as a specific combination or 
se t of combinations, of the coTii;onents; (5) a statement of the 
semantic relationship among the terns and of the structural prin­
ciples of th is  terminological system. ( I t  should be noted here tha t 
the semantic structure of the teiminological systan is  only one 
aspect of the ’kinship system’ of a society. The semantic structure 
to  which we re fe r is  a structure of the logical relationships of 
defin itional meanings among terns and does not pretend to  describe 
such phenomena as m arital exchange, or authority  re la tions.)
Sturtevant (1964:109) offers the following description of the
method of componential analysis:
A componential analysis is  an analysis of a paradigm in terms of 
the defining features, the 'dimensions of contrast' or 'c r i te r ia !  
a ttr ib u te s ’ of the segregates in the se t. The aim is  to discover 
the 'ru le  for distinguishing newly encountered specimens of (a) cate- 
goiy from contrasting a lte rna tives’ (Frake, 1963:512). The procedure 
is  to search for the minimum features of meaning which d iffe ren tia te  
segregates in  the se t. Each feature has two or more contrasting 
values, teimed 'components’. Each segregate is  then defined in terms 
of the presence or irrelevance of each component; i . e . ,  a bundle of 
components defines the segregates. I t  is  noimally assumed that 
the nunber of segregates they define. Tiie paradigm may then be 
viewed as a multidemensional structure , in which the categories 
are placed according to  the componential dimensions.
Componential analysis, a formal method of description f i r s t  developed 
by lin g u is ts , is  applied, for example, to the study of kinship terminology 
to produce descriptions that are abstract, s truc tu ra l, and formally elegant. 
The immediate product of such a terminological analysis is  a series of 
componential defin itions. What is  revealed by a structural analysis of 
these componential defir''tions i s ,  to paraphrase Romney and D’Andrade 
(1964a:152), based on " ta s te , previous knowledge of the systan, empliasis 
on core kin types, and other fac to rs."
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Colby (1966:8-9) notes that beyond b e tte r semantic specification, 
the purpose of componential analysis is  to  find conceptual units (Good- 
enough, 1956) or to reveal the structure of the logical calculus which 
is  snployed in  the given taxonomy associated with the terms (Wallace, 1962). 
Another objective, mentioned by Lounsbury, is  to discover the structure 
of non-linguistic behavior. Goodenough and Wallace onphasize psycholog­
ical correlates in  componential analysis while Lounsbury speaks more 
of sociological correlates. An additional p o ss ib ility  in componential 
analysis is  to go beyond the conceptual d istinctions embodied in a set 
of lex ical items to concepts that are not lex ica lly  objectivized 
(Goodenough, 1956). A further p o ss ib ility , implied in the paper by 
Wallace and Atkins, "The Meaning of Kinship Teims" (1960), is  the 
fa c ilita tio n  of hypotheses testing . In th is  instance, Wallace and Atkins 
performed a componential analysis of /merican-English kin terms to te s t ,  
as one facet of th e ir  to ta l problem the hypothesis that the dimensions 
of sex, generation, and lin e a lity  would be suffic ien t to define componen- 
t ia l ly  a ll  the terms in the kinship domain under study.
How is  the data u tiliz e d  by the cognitiv ist acquired? Discussions
of th is  problem area usually f a l l  under the rubric "Discovery Procedures"
or "E liciting  Procedures." Sturtevant (1964:111) notes :
Since the etlm oscientific method aims a t discovering cu ltu rally  
relevant discriminations and categorizations, i t  is  essential that 
the discovery procedures themselves be relevant to the culture under 
investigation .. . I f  an ethnography is  to re flec t the cognitive system 
of the bearers of a culture, the v a lid ity  of the description depends 
on the discovery procedures.
"Working with informants, one can leam  scmething of the boundaries 
and dimensions of synonyms or related  words by d istribu tional frame-and- 
substitution techniques" (Colby, 1966:11). Another e lic itin g  method
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u tiliz e s  deliberate error by the ethnographer in  naming stimulus objects 
in  order to  evoke corrections from the informant which presumably w ill 
occur a t the same contrast level as the erroneously used lexeme (Frake, 
1963). The e lic itin g  procedures used by cognitivists are self-consciously 
aimed a t eliminating ethnographer bias by discovering how the bearers of 
a culture ask questions, make corrections, and, in general, ta lk  about 
a particu lar category of "objects" which the ethnographer assumes is 
a cu ltu rally  valid  domain.
The major th rust in  the development of rigorous discovery pro­
cedures by cognitivists is  concerned with discovering emically appropriate 
questions related to  a particu lar domain. Brake's explication of in te r­
linked topics and responses of queries in  Subanun is  an excellent example 
(Sturtevant, 1964:112).
Sarles (1963) describes a related  procedure, in the case applied to 
Tzotzil, for identifying questions and th e ir responses in  conversa­
tional tex ts, determining acceptable permutations of the questions, 
and manipulating these to discover classes of appropriate responses.
Tyler (1969:12-13) makes the following comment vhen discussing
controlled e lic itin g :
Controlled e lic itin g  u tiliz e s  sentence frames derived from the 
language of the people being studied. The aim of such e lic itin g  is 
to enable the etimographer to behave lingu istica lly  in ways appro­
p ria te  to the culture he is  studying. This involves the use of 
lingu istica lly  correct questions which re la te  concepts meaningful 
in that cu ltu re .. .Controlled e l ic i t in g .. . is  designed to provide 
the ethnographer with not only the answers, but also to a ss is t him 
in discovering the relevant questions. I t  clearly  derives from 
the fac t that the questioning process is  i t s e l f  the dominant factor 
in sc ien tific  investigation. îïhere the procedures and resu lts  of 
controlled e lic itin g  are contained in the report, two things are 
achieved; (1) there is  an exp licit record of how the data were 
gathered; (2) a public record of the resu lts is  available.
Black and Metzger (1956:145) add:
I t  is  basic to communication theory that you don't s ta r t  getting any
infoimation from an utterance or event u n til you know what i t  is  in
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response to--you must know what question is  being answered. I t  
could be said of ethnography that u n til you know the question that 
someone in  the culture is  responding to you can’t  know many things 
about the response. Yet the ethnographer is  greeted, in the f ie ld , 
with an array of responses. He needs to know what question people 
are answering in  the ir every act.
Metzger and Williams, in a series of papers published between 
1962 and 1963, have stressed the discovery, selection, and use of ques­
tion "frames" appropriate fo r e lic itin g  specific folk c lassifications 
(Sturtevant, 1964:112). They emphasize the recording of both the ques­
tion and the response by the f ie ld  researcher. With regard to the work 
of Metzger and Williams in  th is  area, Colby (1966:11) writes :
A method developed by Metzger and Williams, modelled to sane ex­
ten t on programmed learning techniques, aims a t reducing ambiguity 
and ethnographic bias by forcing the ethnographer systanatically 
to leam  correct word usage in a specified demain of the language.
The ethnographer’s question (eliciting  frame) comes from previously 
recorded native textual m aterials, to insure tha t the phrasing is  
indigenous. The process, in the form of verbatum statements of 
both ethnographer and infoimant, is  presented as evidence so that 
the reader can judge for him self.. .the exact questions put to the 
infoimant are added to the record of his answers.
In th is  chapter I have attempted to develop a type statement of 
the f ie ld  of cognitive anthropology by describing concepts, methods, and 
assumptions generic to th is  approach. To th is  end I have avoided d is­
cussion which employed specific ethnographic examples from the various 
cognitive studies. I t  should also be noted that no single cognitive 
study employs a ll  the notions and methods presented in  th is  chapter. All 
studies in cognitive anthropology, however, make use of a sim ilar con­
ception of culture, the objectives of ethnography, and the c r it ic a l im­
portance of lingu istic  techniques. Further differences in th is  fie ld  
appear specifically  with regard to the problem of the psychological 
va lid ity  of the products of componential analysis. Other problems of 
th is  kind w ill be discussed in  teims of a general c ritique in Chapter V.
I l l
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Sturtevant (1964:99), in h is a r tic le  "Studies in Ethnoscience," 
refers to the new approaches in etlu ography, which I have termed in 
blanket fashion cognitive anthropology as "the New Ethnography." As part 
of a general argument against the positions held by "the New Ethnography" 
and in order to point to the long history of many of i t s  most basic notions,
Marvin Harris (1968:597) has called th is  area of in te res t "the new old
ethnography." Both statements approximate a portion of the tru th . There 
are facets of cognitive anthropology which extend new ideas and methods in 
the pursuits of ethnographic description: there are also features of cog­
n itive anthropology which are ancient in  the history of the f ie ld s  of 
sociology and anthropology. In th is  chapter I w ill indicate seme of the 
sources vhich doubtless contributed to the development of the contemporary 
sub-field of cognitive anthropology. In th is  manner I hope to distinguish 
what is  new from vdiat is  old in  cognitive anthropology.
The bundle of ideas, which are now systematically exploited by
cognitive anthropology, includes the notions: (1) that an important
aspect of culture is  made up of the principles by which a people c lassify  
th e ir universe (Sturtevant, 1964:100), (2) that language provides the
main avenue of access to discovering the ways in which the members of a 
particu lar culture perceive and organize th e ir experience^ (3) that a 
valid  ethnography must be an emic ethnography, (4) that the lingu istic  
model affords the best means through which emic accounts may be acquired,
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and (5) tha t cu ltu ral descriptions should be struc tu ra l and synchronic. 
These are some of the core ideas which I w ill a t lea st p a rtia lly  trace 
in  th is  chapter.
Hymes (1964b:12) makes the following in teresting  point:
The transcultural study of cognition is  a thread running through 
the h istory  of thought about mankind. I t  is  concerned with phrasing 
in  one way or another the question, do they and we think the same?
According to Benjamin Lee Whorf, Antoine Fabre d ’Olivet (1768-1825)
must stand as one of the e a r lie s t pioneers in  the lin g u istic  approach to
cognition. Concerning d’O livet, Whorf (in Hymes, 1964c:134) writes:
...one  of those amazing geniuses who baffle  th e ir  contamporaries 
and leave no successors. The real originator of such ideas as 
rapport-systems, covert classes, cryptotypes, psycholinguistic 
patterning, and language as part and parcel of a c u ltu re ...
D’Olivet was a French grammarian who studied Semitic languages.
With regard to  d’O livet’s study of Hebrew, Whorf (in Hymes, 1964c:134) 
s ta tes:
His Hebrew stands on i t s  own fee t as completely as does Boas’
Chinook. He reorganized the treatment of verb conjugations on a 
psycholinguistic basis, considered individual prefixes and suf­
fixes from the standpoint of th e ir  meaning and function, went into 
the semantics of vowel patterns and tlie semantic coloring of vowels...  
Refusing to identify  the le t te r s  of Hebrew writing with the actual 
phonetic elements and yet perceiving that these elements are not 
mere sounds, but stereotyped, codified, and patterned semantic 
sounds, he advanced to a conception of the phoneme, which he called 
the ’sign’ or the ’vocal sign’--struggling with terminology but 
showing real insight into lingu istic  a c tu a l i t ie s . . .Moreover, Fabre 
d ’Olivet thought in an anthropological and not simply a grammatical 
way; to  him, speech was not a ’facu lty ’ exalted on i t s  own perch, 
but something to be understood in  the lig h t of human behavior and 
culture, of which i t  was a p a rt, specialized but involving no 
differen t principle from the re s t. The vocal sign (phoneme) was 
a highly specialized gesture or symbolic ac t, language a develop­
ment of to ta l somatic behavior becoming symbolic and then diverting 
i t s  symbolism more and more into the vocal channel--such is  his 
teaching put into the modern idiom.
Fabre d ’O livet’s Hebrew study. La langue hebraique restituée  (The 
Hebraic tongue restored), was published in  1815. At th is  same time two
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other authors, Claude Henri due de Saint-Simon and h is secretary 
Auguste Comte, were propounding th e ir  philosophy concerning the proper 
method of studying society and social history. D'Olivet was probably 
as greatly  influenced by the tremendous sc ien tif ic  advancanent of the 
time as was Saint-Simon and Comte. I t  should be ranembered that the 
early 19th century was the age from which the b irth  of modem physics, 
chemistry, and biology, as well as sociology can be dated. John Dalton's 
atomic theory was applied to chanistry around 1805. The discovery of 
the transverse wave-motion of ligh t was made in  the f i r s t  decade of the 
1800's. Curler studies the laws of structure in living organisms, and 
Schwann and Schleiden announced the cell-theory of animals and p lan ts-- 
a l l  in  the f i r s t  several decades of the 19th century. The major sc ien ti­
f ic  accomplishments of th is  period, which were reflected  in d 'O livet's  
work, shared certain  common t r a i ts  which were also to be incorporated 
into a science of society by Saint-Simon and Comte. These landmark 
achievements were a l l ,  in Comte's terns, 's ta t ic a l , '  i . e . ,  they were syn­
chronic and structural in  orientation. Furthermore, they depended upon 
a 'p o s i t i f  or sc ien tif ic  method of approach, i . e . ,  they were systematic 
and empirical studies. The organismic analogy, energized no doubt by 
the breakthroughs in  cell-theory aid medicine, offered,according to 
Comte and Saint-Simon, the model by which society might be studied. Comte 
viewed society as being composed of d ifferentiated  interdependent elements 
which functioned together for the rcaintainance of the to ta l organism. 
Saint-Simon observed that industria lization , an econmic process, was 
instigating change in  every aspect of society. In th is  fundamental sense 
structuralism  was bom. D 'Olivet's study of Hebrew also illu s tra te s  an 
early structural and functional approach, both in his conception of the
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's ign ' and in h is notion that language was to  be best understood in  i t s  
in te rre la tion  with human behavior and culture.
Two more notions make Saint-Simon and Comte significant in the 
stream of thought and events which form the background to contotiporary 
cognitive anthropology. Although they recognized the s ta tic a l and dynam­
ical (structure and process) as describing the boundries of th e ir  new 
science, they stre ss  the s ta tic a l, or structural approach. Further, 
Saint-Simon was the f i r s t  to u til iz e  the idea which he termed "Collective 
Being." This notion was to appear in a more refined manner in the work 
of Durkheim and I4auss as "collective representation." For Saint-Simon 
the "Collective Being" notion was relig ious in tone, though i t  did stand 
for a syndrome which was, in his words, "the essence of h istory ." I t  
can also be suggested that the concept, "Collective Being," may mark 
Saint-Simon's struggle toward a concept of culture--a concept which, with 
the deletion of "being" and the addition of "structure," would not be 
that dissim ilar from the general culture concept of cognitive anthropology.
Another idea of the 19th century which casts i t s  shadow over 
cognitive anthropology is  that of the psychic unity of mankind. Briefly, 
i t  is  the be lie f that the ljuman mind is  and was the same everywhere. "In 
the formulation of Adolf Bastian, psychic unity was freely  invoked to 
explaitn sim ila rities  of culture wherever they occurred" (Harris, 1968:137). 
This idea has survived in tact in the sciences of man as a v ita l  facet of 
the theory systons of such giants as Jung, Freud, and Lévi-Strauss.
A b rief survey of the channels of research in 19th century linguis­
t ic s  also indicates further aspects of the background of cognitive anthro­
pology. Linguistic research a t tha t time was, roughly speaking, proceeding 
in  two directions. One of these directions, connected with such men as
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Franz Bopp, Rasmus Rask, and August Schleicher, vas h is to rica lly  oriented. 
The characteristic  feature of the scholars belonging to th is  current vas 
th e ir e ffo rt to penetrate as fa r as possible into the pre-history of 
language and to reconstruct sounds and v»rd-forms of the non-preserved, 
prehistorical stages of language by comparing the ea rlie s t preserved 
documents of languages that had been developed from the non-preserved 
parent languages (Vachek, 1966:15-16).
The second major trad ition , associated with such men as Wilhelm 
von Humboldt, S teinthal, M isteli, Finck, and Gaklentz, viewed language 
as a phenomenon hie et nunc and attempted to study i t  by nonhistorical 
methods. Trinks (1948), in  his "Linguistics and The Ideological Structure 
of the Period" (in Vachek, 1966:159), notes th a t th is  general line  of 
lingu istic  research was heavily influenced by the philosophical systems 
of Herder and Kant.
Eimboldt conceived of languages as representing a mental system, 
or mental image of the world (Colby, 1966:3-4). Hmiboldt's general 
notion has appeared in recent time under various names; e .g ., cognitive 
map, cognitive structure, image, eidos, model, mazeway, infra-structure. 
Goodenough, for example, has acknowledged his debt to Wilhelm von Emiboldt.
The trad ition  of nonhistorical approaches to the study of language, 
a trad ition  f i r s t  identified with Wilhelm von Humboldt, was continued and 
modified by Vilem Mathesius and his associates. In 1911, Mathesius made 
a convincing plea before the Royal Czech Learned Society for the synchron­
is t ic  approach to language phenomena thus anticipating Ferdinand de 
Saussure's  Cours de lingu istic  generale by five years (Vachek, 1966:4). 
Mathesius’ methods and ideas were to be responsible for the epithet 
’s tru c tu ra lis t’ by which the Circle Linguistique de Prague, founded by
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Mathesius in  1926, was to be known. Mathesius ' notion of "structure" in ­
dicated his position that no element of language could be correctly
evaluated i f  considered in  iso lation  from the other elements of tha t 
same language. Mathesius and the Prague School also u tilized  the concept 
of language function to indicate the ir position that language ex ists for 
the purpose of communication. The Prague group exhibited a steady concern 
for meaning, by which they intended what is  often termed content, or more 
exactly, the references made by an utterance and by the parts conposing 
i t  to  vhat we ca ll extralinguial re a lity  (Vachek, 1966:30). This reference 
is  what the Prague lingu ists understood by the function of language.
Mathesius, (1936, In Vachek, 1966:144) in h is "Ten Years of the
Prague Linguistic C ircle," noted: The functionally and structu ra lly  
oriented analysis of speech was also to  establish  our close connection 
with the trad ition  of Jan Baudouin de Courtenay (Russian)...as well as 
with American lingu istics represented mainly by Edward Sapir." Pursuing 
the European current, i t  can be observed that de Courtenay and the Russian 
lingu istic  trad ition  which he fostered exerted a great influence on the 
theoretical direction taken by Jakobson and Troubetzkoy, the most rigorous 
early formulators of the s tru c tu ra lis ts  approach in lingu istics . Scerba 
and Fortunatov also exerted powerful influences on Jakobson and Troubetzkoy. 
Perhaps the most prominant event in the development of many of the ideas 
of Jakobson and Troubetzkoy, however, was Ferdinand de Saussure's  Cours de 
lingu istic  generale, published in  1916.
A major contribution of Saussure' s is  that his work served as a 
bridge between the current of French structuralism , which follows a line 
highlighted by Comte, Durkheim, Mauss, and Lévi-Strauss, and the development
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of struc tu ra l lingu istics out of the Prague Linguistic Circle. Saussure 
stands close to  being the f i r s t  cognitive anthropologist. His influence 
vas perhaps most responsible for stimulating the application of lin g u istic  
methods to ex tra-lingu istic  phenomena.
Saussure studied the problan of language in  terms of what he 
called "sémiologie." He saw semiology as the study of the common reference 
plane underlying both language and culture (Colby, 1966:6). Saussure 
f e l t  th a t myth, kinship, r i tu a ls , and customs, as well as language proper 
could be treated as signs. The signs to an in fra-structu re  which formed 
the parameters of both lingu istic  and ex tra -lingu istic  phenomena. His 
notion of contrast was the focal point of semiology. Saussure f e l t  th a t 
signs gain th e ir  significance by th e ir  d istinctiveness from other signs, 
rather than by any inherent quality residing in each sign. He used the 
term ’phoneme,' although i t  does not closely resemble ’phoneme’ as i t  is  
used a t  present. Saussure says expressly, "les phonanes sont avant tout 
les e n titie s  opposivites, re la tiv es , e t negatives" (in Vachek, 1966:19). 
Josef Vachek (1966:19) s ta tes that i t  was Saussure’s concept of "les 
phonemes" and his stress on synchrony, rather than diachrony, which was 
his major influence on the early development of struc tu ra l lingu istics  
in Prague. I t  was Saussure who f i r s t  insisted  in  stringent fashion on 
the d istinc tion  between what he called "synchrony," the study of language 
in i t s  s ta tic  s ta te , and "diachrony," the study of language in i t s  evolu­
tionary stages (King, 1969:2). Saussure was also responsible for the 
d istinc tion  in  lingu istics between "la  langue" and "la  parole." This 
classic  d istinc tion  corresponds to  the division of language into syntactics 
and semantics on the one hand, and pragmatics on the other (fb^mes, 1964c:28).
Influenced by Saussure, the Russian trad itio n , and the Prague Circle,
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Troubetzkoy, the illu s tr io u s  founder of structural lin g u is tic s , according
to Lévi-Strauss, advanced to a conception of the phonological method.
These influences, plus Troubetzkoy's additions, can be seen in the outline
of the four fundamental steps in the phonological method (Lévi-Strauss, in
Manners and fâplan, 1968:531-532).
F irs t , structural lingu istics sh ifts  from the study of conscious 
lingu istic  phenomena to study of the ir unconscious infrastructure; 
second, i t  does not tre a t terms as independent e n tit ie s , taking 
instead as i t s  basis of analysis the re la tions between terms; 
th ird  i t  introduces the concept of system; . . .f in a lly , structural 
lingu istics aims a t discovering general laws, e ither by induction 
or by logical deduction, which would give them an absolute char­
acter. Thus, for the f i r s t  time, a social science is  able to 
formulate necessary relationships. This is  the meaning of 
Troubetzkoy's la s t  point, while the preceeding rules show how 
lingu istics must proceed in order to a tta in  th is  end.
Roman Jakobson's  major contribution to structural lingu istics
and cognitive anthropology is  noted by Harris (1968:493-494):
. . . t o  demonstrate the systematic nature of the se t of phonological 
contrast employed by each language in building its^ repertory of 
significant sounds. The structure of such a systan cannot be de­
scribed by a simple linear catalogue of the significant sounds ; 
the structure consists rather of the matrix or network of opposi­
tions in vhich binary groupings of sound differences take the ir 
position in a multidimensional space.
The above, of course, describes the semantic arrangement termed
"paradigm." Jakobson was the f i r s t  to develop the method of componential
analysis. Sturtevant (1964:113) writes:
Analysis in terns of semantic components was f i r s t  applied to para­
digms of affixes, particu larly  to sets where the components are a t 
least something over, i . e . ,  components with separate phonemic iden­
t i t i e s .  In these instances, the contrast set is  defined morpholog­
ica lly , in terms of i t s  lingu istic  environment. The f i r s t  develop­
ment of the method is  due to Roman Jakobson, who applied them in an 
analysis of the semantic components of the Russian case system (in 
1936).
A year la te r  Troubetzkoy made a componential analysis of the 
Slovak case system.
Jakobson was responsible for introducing into America the concepts
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and procedures of the Prague school of structural lingu istics  and the 
anphasis on "binary opposition" and "d istinctive features" (Leach, in 
Manners and Kaplan, 1968:544). Jakobson's major work m s the development 
of the theory of binary opposition in -vdiich a l l  d istinc tive  features are 
supposed to partic ipate  (Vachek, 1966:49). According to Iferris (1968:493), 
Lévi-Strauss' notions of binary contrast analysis stems from his contact 
with Roman Jakobson while both were teaching a t  the New School.
As has been noted, Jakobson, Troubetzkoy, and the Prague Circle 
a l l  owe a debt to the innovative work of Saussure. Saussure's  presence 
is  also f e l t  in the line  of thought stemming from Durkheim and Mauss.
I t  is  significant tha t Mauss and Saussure were contemporaries. Further 
collaborative p o ss ib ilitie s  appear when i t  is  noted that Nfeuss m s a 
student of Durklieim, and Lévi-Strauss m s a student of Mauss. The con­
tinual convergence of French structuralism and structural lingu istics 
is  probably the single most significant fact leading to the development 
of the v a rie tie s  of contonporary cognitive anthropology.
For the purposes of th is  chapter, Durkheim's conception of
"collective representations" and/or "collective consciousness" is  most
important in  noting his place in the general line  of development tom rd
modem forms of cognitive anthropology. In Elementary Forms of The
Religious L ife, Durkheim (1915:444) writes:
. . .the collective consciousness is  the highest form of the psychic 
l i f e ,  since i t  is  the consciousness of the consciousness. Being 
placed outside of and above individual and local contingencies, i t  
sees things only in  th e ir  permanent and essential aspects, which 
i t  c ry sta llizes into communicable ideas. At the same time that i t  
sees from above, i t  sees farther; a t every moment of time, i t  em­
braces a l l  known rea lity ; that is why i t  alone can furnish the mind 
with the moulds which are applicable to the to ta l i ty  of things and 
which make i t  possible to think of them. I t  does not create these 
moulds a r t i f ic ia l ly ;  i t  finds them within i ts e l f ;  i t  does nothing 
but become conscious of them.
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Durkheim's  "moulds" appear very close to  the more modem concep­
tions of "model," "in fra-structu re ,"  "cognitive map," etc. I t  is  Durkheim's 
conception of "collective representations" which had the greatest influence 
on his devoted pupil Marcel Mauss.
In I'feuss' most in fluen tia l work, I/E ssai Siir lé  Don (The Gift)
published in 1924, he:
...endeavored to reduce the worldwide v arie ties  of gift-g iving 
practices, including potlatch, the Kula, Melanesian and Indian 
feasting and fes tiv a ls , to th e ir 'elementary form.' In conform­
ity  with the standard practice of Durkheim's school Mauss is  able 
to discern in these apparently disparate phenomena an underlying 
principle which is  supposed to render them, a t one f e l l  stroke, 
in te llig ib le . All of these phenomena are examples of an 'archaic ' 
form of exchange in which there is  a 'c ircu lation  of objects 
side by side with the circulation of persons and r ig h ts . ' This 
c irculation is  maintained neither by barter, purchase, nor economic 
u t i l i ty ,  but rather by the threefold obligation deeply ingrained 
in the human mind to give, to receive, and to  repay (Harris, 1968:486).
Mauss' conception of "elanentary forms" is  closer to modem 
conceptions of cognitive stm cture than Durkheim's notion of collective 
representations, moulds, foims, e tc . because Mauss was operating with a 
close degree of rapport with assumptions drawn fron psychology (Harris, 
1968:484) and lingu istics (Lévi-Strauss, in Hymes, 1964c:40). Durkheim 
insisted upon a d is tin c t separation between the collective and the 
individual mind. However, as Harris (1968:484) notes, there are many 
passages in  Mauss' The Gift which could be construed as being concerned 
with the conscious and unconscious meanings of g ift-g iving from the 
individual a c to r 's  point of view.
According to Mauss' student, Lévi-Strauss, Mauss is  to be credited 
with the recognition that there are hidden inner 's truc tu res ' of the mind 
which are causally prio r to collective representations as objective social 
facts.
The special achievement of The Gift is  related to th is  reorientation
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of functionalism toward 'unconscious mental teleology. ' What 
rea lly  se t Lévi-Strauss' heart beating and head boiling in  The 
Gift was that Mauss had achieved the threshold of a specific d is- 
covery concerning the 'unconscious teleology of the mind* which 
was to provide the basis for Thé Elgiiëntàry Structurés of Kinship 
(Lévi-Strauss, 1949) and the en tire  pattern  of French 'structural* 
anthropology (Harris, 1968:486).
Leach (in Manner and Kaplan, 1968:542) writes;
Sociologists (and social anthropologists) are concerned with *man 
in society, * with systems of relationships rather than with ind i­
viduals in iso lation . Mauss * insight was to recognize that the 
concept of 'relationship* is  i t s e l f  an abstraction from something 
quite concrete. We say of two individuals that they are 'in  re la ­
tionship ' idien we see that they are in communication, that is  when 
they pass 'messages' to one another, and these messages are conveyed 
through material media, sound waves in the a ir ,  ink scribbles on 
a piece of paper, the symbolic value embodied in a g if t  of flowers.
The 'g i f t , ' th a t is  to say the m aterial thing which passes from 
one individual to the other, is  an 'expression' of the re la tio n ­
ship, but the quality of the relationship is  something both more 
abstract and more mysterious. . .  th is  theme links up d irec tly  with 
(Lévi-Strauss*) view that in any cultural system the conventional 
modes of person to person interaction constitute a language which 
can be decoded like  any other language.. .he applied the same kind 
of argument to a l l  kinds of conventional action and also to  the 
thematic symbols which appear in myth and r itu a l.
Mauss defined the target for Lévi-Strauss* work, and structural
lingu istics provided Lévi-Strauss with the method and the model for
finding his mark. Lévi-Strauss (in Hymes, 1964c:41) enthusiastically
sta tes: **Phonology cannot f a i l  to play for the social sciences the same
rev ita liz ing  role that nuclear physics, for example, played for the exact
sciences." In his "Structural Analysis in Linguistics and in Anthropology"
(in Hymes, 1964c:41), Lévi-Strauss writes:
In the study of problems of kinship (and undoubtedly also in the 
study of other problems), the sociologist is  in a situation  exactly 
like  that of the linguist in phonology; like  phonones, kinship 
terms are elements which have a signifying function; like  them, 
they acquire th is  function only by being integrated into systems;
*kinship systems,* like  'phonological systems,' are elaborated by 
the mind a t the level of unconscious thought: fin a lly , the re ­
currence, in d istan t regions of the world and in profoundly d if ­
ferent societies, of forms of kinship, rules of marriage, a ttitudes 
sim ilarity  prescribed between certain  types of kin, e tc ., leads one
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to  believe th a t, in the one case as in the other, the observable 
phenomena re su lt from the play of general, but hidden, laws. The 
problem can then be formulated in  the following fashion: in
another order of re a lity , the phenomena of kinship are phenomena 
of the same type as lingu istic  phenomena. Can the sociologist, 
u tiliz in g  a method analogous in form ( if  not in content) to that 
introduced by the phenologist, bring about in  h is science a progress 
like  that which has ju st taken place in the lin g u istic  sciences?
Edmund Leach, (1965, in Manners and Kaplan, 1968:546) in his
"Claude Lévi-Strauss--Anthropologist and Philosopher" (1965), o ffers
the following observation when commenting on Lévi-Strauss' f i r s t  major
vrork. Les Structures Elémentaires de la  Parente (1949):
...though Structures is  best regarded as a splendid fa ilu re  i t  
does contain one fundamental idea of great importance; th is  is  the 
notion, d is t i l le d  from î’iauss and Freud and Jakobson, that social 
behavior (the transactions which take place between individuals), 
is  always conducted by reference to a conceptual scheme, or model 
in the ac to r’s mind of how things are or how they ought to be.
And the essential characteristic  of th is  model is  that i t  is  
log ically  ordered. Lévi-Strauss recognizes th a t the actual 
behavior or actual individuals may be fu ll  o f irreg u larity  and 
improvisation, but these practices are nevertheless an expres­
sion of the ac to r’s orderly ideal scheme ju s t as the ideal scheme 
is  i t s e l f  a programme for action produced by the praxis of the 
whole society. As his ideas have developed Lévi-Strauss has 
come to see himself more and more as being concerned with the 
logical structures which are to be found not in the empirical 
facts themselves but a t the back of the empirical fac ts .
Turning to  developments in America which proved to be part of 
the system of currents leading to cognitive anthropology, i t  can be re ­
ite ra ted  tha t Vilem Mathesius, founder of the Prague Linguistic C ircle, 
indicated Edward Sapir in America as taking essen tia lly  the same ta c t 
in  language studies as the Prague group. The work of Sapir’s teacher, 
Franz Boas, offers some early insights into American notions concerning 
language and thought and the general program of lin g u istic s .
Benjamin Whorf (in Hymes, 1964c:129) writes :
. . . th e  problem of thought and thinking in the native community is  
not purely and simply a psychological problem. I t  is  quite largely
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cu ltu ral. I t  is more-over largely a matter of one especially co­
hesive aggregate of cu ltural phenomena that we c a ll a language. I t  
is  approachable through lingu istics and, I hope to show, the 
approach requires a rather new type of emphasis in l in g u is tic s ...
Boas enunciated i t  decades ago in  h is introduction to thé Handbook 
of American Indian languages (1911).
Boas ' introduction to the Ifendbook proposed tha t an important
aspect of culture is  made up of the principles by vhich a people c lassify
th e ir  universe (Sturtevant, 1964:100); and "...showed for the second time
in h istory , but for the f i r s t  in a sc ien tific  manner, how a language could
be analyzed sui generis and without forcing the categories of ’c la ss ic a l’
trad ition  upon i t  " (VIhorf, in Hymes 1964c:136). Boas’ emic orientation
prevailed throughout h is work. For him " . . . th e  defin itive  te s t  of a good
ethnography was whether or not i t  fa ith fu lly  mirrored the world of the
natives as the native saw i t"  (Harris, 1968:316). Two quotations from
Boas’ (Boas, in I ^ e s ,  1964c: 19, 22) "Linguistics and Ethnology" prove
instructive on these points.
Of greater positive importance is  the question of the re la tion  of 
the unconscious character of lingu istic  phenomena to the more 
conscious ethnological phenomena. I t  seems to my mind that th is  
contrast is  only apparent, and that the very fac t of the unconscious­
ness of lingu istic  processes help us to gain a clearer understanding 
of the ethnological phenomena, a point the importance of which can 
not be underrated. Thus i t  appears th a t from p rac tica l, as well 
as from theoretical, points of view, the study of language must be 
considered as one of the most important branches of ethnological 
study, because, on the one hand, a thorough insight into ethnology 
can not be gained without practical knowledge of language, and 
on the other hand, the fundamental concepts illu s tra te d  by human 
languages are not d is tin c t in kind from ethnological phenomena; 
and because, furthermore, the peculiar characteristics of languages 
are clearly  reflected in the views and customs of the peoples of 
the world.
Boas' theoretical particularism  is  reflected  by Stephen A. Tyler
(1969:14), when in the introduction to his Cognitive Anthropology he writes:
What we need is  a more lim ited notion of culture which stresses 
theories of culture. Rather tlian attempt to develop a general 
theory of culture, the best we can hope for a t present is  particu lar
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theories o£ culture. These theories w ill co n stitu te .conç)lete ac­
curate descriptions of particu lar cognitive systems. Only Wien 
such particu lar descriptions are expressed in  a single metalanguage 
with known logical properties w ill we have arrived a t a general 
theory of culture.
Boas’ students, Alfred Kroeber, Edward Sapir, and Ruth Benedict, 
also hold important positions in  the general trend tha t has culminated, 
in one of i t s  aspects, in cognitve anthropology. Among Boas’ students, 
Edward Sapir is  perhaps the greatest contributor to the modem fie ld  of 
cognitive studies. Benjamin Whorf (in ^mies, 1964c:136), a student of 
Sapir, enthusiastically  s ta te s , ’’Sapir has done more than any other per­
son to inaugurate the lingu istic  approach to thinking and make i t  of 
sc ien tif ic  consequence, and moreover to demonstrate the importance of 
lingu istics to anthropology and psychology."
Perhaps the most often quoted statement of Sapir which rela tes 
to the development of the famous Sapir-l&orf hypothesis and to our d is­
cussion of h isto rica l perspectives on cognitive anthropology comes from 
Sapir’s a r t ic le , 'The Status of Linguistics as a Science" (1929:209).
Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone 
in  the world of social ac tiv ity  as ordinarily  understood, but are 
very much a t the mercy of the particular language which has becane 
the medium of expression for their soc ie ty .. .The fac t of the matter 
is  that the ’real world’ is  to a large extent unconsciously bu ilt 
up on the language habits of the group. No two languages are ever 
su ffic ien tly  sim ilar to be considered as representing the same 
social re a lity . The worlds in which d ifferen t societies live  are 
d is tin c t worlds, not merely the same world with d ifferen t labels 
attached.
Sapir (in Hymes, 1964c:128) discusses the re la tion  between
language and experience in a way that is identical to the idea on th is
subject maintained by cognitive anthropology.
Language is  not merely a more or less systematic inventory of the 
various items of experience which seem relevant to  the individual, 
as is  often naively assumed, but is  also a self-contained, creative 
symbolic organization, which not only refers to experience largely
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acquired without i t s  help but actually  defines experience for us 
by reason of i t s  foimal completeness and because of our unconscious 
projection of i t s  im plicit expectations into the f ie ld  of exper­
ience. In th is  respect language is  very much like  a mathematical 
systan, idiich, also, records experience, in the true sense of the 
vord, only in i t s  crudest beginnings but, as time goes on, becomes 
elaborated into a self-contained conceptual system which previsages 
a l l  possible experience in  accordance with certain  accepted formal 
lim itations.
Dell Hymes (1964c: 7) in his "Directions in (Ethno-) Linguistic 
Theory” views Sapir and DeSaussure as the two great pioneers in the lingu is­
t ic  approach which liad as i ts  leitm otifs synchrony and the imminence 
and autonomy of lingu istic  form. Yakov Malkiel (1959:133) writes :
The dramatic re-discovery of Sapir which, one ventures to predict, 
has ju s t begun to gather momemtum, marks a return not to  such 
surface phenanena as mentalism, conjectural psychology, poetization 
of knowledge, but to  a fu lle r , less schematic grasp of the facts 
of language in a l l  i t s  dimensions and layers, nuclear and peripheral 
a like, embedded in the broader facts of culture.
The previously discussed "etic/emic" d istinction  is  regarded by
Pike, i t s  contemporary originator, as having been anticipated by Sapir.
Sapir (Quoted in Pike, 1954:9-10) writes :
I t  is  impossible to say what an individual is  doing unless we have 
ta c it ly  accepted the essentially  arb itrary  modes of interpretation 
that social trad ition  is  constantly suggesting to us from the very 
moment of our b irth . Let anyone who doubts th is  try  the experiment 
of making a painstaking report of the actions of a group of natives 
engaged in some ac tiv ity , say relig ious, to which he has not the 
cultural key. I f  he is  a skilled  w riter, he may succeed in giving 
a picturesque account of what he sees and hears, or thinks he sees 
and hears, but the cliances of his being able to  give a rela tion  of 
idiat happens, in terms that would be in te llig ib le  and acceptable 
to the natives themselves, are p rac tically  n il .  He w ill be guilty  
of a l l  manner of d isto rtion ; his emphasis w ill be constantly askew.
He w ill find interesting what the natives take for granted as a 
casual kind of behavior worthy of no particu lar comment, and he 
w ill u tte rly  f a i l  to observe the crucial turning points in the 
course of action that give fom al significance to the whole in the 
minds of those who do possess the key to  i t s  understanding.
Sapir u tilized  the method of componential analysis in a study of 
English to ta lizers  in a paper en titled  "Totality ," published in 1930.
Colby (1966:8) describes th is  important study.
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A 'to ta l iz e r ’ is  any term expressing a quantitative Judgment...  
viiose function i t  is  to emphasize the fact that in the given con­
tex t the quantifiable is  not to  be thought of as capable of in­
crease, e .g ., a l l ,  the ‘whole flock. Using sixteen categories of 
to ta liz e rs , Sapir made a c lass ifica tion  based on the following 
four component dimensions: general (abstract)--specialized (con­
crete); direct--calculated; non-evaluative (pure)- -evaluative; 
and sirçjle--modified. Sapir derived the notion of to ta l i ty  from 
two kinds of psychological experience: the feeling of re s t  or 
inab ility  to proceed a fte r  a count, formal or informal, has been 
made of a set or series or aggregation of objects; and the feeling 
of inab ility  or unwillingness to break up an object into smaller 
obj e c ts .
Sapir's paper, "Grading: A Study in Semantics" (1915), also 
stands as a landmark in semantic theory. Ilymes (1964a:13-14) points to 
Sapir's "Sound Patterns in Language" (1925) as "crucial and classic" in 
the development of cognitive anthropology's appreciation of ethnography 
and v a lid ity  in ethnographic description. In "Culture, Genuine and Spur­
ious" (1924), Sapir promoted among other things his notion of culture 
as a world outlook.
Alfred E. Kroeber, perhaps the most famous student of Boas, a n ti­
cipated the modern concern with semantic analysis of kinship terminology 
in his a r tic le , "C lassificatory Systems of Relationships," published in 
1909. Working with the kinship terminologies of twelve North American 
tribes, Kroeber distinguished certain  components which would serve to 
define componentially terms in some or a l l  of the twelve terminological 
systans. Kroeber anployed the dimensions of generation, marriage, degree 
of c o lla te ra lity , sex of re la tiv e , sex of speaker, re la tive  age in gener­
ation, and v ita l condition of connecting re la tiv es. The reason Kroeber 
inferred the impossibility of a structural analysis of kinship terms, 
according to Lévi-Strauss (in î^mies, 1964c:43), was because lingu istics 
a t that time was s t i l l  confined to phonetic, psychological, and h isto rica l 
analysis.
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Kroeber's 1909 paper has given r ise  to some disagreement by those 
■who attempt to trace the various currents of •work and thought which form 
the background for contemporary cognitive anthropology. The 1909 paper 
is  inevitably mentioned in  terms of i t s  p rio rity  as a componential 
analysis of kinship terminology. The "etic/emic" nature of the dimensions 
u tilized  by Kroeber is  the point which has stimulated most disagreement 
in evaluating "C lassificatory Systems of Relationships" in terms of recent 
trends in cognitive s-tudies. Sturtevant (1964:102-103) re fe rs  to  th is  
paper as "The basic paper on the e tics of kinship." Harris (1968:577), 
on the other hand, reduces Kroeber*s dimensions to Berreman's (1966)
"anemic" sta-tus; i . e . ,  Harris claims that Kroeber admitted un its  which 
were simultaneously emic and e tic .
Harris (1968:577) notes that the whole point of Kroeber' s a r tic le  
was to replace Morgan's sociological treatment of kinship with a lingu istic  
treatment. In the original paper Kroeber was adamant in h is position that 
terms of relationship re f le c t psychology, not sociology. I4any years la te r , 
lûroeber (1952:172) admitted tha t i t  would have been more correct i f  he 
had stated "tliat as part of language, kin term systans re f le c t unconscious 
logical and conceptual patterning as well as social in s titu tio n s ."
Robert Lowie reflected  the Boasian concern with emics. In "Religion
in Human Life" (1963:534), he writes :
The fie ld  worker's business is  always and everywhere to understand 
the true inwardness of the beliefs and practices of the people he 
studies. He is  not content to  record th a t infants are suffocated, 
aged parents abandoned, or enemies eaten. Unless he can also re ­
cover the accompanying sentiments he has failed  in his task.
The trend in American anthropology, notably between 1930 and 
1950 and as associated with the work of Benedict, Opler, and Kluckhohn, has 
been described by George and Louise Spindler (1963:517-518) as representing
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the f i r s t  steps toward a psychocultural approach.. The conceptions arrived 
a t by these pioneers share certain  features in  common with each other and 
with recent cognitive anthropology. Benedict’s configurationalist notion 
of "patterns" and Opler's more refined conception of "themes" share a 
common concern with what might be called "world view" (Bamouw, 1963:56, 104). 
Benedict sees cultures in  terms of dominant patterns or systems of largely 
unconscious "attitudes" which permeate a l l  society and provide the.mem­
bers of a culture with an integrated means of looking a t the world around 
him. Opler shares th is  notion in  his position that themes, as they in te r­
act with and balance one another, structure the nature of re a lity  for the 
bearers of a culture.
Iferris (1968:574) notes tha t Colby (1966:28) re jec ts  the idea tha t 
Benedict and Opler are relevant in  a discussion of the development of ethno­
graphic semantics, an ethnographic approach which I am considering under 
the general term cognitive anthropology. I feel tha t Benedict and Opler 
should be considered relevant here because th e ir  early conceptions shared 
with contemporary cognitive anthropology an in te res t in patterning of 
cultural beliavior and the attempt to seek th is  integration a t levels 
which are not ordinarily  verbalized by the members of a culture. They 
are also very much emically oriented. They of course did not share the 
lingu istic  approaches nor the stress on discovery procedures, appropriate 
anticipation, and semantic arranganent portrayal in logical space which 
characterizes the modem cognitive anthropologist.
Clyde Kluckhohn sta tes h is stress on emic orientation in his 
famous Mirror for I-lan (1949:300) when he sta tes: "The f i r s t  responsib ility  ■
of the anthropologist is  to set down events as seai by the people he is  
studying." Kluckhohn perhaps stands closer than Benedict and Opler to the
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recent current in anthropology being discussed because of h is contact and 
assim ilation of the work of the Prague School of lingu istic  theory through 
the work of Jakobson. Both Kluckhohn and Lévi-Strauss came to define cul­
ture in terms of structural contrasts (Ifymes, 1964b:15). Wescott (1966:26) 
notes that the quest for meaningful elanents of culture analogous to the 
phoneme was f i r s t  enunciated by Kluckhohn in Mirror for Man. Kluckhohn 
also stands as important in the line  of thought under discussion because 
of his u tiliz a tio n  of the concept of covert culture, or the recognition 
of basic cultural phenonena which is  hidden, rarely  verbalized, and im plicit.
The pervading' influence of Edward Sapir again appears as decisive in 
the view of the language and culture relationship expressed by Benjamin 
Lee Whorf, Sapir's student. As noted previously, Sapir argued tha t a 
language as a cu ltu ral system more or less fa ith fu lly  re flec ts  the struc tu r­
ing of re a lity  which is  peculiar to the group that speaks i t  (Hoijer, 1962, 
in Tax, 1962:264). Whorf's "The Relation of Habitual Behavior and Thought 
to Language" (1941) represented the f i r s t  important documentation of Sapir’s 
thesis . David French (1963:392) lias noted that in view of the numerous 
people who have approximated and formulated the hypothesis that thought 
is  influenced or determined by language a more valid name for the "Sapir- 
Whorf Hypothesis" might be the "Humboldt-Boas-Cassirer-Sapir-Whorf-Lee 
Hypothesis."
In "The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language,"
Whorf compared the language patterns of Hopi and Indian languages of
Arizona with those of modem European languages in order to seek answers
to the following questions.
(1) Are our own conepts of 'time, ’ 'space, ’ and 'm atter' given in 
substantially  the same form by experience to a l l  men, or are they in  
part conditioned by the structure of particu lar languages? (2) Are
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there traceable a ff in itie s  between (a) cu ltural and behavioral 
noms and (b) large-scale lingu istics patterns (Spier, Hallowell, 
and Neman, 1941:78)?
Whorf (in Spier, Hallowell, and Newman, 1941:92-93) concludes:
Concepts of 'tim e' and 'm atter' are not given in substantially  the 
same form by experience to a l l  men but depend on the nature of the 
language or languages through the use of which they have been devel­
oped. They do not depend so much upon any one systan (e.g ., tense, 
or nouns) within the grammar as upon the ways of analyzing and 
reporting experience which have become fixed in the language as 
integrated 'fashions of speaking' and which cut across the typical 
grammatical c lassifica tions, so that such a 'fashion' may include 
lex ica l, morphological, syntactic, and otherwise systematically 
diverse means coordinated in a certain  frame of consistency.. .As for 
our second question.. .There are connections but not correlations 
or diagnostic correspondences between cultural norms and lingu istic  
p a tte rn s .. .There is  a rela tion  between a language and the res t of 
the culture of the society which uses i t .
With regard to Whorf, Hymes (1964b:26) writes:
A predecessor with special in te rest for transcultural studies in  
cognition is  Whorf. A theory of the nature of any sector of 
lingu istic  structure has import for cognition, as a theory of 
something users of language acquire and use, but semantic struc­
ture is  especially sa lien t; and i t  was in the framework of seman­
t ic  description that Whorf broached problems now being developed 
in the framework of transformations...He explored the cognitive 
implications of Hopi structure tlirough a te s t  essen tia lly  like that 
for generative grammars, trying out Hopi sentences implied by his 
understanding of the grammar, and investigating the reasons when
sentences proved unacceptable to his informant.
Robbins Burling in his influential a r t ic le , "Cognition and Com­
ponential Analysis : God's Truth or Hocus-Pocus" (1964:26), has stated 
tha t Whorf's ideas have fallen  into disrepute. Bright and Bright (1965:258) 
deny th is  and point to the numerous recent papers which are a l l  sympathetic 
to the Whorfian hypothesis (e .g ., Hymes, 1961; Kluckhohn, 1961; Fishman, 1960;
Mathiot, 1962). Carrol (1964:12) offers a statement of Wiat may be called
the neo-Whorfian position.
Insofar as languages d iffe r in the ways they encode objective exper­
ience, language users tend to sort out and distinguish experience 
differently  according to the categories provided by th e ir  respective 
languages. These cognitions w ill tend to  have certain  effects on be­
havior.
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Noam Chomsky's theory of generative grammars has also had i t s  
influence on the growth of cognitive anthropology and has been influenced 
in turn by many of the same men and ideas that have le f t  th e ir  mark on 
contemporary anthropological studies of cognition. Sturtevant (1964:10) 
notes the great s im ila rities between Goodenough's c rite rio n  of cu ltu ral 
analysis and Chomsky's c rite rion  for grammars. This sim ilarity  can be 
seen in King's (1969:10-11) statement concerning the goal of generative 
theory.
Our goal in lingu istics is  the construction of a grammar: the
correct account of the lingu istic  competence of the native speaker- 
hearer of a language.
"Competence" refers to " the in trin s ic , largely unconscious 
knowledge underlying our a b ility  to speak and to  understand what is  
spoken" (King, 1969:7). Generative grammars aim a t delivering a fo r­
mal account of competence which w ill serve in formulating and testing 
theories related to the actual lingu istic  performance of the native 
speaker-hearer of a language. The sim ilarity  of th is  program with the 
general cognitive approach to discovering cognitive systems or formal 
accounts of cognitive systems which w ill enable the analyst to a n tic i­
pate appropriate responses is  obvious.
A further sim ilarity  between the general positions represented 
by Chomsky on the one hand and Goodenough on the other, related  to the 
nature of the "rules" they seek, is  tliat both men fee l, like  Lévi-Strauss 
and others, tha t the "rules" and/or "models" they generate are in  some 
way related  to real physical ac tu a litie s  of the human organism. Chansky 
has stated that lingu istic  competence is  instinc tive  in man (1971).
King (1969:14) states that grammars represent an "immensely abstract and 
complex knowledge contained in the human organism."
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The theory of generative grammars has doubtless served to support 
and augment the theoretical programs of cognitive anthropology. I t  cannot 
in anyway, however, be considered as a predecessor to the f ie ld . Sturtevant 
(1964:10) sta tes that Goodenough’s statement of the c rite rio n  of cultural 
analysis, though heavily indebted to lin g u is tic s , was independently para­
l le l  to Chomsky's c rite rio n  for grammars.
In bringing to a close the discussion of American lin g u istic  
and e tlnological tendencies which have momentarily coallesced as cognitive 
anthropology, note must be taken of the role of Leonard Bloomfield in re ­
cent developments. I t  should be remembered tha t Bloomfield in his f i r s t  
book. An Introduction to-the Study of Language (1914), showed concern with 
cognitive categories. Between the publication of Introduction and the 
publication of his Language (1933), he had become converted to a narrow 
version of behaviorism (Hymes, 1964c:11). "An aggressively 's c ie n tif ic ' 
approach, a rejection  of 'mentalism,' and a focus on descriptive method 
per se pervaded American lingu istics for almost a generation, with Bloom­
fie ld  as i t s  patron saint" (Hymes, 1964c:ll). Bloomfield f e l t  that 
"signals can be analyzed, but not the things signalled about," and that 
"th is reinforces the principle that lingu istic  study must always s ta r t  
from the phonetic form and not from meaning" (1933:162). This position 
is  stood on i ts  head by the contemporary advocates of cognitive anthro­
pology. Bloomfield's positive influence in the present development of 
cognitive anthropology is  probably best stated in terms of the rigorous 
sc ien tic ity  and descriptivism with which he injected the f ie ld  of lingu is­
tic s  in America. This stance, coupled with the stimulating conceptions 
concerning the language and culture question produced here and abroad, has 
made cognitive anthropology an indeed compelling sub-field of anthropology.
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Thus fa r , I have attempted to trace what I consider to be the 
major lines of influence which, have formed a background for the emergence 
of cognitive anthropology. I have discussed these influences in terms 
of the development of French structural sociology and anthropology, the 
development of structural lingu istics  and the Prague School, and develop­
ments in America stemming in the main from the theoretical positions of 
Boas and Sapir with regard to the language and culture problan. Extending 
the search for the most important h isto rica l bases of cognitive anthro­
pology, I w ill note men, ideas, and events in B ritish  anthropology and in 
the fie ld s  of psychology and philosophy which can be considered important, 
and sometimes crucial, to the growth of cognitive anthropology.
According to Ffymes (1964c:5), the B ritish  point of view concerning 
the re la tion  of language and culture is  to view language as a mode of 
action, not a countersign of thought. This view was presented, for 
example, by Malinowski in his •'Meaning in Primitive Languages" (1923).
The important point which the B ritish  have championed, and which is  also 
a basic fac t of American cognitive anthropology, is  that native language 
must be u tilized  in  fieldwork.
The standard of emic description is  upheld by Malinowski (1922:25) 
in the following quotation from his Argonauts of the Western Pacific in 
which he stresses the "final goal of which the ethnographer should never 
lose sigh t."
This goal is ,  b rie fly , to grasp the na tive 's  point of view, his 
re la tion  to l i f e ,  to rea lize  his vision of h is world. To study 
the in s titu tio n s , customs, and codes or to study the behavior 
and mentality without the subjective desire of feeling by what 
these people live , of realizing  the substance of th e ir happiness-- 
is ,  in my opinion, to miss the greatest reward which we can hope 
to obtain from the study of man.
E. B. Tyler can be understood in the same sense when he warned that
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the ethnologist ’taust avoid the error which the proverb c a lls  measuring 
other people's com by one's own bushel" (1881:410, quoted in  Sturtevant, 
1964:100). In terms of early  B ritish  anthropological a c tiv ity  relating 
to the la te r  development of cognitive anthropology, the anthropological 
expedition to Torres S tra tis  and New Guinea ju s t before the turn of the 
century must be noted. "On the in itia tiv e  of Hadden and under his d irec­
tion , Rivers, Seligman, Myers, and McDougall studied vision, hearing, 
smell, ta s te , 'cutaneous sensations,' and 'muscular sense,' as well as 
various phenomena not rela ted  to  sensation and perception" (French, 1933: 
390).
The emic position with regard to the study of kinship was early
ennunciated by the B ritish  anthropologist W. H. R. Rivers (1912:119) in
the following quotation from his "The Genealogical Method" (1912):
In acquiring a knowledge of the pedigrees, the inquirer learns to 
use the concrete method of dealing with social matters which is 
used by the natives themselves and is  able to study the formation 
and nature of th e ir  social c lassifica tion  and to exclude entirely  
influence in c iv ilized  categories.
With respect to the effects of certain  trends within the f ie ld  of 
psychology and th e ir relationship to cognitive anthropology, David French 
(1963:402-415) has noted the impact that Gestalt theories of perception 
have had on cognitive studies in anthropology. I t  is  in teresting to note 
that in psychology the Gestalt school was in opposition to the Behaviorist 
school with regard to the nature of perception and cognition. The analog 
in anthropology is  the opposition of the behaviorist oriented Bloanfieldian 
"school" (basing th e ir  studies on verbal behavior) and the Gestalt oriented 
cognitive anthropologist who seeks the organizational and semantical 
principles which l ie  behind verbal behavior.
In the following characterization of Gestalt notions of perception
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(drawn from Chaplin and Krawiec, 1968:141-147), certain  s im ila rities  with 
cognitive anthropology’s position on the nature of cognition and percep­
tion can be seen. Gestalt psychology is  "form" psychology. According 
to  i ts  proponents, our perceptual experiences arise  as "gestalten,"
"foims," or "molar configurations" which are not mere aggregations of 
sensation, but organized and meaningful wholes. The determinants of 
organization and meaning are rela ted  in  turn to certain  fundamental laws 
of Gestalten, the most important of which is  "iscmorphism." The principle 
of isomorphism sta tes that there is  no one-to-one relationship between 
stimuli and percepts, but that the foim of experience corresponds to the 
form or configuration of the stimulus patterns.
Gestalt psychology looks upon the world as psychophysical. Gestalt 
psychologists are in the habit of referring to the "psychological fie ld"  
to represent the perceiver’s view of re a lity . In contrast the world of 
the physicist is  referred to as the "physical situation ."
The general G estaltist law of isomorphism has certain  sub-principles: 
these are the well-known Gestalt principles of perceptual organization, 
sonetimes referred to as laws of primitive organization. The most funda­
mental of these principles of primitive organization is  that of figure- 
ground. Figure-ground is  the fam iliar principle which sta tes that every 
perception is  organized into a figure which stands out frm  a background.
The figure not only stands out but also has well-defined contours, depth, 
and so lid ity . I t  must be emphasized, however, that these figurai character­
is t ic s  are not properties of the physical stimulus-object, but are char­
ac te ris tic  of the psychological fie ld . I t  should be noted that trad itional 
accounts of perception ençhasized the role of experience as an explanatory 
concept. The Gestalt psychologists, on the other hand, emphasize figure-
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ground as a spontaneous and native organization which does not depend 
upon learning but is  an inevitable consequence of man’s perceptual appa­
ratus.
Among the basic laws of the c lassic  Gestalt school is  the law of 
transposition. This principle states that because Gestalten are isranorphic 
to stimulus patterns they may undergo extensive changes without losing 
identity. Thus, a tune transposed to another key remains the same tune 
even though the elements (notes) making up the melody are a l l  d ifferen t. 
Perception, then, is  flex ib le; and, ju s t as a map can be expanded, shrunk, 
or presented in d ifferen t types of geographic projections and remain recog­
nizable as the same map, so the elanents of our perceptions may be changed-- 
often markedly--and s t i l l  yield the same perception. Naturally, there is  
a lim it beyond which change in elements may not go without producing a 
complete transformation in the precept. The structuring of the elanents 
may be changed without destroying the Gestalt only so long as the re la tive  
spatial and taiporal relationships are preserved.
Though the Gestalt psychologists never emphasized adaptation to 
the environment as a systematic thane, the ir psychology is  nonetheless 
functionalistic  in s p ir i t ,  fo r, to the extent that the laws of Gestalten 
are valid , they make for s ta b ility  and constancy in  an ever-changing 
world. I t  w ill be ranembered that th is  was Goodenough’s position con­
cerning cognitive structures in  his Cooperation in Change cited in 
Chapter II .
The forgoing outline of the basic tenets of Gestalt psychology’s 
position concerning perception opens the door for a b rief exploration of 
the place of certain  European and American philosophical trad itions in 
the history of cognitive anthropology. An examination of the major ideas
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and assumptions generated by German Idealism, American Pragmatism, Analy­
t ic  Philosophy, and Logical Positivism is  essential in  understanding 
the various developments leading to and justify ing the present f ie ld  of 
cognitive anthropology and anticipating i t s  future d irection. Certain 
systems of ideas [a philosophy) rela ting  to the nature of re a lity , tru th , 
and man's means of access to these realms l ie  a t the foundation of the 
more readily v isib le  theories, methods, and techniques which mark the 
progress of individual men in individual academic disciplines a t a speci­
f ic  time in a specific place. Because of the almost diagnostic h is to rica l 
shortsightedness of cognitive anthropology, i t  is  d if f ic u lt  to  specifically  
re la te  certain  philosophical positions to the cognitiv ist lite ra tu re  from 
overt and self-conscious indications in that body of lite ra tu re . At le a s t, 
i t  can be suggested that the various philosophical periods and positions 
to be discussed "informed" para lle l trends in other areas of in te llec tu a l 
endeavor idiich can be more readily  understood in terms of th e ir  h is to rica l 
relationships.
The bipolar opposition of Behaviorist Psychology and Gestalt Psy­
chology with respect to a ttitudes concerning the nature of perception has 
been noted, as well as the analogy applicable in th is  case between descrip- 
t iv is t  approaches to language and culture and the cognitive and structural 
approach of cognitive anthropology to the same problem. This opposition 
is  sometimes phrased in psychology and in philosophy in terms of Nativism 
vs. Empiricism. Gestalt psychology holds a N ativist position with respect 
to perception; vàile Behaviorism can be characterized as representing the 
Empiricist trad ition . Nativism originated in philosophy as a para lle l 
concept to Rationalism, and like  Rationalism, i t  is  frequently employed 
as a bipolar opposite to Bnpiricism.
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The B npiricist, notably represented by the English philosophers 
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, maintained the view that a l l  our knowledge 
ultim ately derives from experience which reaches us through our senses.
The R ationalists, such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, held the posi­
tion that the mind is  f i t te d  in i t ia l ly  witii certain  facu lties of reason, 
and that reason, operating in accordance with the. laws of logic, can 
a tta in  knowledge of tru th  which owes nothing to sense experience. Know­
ledge obtained in th is  way is  called a p rio ri knowledge.
The debate between R ationalist and Empiricist philosophers held 
the center arena in  European philosophy in  the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century. This is  sign ifican t because th is  debate shadowed the emergence 
of the f i r s t  attempts to formulate a science of society and, in various 
way, entered the streams of thought concerning man in his social and 
cultural aspects. The presence of th is  basic dichotomy, I fee l, is  today 
very much evident in the tenor of anthropological theory. Further, an 
understanding of the broadest perspectives re la ting  to  the position of 
cognitive anthropology in contemporary anthropological theory must include 
a consideration of these issues.
The Idealism of Immanuel Kant which constituted a one sided synthe­
sis  of B ritish  Empiricism and Continental Rationalism, with the weight on 
the R ationalist position, is  most often considered relevant in  a discussion 
of the philosophical milieu of present trends in cognitive anthropological 
theory (Vachek, 1966:159; Harris, 1968:600). Indeed, for Harris (1968:568ff), 
the en tire  f ie ld  of cognitive anthropology is  discussed in  terms of Idealism 
vs. Materialsim, a s lig h tly  d ifferen t phrasing of the R ationalist vs. 
Empiricist problem.
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, published in 1781, in itia ted  a new
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era of c r i t ic a l  philosophy, namely German Idealism (Sahakian, 1968:169). 
Kant f e l t  that the concepts of time and space were modes of mental exper­
ience p rio r to sensations, but that these concepts had to  act with and 
combine with sensation in order for thought to  occur. However, even 
though fânt injected the necessity of sen sib ility  into his scheme, he in ­
sisted  that in the f i r s t  stage in the attainment of knowledge, a stage 
Wiich he called "The Transcendental Aesthetic," the concepts of time and 
space are prior to and independent of the senses: they are ideal, in te r­
nal creations of the mind. I t  is  also significant that for Kant the mind 
i s  by i t s  nature logical. The be lief in the p rio rity  of mind and the 
belief that the mind operates logically  are notions that are fundamental 
in cognitive anthropology today. These notions are sonetimes blatantly  
stated and a t other times buried in  the assumptions which guide the par­
ticu lar methodology.
For Kant, ultim ate re a lity , though i t  ex is ts , is  unknowable. The 
mind, however, is  driven to reproduce what i t  believes to  be the real 
world. The real world is  an ideal reconstruction in the mind of man, a 
replica of what he believes the real world is  like , according to Kant.
"The world is my representation," wrote Kant (quoted in Sahakina, 1968:173). 
Kant's notion of "representation" finds kinship with the "collective repre­
sentations" of Durkheim and Mauss, the structures of Lévi-Strauss, and the 
cognitive structures of cognitive anthropology in  general. I t  is  also 
interesting that Kant's notion of the real world as an "ideal reconstruc­
tion" in the mind is  very sim ilar to the often used concept of models in 
the lite ra tu re  of contemporary cognitive anthropology.
Harris (1968:268) sta tes that Kant's influence in American anthro­
pology can be f i r s t  identified  in the neo-Kantian orientation of Franz Boas.
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Boas! involvsnent with the neo-fentian movement dates a t least 
from his la s t four semesters a t Kiel when he studied philosophy 
under Benno Erdmann, a leading contemporary authority on Kant.
Another prominent neo-fântian was Rudolf Lehman, with whom 
Boas corresponded on the eve of his a rc tic  expedition.
The influence of another famous German Id ea lis t, Georg Wilhelm
Fredrich Hegel, is  most evident in cognitive anthropology and structural
lingu istics in  re la tion  to such conceptions as "contrast se t,"  "d istinc t
features," "binary opposition," "dimensions of meaning," and "phoneme."
The facet of Hegel’s general philosophy which is  most relevant here is
his dynamic logic, the Hegelian d ia lec tic . Sahakian (1968:191) writes:
The Hegelian d ia le c tic .. .find tru th  through a series of triads: 
thes is , an tithesis , and synthesis. Every th esis , i f  i t  is  to 
have any meaning, w ill find i t  in i t s  an tithesis: every fact 
w ill be understood viien related  to i t s  opposites, to those 
things which the thesis is  not. Only by pointing out the many 
relationships of any one object to  another object can we estab­
lish  the tru th  about that o b jec t.. .Hegel was agreeing with 
Spinoza's dictum that 'a l l  determination is  negation.'
Pragjnatism, essentially  an American philosophy, developed in the 
la t te r  half of the nineteenth century. Pragmatic notions concerning the 
nature of thought are seen in the purpose and action oriented assumptions 
of cognitive anthropology concerning the function of cognitive structures. 
Equating culture with cognition, Goodenough (1963:258-265), for example, 
speaks of "grammatical principles of action" and argues tha t experience 
is  organized in man in  order to fa c il i ta te  the acconplishment of "recur­
ring purpose." Further, for Pragmatists, especially Charles Peirce, 
and for cognitive anthropologists, the mental features which guide action 
and upon which action is  bu ilt are part of man's constitutional make-up.
The Pragmatic crite rion  of tru th  also holds in teresting para lle ls 
with the c rite rion  of descriptive va lid ity  advocated by cognitive anthro­
pology. For both, tru th  is  based upon the workability of any theory or
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proposition. What does not 'work cannot be true. I f  a cogn itiv ist theory 
can anticipate appropriate behavior, i t  is  "true" or valid: i f  i t  cannot, 
i t  is  fa lse , or invalid.
Cognitive anthropology also exhibits the influence of a brand of 
philosophy variously called Logical Positivism, Neopositivism, Logical 
Empiricism, and Scientific Bnpiricism which appeared in Vienna in the early 
twentieth century. The three features of Logical Positivism which are 
most reflected by contemporary cognitive anthropology are a s tre ss  on 
rigorous sc ien tific  procedure, the pursuit of meaning, and the enphasis 
on formal analysis in the pursuit of meaning.
The influence of another kind of philosophy, B ritish  Analytic
philosophy, is  witnessed chiefly  in the rationale for the e lic itin g
heuristics in anthropological studies of cognition. These philosophers
f e l t  that most d iff ic u ltie s  in philosophy are caused by the attempt to
answer questions without f i r s t  discovering what question i t  is  which one
wishes to answer. The work of R. G. Collingwood is  particu larly  relevant
here. Tyler (1969:141) sta tes:
I t  is  noteworthy that as early as Iferld War 1, the B ritish  p h il­
osopher R. G. Collingwood was formulating a new ’logic o f ques­
tion  and answer,’ insisting  that the basic unit of thought was 
not the proposition (as was then held), but ’propositions... 
together with the questions they were meant to  answer.’ Colling­
wood wrote, ’A logic in vhich the answers are attended to and 
the questions neglected is  a false  lo g ic .’ Ifote that he is  
referring to the questions, usually unstated, that the proposi­
tion is  intended to answer. The question is  im plicit, as far 
as the speaker is  concerned: he assumes i t  is  known to the 
hearer. I t  was Collingwood’s thesis that the question may 
actually be unknown or mistaken by the hearer.and, i f  so, he 
is  incapable of understanding and responding appropriately...
For ethnography th is  principle has a special relevance. Where­
as the ordinary speaker normally assumes knowledge of his im­
p l ic i t  question on the part of his hearer, the ethnographic 
approach used here (cognitive anthropology) assumes lack of 
knowledge of the question on the part of the anthropologist, who 
must proceed systematically to learn them from informants.
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In conclusion, Sturtevant (1964:114-115) notes the specific in flu ­
ences which lead to the emergence of the f ie ld  of cognitive anthropology 
in America with the simultaneous publication in Language (1956) of a r tic le s  
by Floyd G. Lounsbury and Ward H. Goodenough:
In each case the breakthrough was the re su lt of training by Murdock 
in the e tics  of kinship, plus thorough knowledge of descriptive 
lin g u istics  (where componential analysis was then used in  phonology), 
plus an acquaintance with the philosopher Charles W. Morris' work 
on the theory of signs. Both shared also some exposure to mathe­
matics and learning theory.
The effects of Goodenough and Lounsbury's exposure to the f ie ld  
of learning psychology has been l i t t l e  recognized and explored in  the 
majority of b rie f survey of the history of the f ie ld  of cognitive anthro­
pology. The "purposive behavior" conceptions of Edward C. Tolman, expounded 
in a series of works between 1932 and 1959; the book A Study of Thinking 
written by J .  S. Bruner, J . J . Goodnow, and G. A. Austin and published in 
1956; and the continuing study of concept formation in children by Jean 
Piaget of the Universities of Paris and Geneva can be singled out as 
three major influences on Goodenough and Lounsbury's formulation of the 
theoretical orientation that I am calling cognitive anthropology.
The conceptions of "cognitive map" and "fie ld  cognition modes" 
as mental structures are the inventions of Tolman. Tolman's work was 
mainly involved with the study of learning in animals. The conception 
of "sign Gestalts" as cognitive processes which are learned relationships 
between environmental cues and the animal's expectations was borrowed 
from Gestalt psychology. Tolman f e l t  that sign Gestalts form a pattern  
which he referred to as a cognitive map. In studying how a ra t leam s 
to  run a maze to the reward point, Tolman demonstrated that the animals 
leam  a cognitive map of the maze and not merely a set of motor habits.
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He conceived of these cognitive maps as complex mental structures which 
were anployed in learning and, in  general, acting purposefully. I t  is  
also significant that Tolman f e l t  that cognitive maps were actual co rtica l 
mechanisms.
In Tolman, many old notions are encountered again, though with a 
more sc ien tis tic  dressing. Further, many ideas idiich are a part of the 
co g n itiv is ts’ scheme appear in Tolman's formulations--cognitive maps, 
real mental structures, emphasis on purposive behavior as part of explana­
tion  of human thinking and learning, s tre ss  on importance of expectations 
and anticipation of individual in  learning process, and a general Gestalt 
view of perception and thought.
The work of Jean Piaget can also be considered as p art of the gen­
eral current of thought from vàich cognitive anthropology was fashioned. 
P iaget's position is  th a t the study of conceptual thinking in children, 
especially the origin and development of basic concept and systems, should 
not only show how concepts are formed but should also show vhat work a 
concept does in shaping thought (Thomson, 1959:88). P iaget's work i s ,  in 
part then, a continuation of the old evolutionary notion that the study 
of thought processes in  children and "savages" would illuminate the nature 
of thought a t more advanced developmental stages.
P iaget's work is  very much modeled a fte r  the R ationalist tendencies 
of French Structuralism. The idea that the mind is  log ically  structured 
is  doubtless reflected  in P iaget's work in constructing a new type of logic 
vàich he c a lls  "psycho-logic," based on mathematical logic, and which he 
believes is  best suited to describe and re fle c t the nature of thought. 
Piaget further maintains that thought processes are best analyzed in terms 
of groups or systems Wiich are the in terio rization  of actions. P iaget's
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conception of "group" is  very similar to the notion encountered previously 
in  th is  chapter of "mental structure ." Piaget also exhibits a trend 
which has been noted previously when he sta te s  that higher psychological 
functions grow out of biological mechanisms (Thomson, 1959:90).
Mich of Goodenough and Lounsbury* s claim for o rig ina lity  in cer­
ta in  of th e ir formulations f i r s t  published in  1956 can be challenged by 
a review of the book by Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin, A Study of Thinking, 
published the same year as Goodenough and Lounsbury* s ground breaking 
a rtic le s  in  the journal Language. Bruner and his associates were in te r­
ested in how adult subjects vho have already formed and developed a 
conplex repertory of concept a tta in  new class concepts of various kinds. 
Bruner saw the chief problem for his work in designing experiments which 
would serve to externalize the thought processes of his subjects. Simi­
la r ly , Goodenough (1965, in Tyler, 1969:257) notes that he developed the 
method of conponential analysis in  order * '. . .to  make objective something 
about Trukese kinship...** With respect to  componential analysis, Bruner 
and his associates u tilized  paradigmatic representations and componential 
analysis in th e ir  1956 study of concept attainment in adult subjects. 
Further, Bruner sim ilarly to the general methodological program of cog­
n itive  anthropology, focused on class concepts and c lassifica tion  on the 
basis of discriminable a ttribu tes. Thomson (1959:64) notes :
There are many varie ties  of concepts, but the class concept is the 
type which has been selected for scrutiny by experimental psycholo­
g is ts . I t  may be tha t th is , almost exclusive, attention paid to 
c lassifica tion  as an exemplification of conceptualizing derives 
from A ristotle*s logic, which is  based upon relations of class 
inclusion and exclusion, and from the fact tha t few people are 
aware of the revolutionary changes in logic in  the present century.
The sim ilarity  between Bruner and Goodenough is  also reflected by 
comparing Goodenough*s idea of tîie culture concept and the nature of
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ethnography with Bruner's model of the problem situation  in  concept 
attainment and learning. Goodenough (in Hymes, 1964c:36) s ta te s  that a 
society 's culture consists of viiatever i t  is  one has to  know or believe 
in order to operate in a manner acceptable to i t s  members, and do so in 
any role tha t they accept for any one of thanselves. He then s ta te s  that 
a valid ethnography would be on the order of a kind of guide to  appropri­
ate behavior in a particu lar culture. Thomson (1959:69) w rites:
Bruner noted that i f  a subject has to acquire a new concept by 
learning i t s  defining a ttrib u te s  he is  rea lly  in a problem s itu ­
ation requiring a number of decisions. He gave the example of a 
stranger being shown around a town by one of i t s  inhabitants.
In the course of his introductions several c itizens are pointed 
out as being in fluen tia l. The stranger is  se t the task of 
finding out what makes a man in fluential in th is  particu lar 
community. What are the a ttribu tes vhich define th is  c la ss -- 
wealth, occupation, education level, age, religion? The 
stranger has a problan. What is  his task? Which a ttrib u tes  
are relevant? How many or how few are needed for a re liab le  
defin ition  of "in flu e n tia l '?
In th is  chapter I have attempted to demonstrate the antiquity  of 
the conceptions and objectives which are now considered basic to cognitive 
anthropology. The "newness" of cognitive anthropology resides in i t s  
synthesis of old ideas and methods with new manners of inquiry, objectives, 
and means of danonstration gleaned from psychology, semantics, mathematics, 
biology, philosophy, and sociology. The basic novelties which permit the 
f ie ld 's  existence as such include the explicit conceptualization of 
culture as a idiole in terms of cognition (Sturtevant, 1964:100), the 
position that ethnography should be thought of as concerned with the d is ­
covery of the conceptual models with which a society operates, and the 
proposition that v a lid ity  of an ethnographic description should be judged 
in terms of anticipation of appropriate cultural behavior.
IV
PERCEPTION, COGNITION, AND THE CONCEPT OF MIND
In th is  chapter I m i l  deal with the most recent studies in  psy­
chology which deal with perception and cognition. This direction is  
necessary in  order to i llu s tra te  tha t the assumptions concerning percep­
tion  and cognition which are part of the cognitiv ist strategy are not 
necessarily supported by the special fie ld s  of perceptual and cognitive 
psychology. That th is  fact is  realized, overtly or covertly, by cogni­
tive anthropologists is  witnessed by the re la tiv e  lack of notice given to 
the men and ideas generated by the psychological specia lis t in the fie ld s 
of perception and cognition. A conclusion that can be drawn is  that the 
cognitiv ists notions of perception, cognition, and mind are drawn more 
fran a general fa ith  based on an internalized R ationalistic and Idea lis tic  
conception of such facets of human ac tiv ity , than from contemporary d is ­
ciplines that specialize in the rigorous study of these human processes.
The survey that follows w ill, 1 think, demonstrate why researchers in 
the fie ld  of cognitive anthropology might understandably prefer to ignore 
the conclusions reached by modern perceptual psychology. The studies of 
perceptual psychology challenge a basic assunption of cognitive anthro­
pology (the be lief, advocated or implied, in formal cognitive structures 
of the mind) as well as the S-R (stimulus-response) model u tilized  as the 
basis of discovery and validating procedures.
Similar to the cogn itiv ists ' tendency not to  c ite  recent psychological 
studies of perception and cognition is  the tendency not to define precisely
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what they intend by the concepts o£ "perception" and "cognition."
Once again th is  is  apparently based on the notion that the meaning of 
these conceptions is  self-evident. A b rie f  consideration of the long 
history of these ideas in  psychology and philosophy, as well as anthro­
pology, would certain ly  demonstrate th is  position to be in error.
As a necessary preface to  the following discussion, I w ill deal 
b riefly  with defin itional statements as to  the nature of perception. 
Stagner and Karwoski (1952:207) define perception in the following manner:
Perception is  the process of obtaining knowledge of external objects 
and events, by means of the senses. William James put i t  well when
he wrote, 'Perception is  of defin ite  and probable tilings.' In
other words, man takes his sensations (about which he is  sure) and 
reaches conclusions about real objects (about which, actually , he 
is  less sure i f  questioned).
McConnell (1961:185) writes:
. . .a percept (is) an experience composed of a core sensations plus 
certain  images which have become associated with th is  core through 
past experience. The sensations siqiply the 'raw data ' of experience, 
vhile the images supply the context which gives the sensations
meaning. Perception is  the process whereby we learn the meaning of
stimuli in the external world, the process by which images are b u ilt 
up and attached to sensations.
Sartain (1962:233) defines perception:
Perception may be defined as the process by which sensory imput is 
interpreted...Perception is  a process that mediates between stimula­
tion  and response. As a mediating process perception cannot be 
d irec tly  observed, but must be inferred from observable behavior 
and a knowledge of the stimulus situation.
Carmichael (1957:90), in his Basic Psychology,..writes:
Perception (is) an awareness of external qua litie s, re la tions, or 
objects dependent a t  lea st in part upon present sensory stim ulation... 
I t  is always based on the way the organism 'works over' the data 
of the senses. The in te res ts , needs, and socially  determined ex­
pectations of the individual influence perception.
The preceeding definitions are of course heavily tin ted  by the ir
authors particular theoretical bias. However, taken together, they give
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a general understanding of perception idiich i s  su ffic ien t fo r the pur­
poses of th is  section.
The fundamental problem for c la ss ica l perceptual psychology was
to account for the orderly arraugment o f objects in  space and time in
the world of the perceiver (Chaplin and Krawiec, 1968:123). The Scottish
philosopher, Thomas Reid (1710-1796), was the f i r s t  to formulate the
d istinc tion  between sensation and perception.
He referred sensations to the a c tiv itie s  of the sense organs as 
these are experienced in consciousness. Perception he held to be 
dependent on sensation but d ifferen t from the former in  th a t the 
perceiver is  aware of objects or events in  his environment and 
not merely sense impressions (Chaplin and Krawiec, 1968:125).
Reid evaded the problem of a ttm pting  to formulate a rigorous 
explanation for perceptual meaning. He simply a ttribu ted  the quality  
of perception to an instinctive tendency in  the human constitu tion . He 
held th a t the perception of time and space was in tu itiv e . In a crude 
fashion Reid’s position is  sim ilar to the position of cognitive anthro­
pology. However, as Chaplin and Krawiec (1968:125) s ta te , "Reid's own 
solution was simple and forth righ t but not very satisfying to the modem 
reader." If  Reid is  considered one of the f i r s t  to deal with the problan 
of perception, i t  can be seen that one of the f i r s t  explanations of per­
ception in Western philosophy was n a tiv is tic  and couched in terms of the 
R ationalist fa ith .
The counter position in c lassical perceptual theory, the Empiricist 
position, is  early exm plified by the work of Berkeley who attm pted  to 
deal with the problm  of perceptual meaning in  terms of associationism.
He held that any perception is  meaningful only in the lig h t of past per­
ceptions, vdiose meaning in  turn is  carried into the present in the form 
of ideas (Chaplin and Krawiec, 1968:126). The m p ir ic is t  trad itio n  rejected
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appeal to the mind as a means to explain the mechanisms of perception.
The ençihasis on the study of the perception of space and time 
variables, guided by the nativism or empiricism paradigm, lasted u n til 
the end of World War I I . At that time perceptual psychologists began 
to  view perception as a meeting ground for motivational, a ttitu d in a l, 
and personality variables. This break in research d irection was some­
thing of a "sc ien tific  revolution" in Kuhn's terms. The postwar psy­
chologists argued and powerfully denonstrated the incredible degree to 
which the meaning of experience is  contributed by the observer. Modern 
perceptual psychology has gained from i t s  long history the knowledge tha t 
the trad itional S-R model is  inadequate to  the task of formulating a 
clear explanation of perception. Contemporary perceptual psychology has 
placed the "0" (organism) in  the S-R model and, with th is  S-O-R orien ta­
tion , has been able to reach some interesting conclusions concerning 
perception. The modem S-O-R formula is  known generally as d irective 
s ta te  theory because i t  places emphasis on such "0" factors as se ts , 
values, needs, a ttitu d es , e tc . In other words, contemporary perceptual 
psychology has turned from a focus on the structural deteiminants of per­
ception, such as the nature of the physical stim uli, to  behavioral 
determinants of perception, such as past experience, unconscious assump­
tions about "objects," needs, a ttitu d es , etc.
I t  is  someviiat d if f ic u lt  to  arrange a discussion of the various 
experimental categories dealing with behavioral determinants of perception. 
Different authors arrange presentation of the significant experimental 
findings in  d ifferen t ways. Stagner and Karwoski arrange a multitude of 
studies under the general heading of the "effects of perceptual assump­
tions on perception." Chaplin and Krawiec use such headings as "sets"
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(or temporary sta tes of motivation) and "attitudes and values" as percep­
tual determinants. Both of these organizational frames could be subsumed 
under Stagner and Karwoski's "effects of perceptual assumptions." Sartain 
01962:244) u tiliz e s  an even more inclusive heading: "Personal factors in 
perception."
In th is  chapter I w ill organize the presentation of significant 
experimental findings in recent perceptual psychology in the following 
order: social influences on perception; the effects of se ts on percep­
tion; the effects of needs on perception; the effects of emotion on per­
ception; the effects of values and a ttitudes on perception; and the e f­
fec ts of learning on perception. These headings overlap, of course, but 
I feel that they emphasize certain  significant factors reflected  in the 
subsumed experimental statements. Also, the various key concepts in each 
heading, e .g ., needs, emotions, e tc ., are intended in a very general sense.
James McConnell (1961:303) notes that social pressures cannot only 
change the effect associated with a percept, but i f  the pressure is  great 
enough, the percept i t s e l f  can be changed. Stagner and Karwoski (1952:
240) write:
Suggestions may come from the actions or words of others in an in ­
direct manner. One's past experience leads him to assume tha t,
\dien others attend to an object, i t  may have importance for him.
We also accept the in terpretation as to size, value, etc . held by 
others.
Two experimental studies are of particular in te rest here--Sherif's 
1935 study and the experiment reported by McConnell (1961). Sherif (in 
Stagner and Karwoski, 1952:240) devised an experiment to measure the 
social effects on perception. He f i r s t  had his subjects tested  individ­
ually  on the autokinetic phenanena (in a dark room one watches a point 
of lig h t, actually  fixed, and i t  seems to move). Each subject developed
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his own estimate of the distance in inches which the lig h t moved. Next, 
three subjects worked together on th is  problem. Sherif found that the 
estimations moved together, i . e . ,  persons who had made high estimates 
lowered them, and persons with low estimates raised them. "Basically, 
th is  means that we w ill modify our own perceptions of size, movement, and 
value to conform with the judgments expressed by people around us" (Stagner 
and Karwoski, 1952:240).
McConnell (1961:303) reports an experiment in which a large 




and then were asked to judge which w a s  the longer. Ifowever, before the 
subjects reported the ir judgments, four or more "stooges" reported f i r s t .  
When:the stooges reported tha t line  "B" was longer than line "A", a large 
number of the subjects yielded and reported that they too thought "B" was 
longer. Some subjects, when questioned la te r , reported that they ju st 
went along with the group, while others insisted that the perceived "B" 
as longer.
The effect of "sets" on perception is  an important area of study. 
McConnell (1961:273) defines "set" as a readiness to respond in a certain  
way. Chaplin and Krawiec (1968:176) write that sets are temporary sta tes 
of motivation which a le r t  the subject to perceive or respond in accordance 
with the se t. With regard to sets in  Hebb's theory, ^tConnell (1961:273) 
writes:
Sets play a powerful role in controlling our experience. One of the 
basic laws of psychology, derivable from Hebb's theory, i s  th is :
We see what we expect to see. Since perception generally precedes 
and influences action, i t  follows that a corollary to th is  law is  
th is : We react as we are set to react.
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Hastorf (1950, in Stagner and Karwoski, 1952:239-240) gave his 
subjects the task of adjusting a c irc le  of lig h t so that i t  looked to 
be the same distance away as a targe t. When they were to ld , i . e . ,  pro­
vided with the se t, th a t the target was a ping-pong b a ll, they responded 
d ifferen tly  than when told that i t  was a b illa rd  ba ll. When simply shown 
a disk and asked to judge i t s  distance, the same disk was seen farther 
away as a ping-pong ball than as a b illa rd  b a ll.
Cartwright (1949, in McConnell, 1961:272) made a study of war 
bond sales during World War I I . At f i r s t  war bond sales were very low. 
Cartwright writes that the population perceived tlie slogan "Buy War Bonds" 
simply as a request for money which carried no implication that any money 
would be ultim ately returned. At th is  point the sale of bonds went 
poorly. When the populace was convinced, i . e . ,  i t s  set was a ltered , that 
their money would come back to them, the sale of bonds went up. Cart­
wright concluded that in each case the people reacted as th e ir expectancies 
made than se t to react.
Sipola (1935, in Chaplin and Krawiec, 1968:176) required h is sub­
jec ts  to respond to a l i s t  of words presented tachistoscopically a t 0.10 
second. The stimulus words were: horse, baggage, chack, sael, wharl, 
monkey, pasrort, berth, dack, and pengion. One group was told before­
hand that i t  would see words dealing with animals or birds : the other
grotp was told that i t  would be responding to  words dealing with travel 
or transportation. Since a l l  the words except 1, 2, 6, and 8 are ambig­
uous, the hypothesis was that the responses of the subjects would corres­
pond to the sets with which they were provided. For example, the f i r s t  
group might perceive "dack" as "duck," while the second group might per­
ceive "dack" as "deck" or "dock". The resu lts  confirmed the hypothesis.
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Subjects in the f i r s t  group perceived six  times as many animal-bird 
words as did the subjects in the second group, who, perceived five  times 
as many travel-transportation words as the f i r s t .
Adams [1923, in Stagner and Karwoski, 1952:239) a ltered  the 
odor on theree a r t i f ic ia l  flowers before submitting than to  her subjects. 
An a r t i f ic ia l  pink rose was perfumed with v io le t scent, a red rose with 
l i l y  scent, and v io le ts  with l i l y  scent. Ten of the twelve subjects 
tested reported that the perfume was the characteristic  odor of the flower, 
although when tested with eyes closed they a l l  identified  the scents 
correctly.
With respect to studies dealing with the effects of needs on 
perception, the underlying assumption seems to be tha t when certa in  needs 
or drive s ta tes are active the organism is  most like ly  to give i t s  a tten ­
tion  and perceptual p rio rity  to potential s a tis f ie rs  of the particu lar 
need, or drive. The major studies here deal with hunger's e ffect on 
perception.
Sanford (in Chaplin and Krawiec, 1968:176) demonstrated that 
hungry subjects completed word stons in such a way as to make more food­
relevant words than did nonhungry subjects. For example, the word stan 
'h e --"  was more lik e ly  to be completed as "meat" or "meal" by hungry 
subjects than by nonhungry subjects.
I^fcClelland and Atkinson (1948, in Stagner and fhrwoski, 1952: 
241-242) showed blurred pictures (ambiguous stim uli) to th e ir  subjects 
one to sixteen hours a fte r  eating. As the amount of presumed food need 
increased the perceptions reported showed a great increase in  the number 
of food related  objects reported.
In studying the effects of emotion on perception, Leuba and
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and Lucas [1945, in Chaplin and Krawiec, 1968:177-178) hypnotized three 
subjects and by means of suggestion induced three d ifferen t moods in 
each subject--"happy," " c r i t ic a l,"  and "anxious." While in  each mood, 
the subjects were presented with six pictures which they were asked to  
describe following a b rie f observation period. In general the descrip­
tions corresponded to the induced mood.
Values and a ttitudes have also proven to be crucial in  percep­
tion . Bruner and Goodman (1947, in Stagner and Karwoski, 1952:242) 
asked children to adjust the size of a c irc le  of lig h t to match the size 
of coins. In another series they asked the children to adjust a c irc le  
of lig h t to match the size of gray cardboard disks, the sizes being the 
same as the coins. All the children overestimated the size of the coins. 
In the same experiment two groups of ten-year old children, one group 
fran "rich homes" and one group from "poor homes," were asked to e s t i ­
mate the size of coins using the same c irc le  of lig h t adjusting technique. 
The poor children overestimated the size of every coin to a greater degree 
than the rich  children (Chaplin and Krawiec, 1968:178).
Postman, Bruner, and î*fcGinnies (1948, in  Stagner and Karwoski,
1952:242) used a standard te s t to  identify  people who had high religious
values, high economic values, and so on. To these people words were
presented in a tachistoscope a t very short exposure. In the majority of
cases words which related to  the person's high value were perceived a t
much shorter times (faster perception) than when the words related  to
values on which the subjects made, a low score.
The experimenters claim that two processes are involved: 'per­
ceptual se lec tiv ity ' (more e ffic ien t use of cues which f i t  in 
with motives or values) and 'perceptual defense' (active re s is-  
tence to  certain  perceptions which were contrary to the person's 
values) (Stagner and Karwoski, 1952:242).
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Experiments which deal ivith the effects of learning on perception 
have produced some s ta rtlin g  resu lts . I include here studies which others 
have discussed under the headings of "motives," "conditioning," and 
"subception." However, in my opinion a l l  of the following studies re la te  
to learning, in the broadest sense, and i t s  effect on perception.
Senden (1932, in Stagner and Karwoski, 1952:207) collected in for­
mation in  six ty-six  instances of persons who had undergone cataract oper­
ations permitting vision a t a delayed age. I t  ivas hoped that these reports 
would enable a determination of vhat a person can see when presented with 
a v isual environment for the f i r s t  time. One conclusion stands out clearly  
from these observations: the patien t is  aware of being visually  stimu­
lated , but he does not identify  objects as such. Even though these people 
knew objects from tactual experience and had the use of language, they 
could not answer questions because the words simply did not re la te  to 
vision. Such a man could distinguish visually  between a ball and a block, 
but he did not know which was vhich u n til  allowed to  handle them. Two 
s tr ip s  of cardboard, 10 cm. and 20 cm. in length, were perceived as d if ­
feren t, but the individual could not say which was shorter--although he 
knew the meaning of th is  word in terms of touch. The perceived object is  
a to ta l i ty  involving vision, touch, smell, e tc ., but there is  no inherent 
connection between these cues: the relationships must be learned. Senden*s 
data may be of some help in  understanding the development of perception. 
Naming colors was apparently easiest. Motion, size, and distance were 
acquired fa ir ly  soon, but i t  took months to identify  common shapes.
Riesen (1947, in Stagner and Karwoski, 1952:208) reared twD chimp­
anzees in to ta l darkness. He found that the animals did not leam  to use 
visual cues in any manner, although i t  was clear from th e ir  behavior that
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they did see ’’something" in th e ir  environment. They showed no eyeblink 
to an object approaching the eye and were incapable of forming a fear 
response to a visual stimulus (a d istinc tive  visual pattern  paired with 
e lec tric  shock).
Stagner and Karwoski (1952:208) write:
The data collected by Senden and Riesen seem to prove conclusively 
that learning plays an important part in our a b ili ty  to identify  
objects and th e ir characteristics.
Chaplin and Krawiec (1968:176-177) describe the experiment of 
Schafer and Murphy (1943). The experimenters devised drawings in such 
a way that e ither half of the drawing could be seen as a face. The faces 
were then cut out so that e ither could be presented separately. A 
training series was then in itia ted  in viiich members of one group of 
children were 'rewarded' with small sums of money every time they were 
shown one face and 'punished' by losing a few pennies every time they 
were shown the a lternate  face. The faces were then combined and presented 
tachistoscopically a t  exposure time short enough to  prevent the percep­
tual alternation which usually occurs i f  ambiguous figures are fixated 
for rela tive ly  long in tervals. A significant difference was found in 
the direction in Wiich d irec tive-sta te  theory would predict, namely, 
the rewarded face was seen--the punished face unnoticed.
Lazarus and McCleary (1949, in Stagner and Karowski, 1952:242-243) 
had subjects study a l i s t  of nonsense words. Certain syllables always 
were accompanied by shock. Such syllables, when seen la te r , gave r ise  
to  the GSR. Now, I^kCleary and Lazarus presented the syllables in a tach­
istoscope, a t very short exposure times. Before the syllable was recog­
nized, the GSR measures showed a sizeable difference between shock and 
non-shock syllables.
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(Such) studies suggest that some kind, of basic recognition of a 
stimulus as 'good' or 'b ad ', rewarding or threatening, occurs fa s te r , 
a t a more primitive level, than conscious iden tification  of the 
stimulus. Neurologically i t  may be that subception (unconscious 
perception) is  based upon an emotional response mediated through the 
thalamus, to which sensory impulses go before they reach the cerebral 
cortex. Much experimentation is  now being done along these lines, and 
in  a few years psychologists expect to  be much be tte r informed about 
th is  aspect of perception (Stagner and Karwoski, 1952:243).
The effect of behavioral determinants on perception is  powerfully demon­
strated  by noting several examples from the history of science. Kuhn 
(1962:115-121) offers the following examples when discussing sc ien tific  
revolutions as changes in world view. Sir William Herschel's discovery 
of Uranus demonstrates the influence of sets on perception. Between 1690 
and 1781, on a t least seventeen d ifferent occasions, a number of 
astronomers had seen a "star" in positions which were occupied a t that 
time, according to  modem astronomy, by Uranus. One of the best observers 
in th is  group had actually seen the s ta r on four successive nights in  1769 
without noting the motion that could have suggested another iden tification . 
Herschell, when he f i r s t  observed the object twelve years la te r  with an 
improved telescope of his own manufacture, noted both the c e le s tia l body's 
d isk-size, highly unusual for a s ta r , and i t s  motion among the s ta rs , and 
announced that he had seen a new comet! Herschel's "s ta r  set" had effec­
tive ly  blinded him to the perception of the diagnostic planetary character­
is t ic s  of the body. Kuhn (1962:116-117) writes :
Can i t  conceivably be an accident, for example, that Western astrono­
mers f i r s t  saw dm ge in the previously immutable heavens during the 
half-century a fte r Copernicus' new p a rad i^  (set) was f i r s t  proposed? 
The Chinese, whose cosmological beliefs did not preclude ce le s tia l 
change, had recorded the appearance of many new sta rs  in  the heavens 
a t a much ea rlie r  date. Also, even without the aid of a telescope, 
the Chinese had systematically recorded the appearance of sunspots 
centuries before these were seen by Galileo and his contemporaries.
Nor were sunspots and a new s ta r  the only examples of c e le s tia l 
change to emerge in  the heavens of Western astronomy immediately a fte r 
Copernicus. Using trad itiona l instruments, some as simple as a piece
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of thread, la te  sixteenth-century astronomers repeatedly discovered 
that comets wandered a t w ill through the space previously reserved 
for the immutable planets and s ta rs . The very ease and rap id ity  with 
which astronomers saw new things when looking a t old objects with old 
instruments may make us wish to  say th a t, a fte r  Copernicus, astronomers 
lived in  a d ifferen t world.
The history  of the study of e le c tr ic ity  offers further examples 
(after Kuhn, 1962:117-118). During the seventeenth century, when th e ir  
research was guided by one or another effluvium theory, e lectric ians re ­
peatedly saw chaff partic les rebound or f a l l  from the e lec trified  bodies 
that had a ttrac ted  them. At lea s t, that is  what seventeenth-century ob­
servers said they saw, and, as Kuhn humorously notes, we have no more 
reason to  doubt th e ir  reports of perception than our own. Placed before 
the same apparatus, a modem observer would see e lec tro sta tic  repulsion 
rather than mechanical or gravitational rebounding. Similarly, researchers, 
a fte r the assim ilation of some of Franklin 's notions, saw something d if fe r ­
ent vàen looking at a Leyden ja r  than they had previously seen. And 
again, where Lavoisier had seen oxygen. P riestly  has seen dephlogisti- 
cated a i r ,  and others had seen nothing a t a ll .
Use of the verb "to see" in  the above brings the point home. Tlie 
differences being noted above are differences in perception and not 
differences in stimuli or sensations. "Reality" becomes d if f ic u lt  to  pin 
down. What was "really" in the container that both P riestly  and Lavoisier 
"saw," oxygen or dephlogisticated air?  An even more in teresting question 
is  what w ill "really" be in that container ten years from now?
This line  of thought ra ises issues which w ill be dealt with in 
more d e ta il in the next chapter. What is  the nature of an ethnography 
as a culture description? How should we evaluate what the ethnographer 
"sees" and describes?
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At f i r s t  glance the information so fa r discussed in  th is  chapter 
would suggest support for the cognitiv ist position that language i s  a kind 
of theory or system of ru les which structures perception or the manner in  
vhich the world is  meaningfully ordered for the members of some society 
sharing a given culture. However, the above most forcefully  demonstrates 
variables which d iffe ren tia lly  order ejqjerience rather than variables 
which consistently offer a s ta tic  structure to  experience. The "material" 
experience of the members of a culture is  as variable and continually 
changing in terms of c rite rion  of meaning as are the structu ra l and be­
havioral determinants vhich are "brought to  experience" by the bearers of 
some culture. At least with regard to  the conclusions reached by contem­
porary perceptual psychology, the products of cognitive anthropology 
present an absurdly over-sinplified version of meaningful, i . e . ,  perceptual, 
organization in  man. Language may be considered as one of the behavioral 
determinants of perception but by no means the only or major one as 
cognitive anthropology seems to imply. If  cognitive anthropology had as 
i t s  objective certa in  self-consciously limited goals, the information 
gained from a survey of perceptual psychology would not be that damaging. 
However, as has been noted, cognitive anthropology aims a t to ta l and real 
description of particu lar cultures, and i t  is  a t th is  point that i t  is 
open to  the above criticism .
The notion, sta ted  and inplied , in the lite ra tu re  of cognitive 
anthropology, that the mind is  logical and is  thus reflected in  the logic 
of experiential orderings as discoverable by the methods of cognitive 
anthropology is  also questionable from the standpoint of perceptual 
psychology. There is  no structured and integrating logic to motives, 
emotion, values, a ttitu d es , se ts , drives, and needs; and as the experiments
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performed since World War II  demonstrate, these variables can and do 
radically  affect perception. The key here is  "demonstrate." The studies 
in  perceptual psychology are characterized by the self-conscious and 
rigorous demonstration of th e ir  contentions, vhereas the opposing con­
tentions of cognitive anthropology are le f t  to be assumed as self-evident.
A d ifficu lty  arises in attempting to u ti l iz e  data from perceptual 
psychology in a critique of cognitive anthropology because of the d iffe r­
ences of levels which are involved--psychological on the one hand and 
cultural on the other. The significance of the comparison, however, main­
tains Wien the informant-centered emic th rust of cognitive anthropology is  
considered. The data of cognitive anthropology stems, by the avowed 
intent of cognitive anthropology, from the informant. In th is  sense 
psychological considerations must be applicable. The degree to which 
logic-less determinants affect perception is  also applicable in a pro­
found way to  the ethnographer. This facet w ill be considered a t greater 
length in Chapter V. In th is  instance i t  amazes me that cognitive 
anthropologists seem to be unaware of the "tyrannical hold" that the ir 
culture has bequeathed to  them in viewing and in arguing for the "tyrannical 
hold" that other cultures exert on th e ir members.
The significance of the language dependence of cognitive
anthropology is  also questioned by recent findings in perceptual and
cognitive psychology. Few of the behavioral determinants of perception
discussed above are demonstrably language dependent, yet a l l  of them can
be demonstrated to radically  change the world as we see i t .  In a book
dealing with cognitive psychology, Thomson (1959:164-165) writes:
Thought cannot be sinply identified  with using language.. .Again the 
study of speech disorders due to brain injury or disease suggests 
that patien ts can think without having adequate control over th e ir
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language. Some patien ts, for exanç)le, f a i l  to find the names of 
objects presented to  them and are unable to  describe simple events 
which they witness; they even find i t  d if f ic u lt to in terpret long 
written notices. But they succeed in  playing games of chess or 
draughts. They can use the concepts needed for chess playing or 
draughts playing but are unable to use many of the concepts in 
ordinary language. How they manage to do th is  we do not know. Yet 
animals such as Kohler's chingjanzees can solve problems by working 
out strateg ies such as the invention of ir^lements or climbing aids 
when such animals have no language beyond a few simple warning cries. 
In telligen t of 'in s ig h tfu l' behavior is  not dependent in the case of 
monkeys on language sk ills : presumably human beings have various 
capacities for thinking situations which are likewise independent 
of language.
Cognitive anthropology's position on thinking or cognition as a
logical process based largely on logical contrasts and discriminations is
also revealed to be sim plistic by Thomson's (1959:207) conclusion to his
h isto rica l survey of the f ie ld  of cognitive psychology:
I t  is  necessary to  keep in mind the fact th a t 'thinking' is  a poly­
morphous concept which applies to a considerable range of d ifferent 
sorts of ac tiv ity . Whether or not these d ifferent types of ac tiv ity  
are rela ted  to  each other, and, i f  so, in  what specific ways, is  a 
question which must be always kept in view. When a person is  
thinking, i t  is  usually the case that several of these distinguishable 
sorts of ac tiv ity  are involved within the same s itu â tion--visual 
and other types of imagery; verbal contents; insights; performances 
which are the resu lt of the evocation of prio r learning; strugglings 
which are the steps towards the acquisition of new sk ills  or concepts; 
goal directed behavior which conforms to  well-established rule- 
following models and goal directed behavior which is  exploratory in 
the means i t  adopts toward what may be an unfamiliar goal; 
operations which conform to strategies of a s tr ic t ly  logical form and 
leaps in  the dark which appear unrelated to  any other part of a long 
series of a c tiv itie s .
As I have continually noted, the fie ld  of cognitive anthropology
operates with a series of assunptions pertaining to the concept of "mind."
As Brown (1964:251) notes:
For ethnoscience the mind seems to be a categorical grid inposed on 
rea lity , rendering some things equivalent and others nonequivalent. 
Since the ce lls  of the grid are usually named, the design^pf the 
grid should be discoverable from inquiries about the meA&igs of 
words.
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Brown (1964:251) opposes the mind conception of cognitive
anthropology to the concept of mind developed by Piaget.
For Piaget, intelligence is  an ac tiv ity ; to think is  to operate...
The mind, for Piaget, is  more transformer than template...To study 
the mind as a transformer, you have to ask subjects to  do more than 
denote and define. P iaget...has asked them to solve problems, operate 
apparatus, and invent e3q)eriments.. .The methods of ethnoscience have, 
thus fa r , stayed close to  the methods of descriptive lingu istics and 
especially to  the methods for deriving 'emics* from 'e t i c s . '
Thomson's (1959:84) critique of Bruner's work with the formation
of "simple class concepts based on the discrimination of certain  easily
identifiab le  attribu tes" is  apt for the "class concept" orientation of
cognitive anthropology generally.
. . .h i s  (Bruner's researchers confine themselves to  what is  only part 
of a much wider f ie ld  of conceptual behavior--namely, the case in 
\diich a simple class concept is  formed on the basis of the d is­
crimination of certain easily  iden tifiab le  a ttribu tes. There is  
no doubt that human beings do a tta in  and use such concepts in th e ir 
normal thinking, and that c lassifica tion , on th is  basis, plays an 
ijiçortant part in the organization of perceptual data. But th is  is  
not the only type of concept which we use in our everyday thinking, 
nor is  i t  even the only variety  of class concept. Not a l l  
c lassifica tion  is  based upon our a b ility  to  discriminate perceptual 
cues, and not every empirically grounded concept is  a class concept... 
Accordingly, our knowledge of concept attainment cannot yet throw 
much ligh t on 'thinking' in general.
The most powerful contemporary "school" in psychology dealing 
with perception is  represented by "transactional functionalism" developed 
by Ames and his associates a t the Hanover In s titu te  for Associated Research. 
Ames and h is group have devised some of the most remarkable perceptual 
experiments in the entire history of experimental psychology (Chaplin and 
Krawiec, 1968:170). This approach runs counter to  the perceptual and 
cognitive assumptions of cognitive anthropology by emphasizing the in te r­
active nature of perception. Transactional functionalism is  specifically  
in  opposition to G estalt-like approaches in the manner in which i t  
de-emphasizes inherent organizing factors in perception, while demonstrating
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the degree to which perceptions vary depending on the particu lar nature 
of the transactions of nian with h is environment.
Proponents of cognitive anthropology have argued tha t the "stimulus 
saturation" type of experiment in  psychology serves to support th e ir  con­
tention that the human mind is  composed of a f in i te  number of structures 
which can handle only a lim ited quantity of in-put. This serves to  ex­
p lain , for them, the typical blocking reaction of over-stimulated subjects.
I would simply like to note that another manner of explaining the reaction 
of the stimulus saturated subject is  by noting that "ra te  of in-put" is  more 
experimentally equal to  the task of explanation as a crucial variable 
than is  appeal to the "black-box" of the mind.
In th is  chapter I have attempted to i l lu s tra te  the a lterna tives,
presented by perceptual and cognitive psychology to cognitive anthropology's
position on perception, cognition, and the concept of mind. What I think
th is  chapter demonstrates is  that the various positions which are in
opposition to cognitive anthropology's understanding of these concepts
argue from a stronger base--a base composed of a long history of particu lar
specialization in the fie ld s of perceptual and cognitive study, and a base
which is experimentally rather than speculatively grounded.
In a famous passage the philosopher Whitehead (1932:68-69) writes:
Thus nature gets credit which should in tru th  be reserved for ourselves : 
the rose for i t s  scent: the nightingale for i t s  song: and the sun for 
i ts  radiance. The poets are en tire ly  mistaken. They should 
address the ir ly rics to themselves, and should turn them into odes 
of self-congratulation on the excellency of the human mind. Nature 
is  a dull a ffa ir , soundless, scentless, colourless, merely the 
hurrying of m aterial, endless, meaningless.
V
GENERAL CRITIQUE
This chapter presents a "general" critique in  the sense tha t i t  
w ill deal with a limited range of problems raised by the assumptions, 
objectives, methods, and the overall self-conception of cognitive anthro­
pology. Matters of technique competence in cognitive anthropology are 
beyond my a b il i t ie s  and, i f  the cognitive lite ra tu re  bears witness, beyond 
the a b ili t ie s  of the majority of commentators on the fie ld . However, a • 
highly specific knowledge of symbolic logic. Boolean algebra, se t theory, 
and calculus, as well as a detailed presentation of the ethnographic data 
u tilize d  in the cognitive lite ra tu re  is  not necessary in  order to discuss 
the bedrock foundation upon which cognitive anthropology re s ts . Choice of 
techniques is  subsequent to , and dependent upon, the presuppositions 
inherent in cognitive anthropology; and the nature of the data presented 
in  the cognitive lite ra tu re  is  a reflex  of specific techniques guided by 
objectives which are condoned and indicated by the particu lar assunptions 
and presuppositions of cognitive anthropology concerning the nature of 
the universe in viiich they are operating.
Beginning a t  the beginning, then, leads d irec tly  to  a consideration 
of the ontological position of cognitive anthropology. Ontology is  here 
construed as th a t branch of metaphysics dealing with the nature of being 
or re a lity . The French philosopher of science, Emile Meyerson (in Brody 
§ Capaldi, 1968:59), notes:
Science is  not positive and does not even contain positive data in  
the precise meaning Wiich Auguste Corate and his a&erents have given 
to th is  term --that i s ,  data ' stripped of a ll  ontology.' Ontology is
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of a piece with science i t s e l f  and cannot be separated from i t .  Those 
who pretend to  separate them are unconsciously using a current meta­
physical system, a common sense more or less transformed by science 
of the past, which is  fam iliar to  them.
Ironic as i t  may seem, I feel that the position of cognitive 
anthropology with regard to  the nature of re a lity  is  best described as a 
kind of Realism. This appears ironic when cognitive anthropology’s 
position concerning the nature of language, thought, and the mind is  con­
sidered. As was noted when discussed, cognitive anthropology’s position 
that knowledge of re a lity  is  variable and dependent upon the particu lar 
mental structures of the bearers of some culture as discoverable 
through language is  most adequately described and understood in terms of 
Rationalism and Idealism. I t  is  as i f  the cognitive anthropologist were 
arguing that everyone else in  the world lives in  accord with the ir 
particu lar cu ltu rally  provided mental f ic tio n  except cognitive anthropolo­
g ists who deal only with pure, demonstrable, and reproducable fac t. This 
kind of confusion is  reflected  in  cognitive anthropology in  a number of 
ways. The emic/etic d istinc tion  and the empirical/formal d istinc tion , 
with respect to  the nature of the kind of science which cognitiv ists feel 
anthropology should be, a l l  mirror the kinds of confusion tha t occur when 
consistency is  not self-consciously sought a t the level of basic assumptions.
The naive realism of cognitive anthropology is  exemplified by the 
f ie ld ’s zealous concern with the discovery and description of fac ts , and 
the im plicit b e lie f  that tru th  w ill somehow appear from a large enough 
body of properly collected fac ts. With the famous philosopher of science, 
Norwood Hanson (in Brody 8 Capaldi, 1968:150), the cognitive anthropologist 
would agree that ’’. . .s c ie n t is ts  do not s ta r t  from hypothesis, they s ta r t  
from data.” As th is  chapter w ill demonstrate, I re jec t th is  position.
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Further, I feel that th is  combination of inductive discovery procedures 
and formal or deductive validating and demonstration procedures only 
serves to  cloud the proper appreciation of precisely what cognitive 
anthropology is  about, both from the standpoint of the cognitive anthro­
pologist and from the standpoint of those who attempt to evaluate his 
product.
When commenting on B.B. Colby's discussion of ethnographic sem­
antics, G.L. Trager (1966:25) writes :
The 'new phase in  descriptive ethnography,' that Colby notes, is  not 
new--it is merely a long-neglected continuation of the old, tr ied  and 
true methods of Boas and a l l  the founding fathers of our fie ld . True, 
they were followed by a generation of much lesser sta tu re , with a 
kind of inbred fear of language and i ts  uses, and the ' great thinkers' 
of that generation went in for theory, or what they thought was 
theory, without bothering with troublesome data. There are now once 
again some anthropologists who in s is t on recording data, and who 
don't care i f  the theory doesn't f i t  the data. In th is  sense there 
is  a new in te res t, but i t  is  renewed rather than new.
The notion tha t fac t is  prior to theory is  echoed by Stephen A. 
Tyler in the introduction to h is book Cognitive Anthropology. He (Tyler, 
1969:1) s ta te s , "IVhen the descriptive facts of science no longer f i t  the 
older explanatory models, i t  becomes necessary to discover new theories 
which w ill more adequately explain the accumulated data." The emphasis on 
the p rio rity  of fact is  further demonstrated by Tyler in  the following 
quotations :
Rather than attempt to  develop a general theory of culture, the best 
we can hope for a t present is  particular theories of culture. These 
theories w ill constitute complete, accurate descriptions of particu lar 
cognitive systems. Only when such particular descriptions are ex­
pressed in a single metalanguage with known logical properties w ill 
we have arrived a t  a general theory of culture (Tyler, 1969:14).
Conparisons between systems can only be useful i f  the facts conpared 
are tru ly  conparable, and we cannot know what facts are comparable 
un til the facts themselves are adequately described. When th is  is  
achieved, the units of comparison w ill be formal features rather than 
substantive variables (Tyler, 1969:15).
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Goodenough (1956:173) also fancies himself an explorer in  the
rea l world when he w rites, "The great problem for a science of man is
how to get from the objective world of m a te ria lity ...to  the subjective
world of form as i t  ex ists in Wiat, for lack of a be tte r term, we must
ca ll the minds of our fellow man." Goodenough further indicates his
Realist stance when he derives human cognition from the "modal clustering
of events" in nature. He (1963:253) sta tes:
No part of the real world, of course, is  perfectly  stab le , though i t  
may appear to hang in  a s ta te  of balance for some time, especially 
when viewed macroscopically. But the repetition  of events within i t  
is  never exact, merely a modal clustering of tracks. These modal 
clusterings, however, are essential to human cognition, for in th e ir 
absence people would be unable to discern discontinuities in th e ir 
surroundings by which to discriminate categories of phenomena...
The above quotation from Goodenough seems curiously a t odds with 
the view of cognitive anthropology in that what is  considered relevant 
material phenomena in a particu lar culture is  a cultural product. I f  d is ­
cernment of discontinuity in human cognition is  dependent on modal 
clustering of events repeated in the real world, as Goodenough claims, 
vhat does th is  say for the raison d 'e tre  of cognitive anthropology?
Goodenough (1963:253-254) continues:
...o u r  concern is  to  record everything that is  rea lly  happening, on 
the assumption that we are all-seeing observers and th a t, as 
sc ien tis ts , we are in terested only in  observable fac ts. Not knowing 
what the facts that we observe mean, we count them and so rt than 
s ta tis t ic a lly  and invent theories to  rationalize the resu lts .
The notion tha t s ta tic  facts exist in our environment to be per­
ceived in a constant and p ris tin e  sta te  was seriously challenged by the 
previous discussion of recent conclusions drawn by experimental psycholo­
g is ts  working in  the f ie ld  of perception. As was seen, the acquisition of 
meaning from what we choose to ca ll sense data was by no means a simple 
process. Indeed, the majority of studies dealing with perception has.
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since World War I I ,  tended to focus on the ways in  Wiich perception is  
determined and influenced by se ts , expectations, a ttitu d es , values, 
motivation, emotion, etc. The majority of contemporary philosophers of 
science, and sc ien tis ts  as well, would challenge Goodenough’s contention 
above that "observable facts'." are d irec tly  re la ted  to  what is  "rea lly  hap­
pening," i . e . ,  th a t observable facts automatically explain the tru th . 
Further, Goodenough's concern "to record everything tha t is  rea lly  
happening" is  both naive and absurd, as well as incessible.
Kaplan (1964:131-132) writes :
. ..n o  human perception is  imraaailate, certain ly  no perception of any 
significance for science. Observation is  already cognition, not 
ju s t  m aterial for subsequent knowledge, and the p o ss ib ility  of error 
is  as ever-present in th is  cognitive process as in the more obviously 
in feren tia l ones. Seeing is  believing because we do not ju s t see 
something: we see that something is  the case...An observation is  
made: i t  is  the product of an active choice, not a passive exposure...  
Data are always data for some hypothesis or other; i f ,  as the etymology 
suggests, they are what is  given, the observer must have hypotheses to 
be e lig ib le  to receive them. In his Theory of Data Clyde Coombs 
proposes tha t the term 'da ta ' be used for observations already in te r­
preted in some particu lar way. I am saying that there are no other 
works of observations, though often the in terpretation  a t work is  far 
from e^g lic it and clear.
Cohen and Nagel (1934:199) add:
I t  is  an u tte rly  superficial view.. . that the tru th  is  to  be found by 
’studying the f a c ts . ' I t  is  superficial because no inquiry can even 
get under way u n til and unless some d iffic u lty  is  f e l t  in  a practical 
or theoretical situation . I t  is  the d ifficu lty , or problem, which 
guides our search for some order among the fac ts , in terms of which 
the d ifficu lty  is  to be removed.. .Facts must be selected for study on 
the basis of a hypothesis. In directing an inquiry, a hypothesis must 
of necessity regard some facts as significant and others as not.
Mach (in Brody § Capaldi, 1968:33) when discussing explanation in
physics sta tes:
In the investigation of nature, we always and alone have to do with 
the finding of the best and simplest rules for the derivation of 
phenomena from one another. One fundamental fac t is  not a t a l l  more 
in te llig ib le  than another: the choice of fundamental facts is  a 
matter of convenience, history, and custom.
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Popper (in Brody § Capaldi, 1968:184) w rites:
Observation is  always selective. I t  needs a chosen object, a defin ite  
task, an in te re s t, a point of view, a problem. And i t s  description 
presiçposes a descriptive language, with property words; i t j  pre­
supposes sim ilarity  and c lassifica tion  which in  terms presupposes 
in te res ts , points of view, and problems. 'A hungry animal,’ writes 
Katz, 'divides the environment into edible and inedible things. An 
animal in f lig h t sees roads to escape and hiding p laces.. .Generally 
speaking, objects change.. . according to the needs of the animal.’
We may add that objects can be c lassified , and can become sim ilar 
or dissim ilar, only in th is  way--by being rela ted  to  needs and 
in te rests . This ru le  applies not only to animals but also to
sc ien tis ts . For the animal a point of view is  provided by i t s  needs,
the task of the moment, and i t s  expectations; for the sc ien tis ts  by 
his theoretical in te res ts , the special problem under investigation, 
his conjectures and anticipations, and the theories which he accepts 
as a kind of background: his frame of reference, his 'horizon of 
expectations.'
Therefore, when G.L. Trager (1966:25) supports the aims of
"anthropologists who in s is t  on recording data ...and  who don 't care i f
the theory doesn't f i t  the data," he is  missing the point that recording
data, and particu larly  sc ien tif ic  data, depends on a problem orientation
or hypothesis which guides the recorder in selecting what is  significant
and what is  not sign ifican t in the data. Popper (in Brody 6 Capaldi,
1968:184) offers the following comment concerning th is  point:
Twenty-five years ago I tr ie d  to bring home the same point to a 
group of physics students in  Vienna by beginning a lecture with the 
following instructions: 'Take pencil and paper; carefully observe,
and write down what you have observed.' lliey asked, of course, what 
I wanted them to observe. Clearly the instruction, 'Observe." is  
absurd. I t  is  not even idiomatic, unless the object of the 
transitive  verb can be taken as understood.
Tyler (1969:1) makes an error comparable to Trager's vhen he 
s ta te s , "IVhen the descriptive facts of science no longer f i t  the older 
explanatory models, i t  becomes necessary to discover new theories which 
w ill more adequately explain the accumulated data." Once again, Tyler's 
"descriptive facts of science" are actually specific data which represent 
in a fundamental sense the answer to a specific question Wiich was phrased
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in  terms of a body of previously unrelated fac ts , and which ordered these 
facts in  terms of the particu lar c r i te r ia  of the hypothesis, problem, or 
question. Simple, fac ts do not order theory, as Tyler assumes: theory 
orders fac ts.
A sim ilar critic ism  can be directed toward T yler's statement, 
previously quoted, tha t a general theory of culture "w ill arrive" only a f­
te r  a significant number of accurate culture descriptions are made. The 
only sense to th is  statement would be conditioned by an operation which 
posited a particu lar theory of culture to  d irect and guide the descrip­
tions. The descriptions would then serve as one of the means to evaluate 
the theory orig inally  presented.
Again, Tyler (1969:15) s ta te s , "Comparison between systems can 
only be useful i f  the facts compared are tru ly  conçarable, and we cannot 
know what facts are comparable u n til the facts themselves are adequately 
described." Like Popper's "Observe!" and Trager's "record," "compare" is 
equally pointless without an hypothesis which directs atten tion  to which 
facts and to  which features of which fac ts are to be compared and for 
what reason. The comparability of fac ts is  not necessarily dependent on 
some conception of the in trin s ic  re a lity  of the particu lar fac t. Further­
more, any notion of what constitutes an "adequate" description in rela tion  
to comparison is  dependent on some idea on what the point of the 
future conçarison w ill be, an hypothesis which would serve to  place 
lim its on the problem of adequacy of description, an hypothesis which 
sta tes what "description" w ill mean in a particu lar case. Sim ilarly, 
the notion of "useful" in  T yler's statement above is  ambiguous and suggests 
that i t  too is  dependent on s t i l l  further presuppositions and particu lar 
problem orientations which do not automatically spring from the fac ts.
94
Goodenough's previously quoted m aterial in  th is  chapter also ex­
h ib its  what I consider to  be cognitive anthropology's erroneous apprecia­
tion  of the nature of fac t and theory. With regard to  Goodenough's two 
quotations cited ea rlie r  one could ask: What does repetition  mean in th is  
instance? Repetition of vhat? Ifhat is  an event? How is  modality calcula­
ted in nature? How does one decide what is  included in a particu lar modal 
cluster? How can one record everything that is  rea lly  happening? What is  
the basis for assuming that the sc ien tis t is  an all-seeing observer? How 
does one define an observable fact? How does one acquire facts i f  they 
have no meaning? How can one possible count and s ta tis t ic a lly  sort facts 
which have no meaning? The answers to a l l  these questions depend upon 
a certain  series of presuppositions and not, as Goodenough apparently 
assumed, upon self-evidence. The basis for the discovery procedures in 
cognitive anthropology as the general character of the preceding 
statements by Trager, Tyler, and Goodenough i llu s tra te , is  inductive in 
nature, even though the most loudly touted discovery methods of the 
fie ld  are formal and deductive.
The problem of how the cognitivist arrives a t the delineation of 
a certain  domain or universe of discourse to which he w ill apply his 
formal analytic techniques is  crucial particu larly  because the product of 
his analysis w ill be claimed to have emic significance or perhaps 
psychological rea lity . I t  is  a t th is  level that the formal and deductive 
drive of cognitive anthropology breaks down. All analysis is  dependent on 
th is  basic f i r s t  step, and i t  is  a t th is  point that the cognitiv ists ' 
strategy is  most vague. The general opinion of the cognitiv ist seems to 
be that the domain w ill somehow appear upon inductive observation. Re­
garding the domain problem, Goodenough (1956:198) writes:
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Determining the universe: The f i r s t  step in  analysis is  to  gather 
together a ll  expression whose denotata make i t  appear on inspection 
that there may be some common element in th e ir  s ign ificata ; which 
is  another way of saying that they appear to  re la te  to  the same 
subject matter.
All of the inportant steps in  Goodenough's plan are necessarily 
e tic ; i . e . ,  the observer is  inspecting in the observer's terms, and i t  
is  he who decides that a common element is  or is  not present.
Pelto (1970:70), referring to  Brake's a r tic le , "The Ethnographic
Study of Cognitive Systems" (1963), notes:
As a f i r s t  step the anthropologist must identify particu lar 
' segregates ' - - the meaningful behavioral items that are groiçed to ­
gether as sets of contrasting responses. He suggests that such forms 
w ill be found by observing verbal behavior, particu larly  bounded 
sociolinguistic contexts.
Frake, like  Goodenough, seer/iS to  assume that the emic universe of 
discourse w ill singly appear upon observation of verbal behavior. I t  is 
also an e tic  decision as to when one can decide that he is  observing a 
"bounded sociolinguistic context." The bounding is  done by the investi­
gator. Frake, however, offers no suggestion concerning how he arrives at 
his bounded contexts.
An o ft cited attençt to solve the problem of domain discovery is  
the work of Metzger and Williams (1963a) which is  based on programmed 
learning techniques. The basic notion is  that the ethnographer leam s 
correct word usage in a specified domain by referring to  previously 
recorded native m aterials. "The process, in the form of verbatum s ta te ­
ments of both ethnographer and informant, is  presented as evidence so that 
the reader can judge for himself" (Colby, 1966:11). The inductive problem 
of in fin ite  regression rears i t s  head in th is  case too. What is  the basis 
for ethnographer "A" accepting the emic va lid ity  of the e lic itin g  frames 
u tilized  by ethnographer "B." Certainly temporal p rio rity  is  not
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suffic ien t. Furthermore, when the reader "judges for himself," he once 
again has escaped the emicist ideal.
To temporarily digress, another very rea l concern that can stem
from the e lic itin g  procedures suggested by such cognitiv ists as Metzger
and Williams (1963a) and Frake (1964) re la te s  to  the delicate  problems
of ethnographer/informant rapport and informant fatigue. When discussing
how to te s t  i f  "discovered queries" are appropriate with respect to
particu lar top ics, Frake (1964, in Tyler, 1969:135) writes:
As a te s t ,  the reader with a chair and an English speaking informant 
handy might try  to  detect which of the following queries are in ­
appropriate:
What kind of a chair is  it?
What does a chair ta s te  like?
What is  a chair used for?
What sex is  that chair?
What part of a chair is  th is?
How fas t is  th is  chair?
A half hour of questions like  th a t could push the most committed 
and sympathetic informant to the breaking point. I t  would be extremely 
d iff ic u lt to  u ti l iz e  such techniques i f  instead of such neutral topics as 
firewood, color categories, sandwiches, or kinship terms, the topic was 
more emotionally loaded.
The major consideration at th is  point then is  the emic/etic d is­
tinction  and the nature of induction, for clearly  the domains analyzed by 
the cognitive anthropologist are inductively generated to be deductively 
analyzed. What then of emic resu lts?  Can emics be derived from etics? 
These questions lead to  consideration of the resu lts  of defining "emic" in 
two different manners. One emphasis would yiew emic statements as 
psychologically rea l presentations of the na tive 's  viewpoint. Another 
tendency is  to  stress th a t emic statements represent a calculus, a model, 
or an accurate approximation of the n a tiv e 's  categorization of a certa in
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realm vàich can be tested  by the ethnographer's a b ility  to appropriately 
anticipate behavior.
Goodenough (1956), for example, repeatedly sta tes in  h is paper on
Trukese terminology that the purpose of conç)onential analysis of kinship
terms is  to provide psychologically real defin itions. Regarding th is
a r tic le , Wallace and Atkins (1960, in  Tyler, 1969:363) note:
He (Goodenough) speaks of people having 'ce rta in  c r ite r ia  in  mind by 
which they make the judgement tha t A is  or is  not B's cousin '; he 
alludes to  the method as a means of learning about 'human cognitive 
processes'; he discusses 'concepts' which ex ist in 'the  Trukese 
cognitive w orld '. In his e a rlie r  monograph on Truk he ju s t if ie s  the 
choice of components by characterizing them as 'c r i te r ia ' or 'ru le s ' 
valid  in 'Trukese thinking,' by which the Trukese 'appraises his 
relationship with another individual'.
Anthony F.C. Wallace also argues that psychological re a lity  is  
the goal of formal analysis (Hammer, 1968:527; Colby, 1966:8-9). Hymes 
(1964b) and Romney and D'Andrade (1964) also uphold th is  position. For 
a l l ,  the te s t that psychological re a lity  has been achieved is  based 
around the te s t  by appropriate anticipation stratagem.
The hopes of those authors vdio believe in the possib ility  of 
arriving a t psychologically rea l statements v ia  formal methods of analysis 
is  seriously challanged by Burling (1964) in his paper "Cognition and 
Componential Analysis: God's Truth or Hocus-Pocus." Burling denies 
that cognitive studies provide insight into the cognitive processes of 
peoples. He bases h is opinion on the fac t that there are a great number 
of logically  poss _le alternatives for grouping se ts  of even a very few 
items. He (1964:23) s ta te s , fo r example, that there is  "a to ta l  of 124 
ways in viiich a set of four terms can be d iscreetly  but nonredundantly 
apportioned into ce lls  by the application of components. Clearly with 
five or more items the p o ss ib ilitie s  would rapidly become astronomical."
He further notes that the componential analysts have a whole series of
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other logical problems to  cope with, including homonoiny (sp littin g  a
single term into two d ifferent meaning c lu s te rs ) , nonbinary components,
and redundancy (Pelto, 1970:73). Burling (1964:27) concludes by sta ting :
I t  is  always tempting to a ttrib u te  something more important to one's 
work than tinkering with a rough set of operational devices. I t  
certain ly  sounds more exciting to  say we are 'discovering the 
cognitive systems of the people' than to  admit that we are ju s t 
fiddling with a se t of rules idiich allow us to  use terms the way 
others do.
The problem that Burling raises for those who claim to be 
delineating psychologically real cognitive systems of a people is  th is : 
of the many logically  complete and coherent deductive orderings of a 
specific domain, how does the analyst arrive a t the decision that his 
particu lar analysis is  psychologically valid  for the bearers of a 
certain  culture.
Hymes (1964d:116) and Frake (1964b:119) have responded to  Burling's 
paper. %mes claims that the superfluous possible logical solutions of 
ordering are eliminated by the fie ld  worker who carefully e l ic i t s  the 
appropriate terms from informants in  relevant sociolinguistic contexts.
In th is  way, according to Hymes, "God's tru th" can be approximated 
(Colby, 1966:12). However, two points can be made a t  Hymes' expense.
The emic goal is  questionable when, as previously noted, the few statements 
of e lic itin g  procedures by cognitivist demonstrate the ir inductive or 
e tic  nature. Further, how can a psychologically real statement of 
cognitive process be approximated i f  the analyst admits that he is  
attenpting to discover precisely that statement in the f i r s t  place? I f  
the analyst does not know the logico-semantic characteristics of a 
particu lar domain, how can he possibly know when he has approximated them?
In Frake's (1964:119) reply to Burling, the co g n itiv is t's  major 
validating c r i te r ia ,  appropriate anticipation of informant response, is
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cited as an answer to  Burling’s criticism . Burling (1964, in Manners and
Kaplan, 1968:521) in  h is "Rejoiner" to Hymes and Frake writes:
%  only ju s tif ic a tio n  for writing yet another programmatic a r tic le  
was that I have tr ie d  to  analyse various sets of terms, and I have 
not found the proposed methods adequate. I have faced horrendous 
problems of alternative p o ss ib ilitie s , and I f e l t  that part of the
d ifficu lty  stemmed from the logical problems raised in my paper. My
colleagues may well be more clever and successful in these analyses 
than I. But when Goodenough suggests an in trica te  d istinc tion  between 
’lin e a l’ and ’ab lin ea l,’ and ’co lineal’ to  help in  ordering English 
kin terms, I am not persuaded that he is  approaching anyone’s 
cognitive system though he is  certainly proposing a scheme that works. 
Mien Frake confidently te l l s  us that for a Subanun ’A case of nuka 
may eventually develop into one of 23 more serious diseases’ (no 
’about 23’ or ’over 20’ but ju st ’23), I suspect the imposition of a 
spurious precision.
I feel that Burling’s criticism  stands well against the feeble 
attenpts to debunk i t .  The cognitiv ist attempts to decide between
two equally complete formal accounts of a particu lar domain as being the
psychologically rea l one must ultim ately res t with certain c r i te r ia  that 
are brought to bear from an e tic  standpoint, i . e . ,  in terms of d istinctions 
appropriate to the analyst, and not to the native.
Romney and D'Andrade (1964) attempted to maintain the va lid ity  of 
the quest for psychologically real definitions by asserting that supporting 
evidence to argue the psychological re a lity  of one formal account over 
another can be achieved by "further behavioral measures." I t  could then 
be asked: "How does one establish the emic va lid ity  of a te s t  which 
te s ts  for emic validity?"
That Burling had made his point in the debate with Itymes and Frake 
can be seen in the fact that there was a general "drawing-in-of-horns" about 
that time with regard to the question of the psychological re a lity  of so- 
called cognitive descriptions perporting to represent a native speaker’s 
cognitive world. Wallace (1965, in Tyler, 1969:399) writes:
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...awareness of the problematic nature of psychological v a lid ity  sprang 
h isto rica lly  from the apparent indeterminacy of the resu lts  of 
componential analysis. The publications on componential analysis to 
date, and no doubt unpublished experiences of others like  myself, 
suggest that the application of i t s  procedures to lexical and 
denotative data does not automatically yield a unique description 
of a native cognitive (or semantic) system. This is  not to say that 
such descriptions are inaccurate in predicting the usage of a native 
speaker.
%  suspicion is  that the cognitivists have not abandoned th e ir  
be lief that i t  is  possible to "get inside the native 's head." As the 
relevant lite ra tu re  since 1964 demonstrates, they have merely become more 
cautious in how they ta lk  about th e ir goal. Terms like  "calculus" and 
"model" increasingly replace "psychologically real" in the cognitiv ist 
lite ra tu re .
The continuing primary means, however, by which cognitivists
claim the descriptive va lid ity  of the ir analyses is  simply informant
response. This aspect of cognitivist strategy is  highly susceptible to
criticism . Colby (1966:12) sta tes when discussing Hymes:
When %nes speaks of prediction, he means mainly an affirmative in­
formant response to the correct naming of objects in the environment 
showing that the meaning has been attained by the investigator. The 
drawback to such a c rite rion  is  that the various semantic principles 
and conponents applied by the investigator when he decides whether an 
object is  designated by a specific lexical unit may not always be 
conscious to him...Even i f  the investigator is  fu lly  conscious of a l l  
the semantic c r i te r ia  he uses in testing  word usage, an affirmative 
infoimant response does not necessarily mean the c r ite r ia  are those 
used by native speakers.
Pelto (1970:85) notes :
The te s t  of ' correctness' in . . . f ie ld  research strategies is  the same-- 
i ts  empirically determined productivity. The complete outsider's 
set of survey questions put to  a sample of the local population is  
often empty of meaning and devoid of p red ic tab ility .. .But the local 
people are not invariably be tter than the ethnographer in  categorizing 
their own social re a lity  for the simple reason that (1) they are not 
social sc ien tis ts , and (2) th e ir (arbitrary) categorizations were 
not constructed for the purposes of cross-cultural study of behavior 
systems...Neither the 'in s id e r' nor the 'outsider' in the cultural
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scene has the answers for appropriate categories and defin itions of 
behavioral facts. The appropriate categories depend on th e ir  pre­
dictive consequences in  research.
With regard to the cognitivists* stre ss  on "appropriate a n tic i­
pation" rather than "prediction," Harris (1968:572) remarks: "Since no 
attention has been devoted to the question of how to proceed with th is  
operation, i t  cannot be taken a t once both l i te ra l ly  and seriously." At 
another point Harris (1968:575) remarks:
There are certain  options which in th e ir  most subtle form defeat 
the emic/etic d istinction . Thus i t  is  a commonplace of psycho­
analytical research and practice that the actor is  regarded as a poor 
observer of his own inner sta tes.
Some general comments from various philosophers of science may be 
brought to bear on th is  problem- -theor)^ and i ts  validation. Kaplan (1964: 
315) notes :
...th eo rie s  cannot be validated as though they were wholly se lf- 
contained. I t  is  singly a m istake...to  suppose that validation 
consists in confronting 'the* theory with 'the* observation. Other 
theories and facts are always involved--for instance, those bearing 
on the instruments of observation.
P a rticu la ris tic  cognitive theories are en tirely  self-contained 
involving no other theories or facts but those present when "the" theory 
confronts "the" observation in anticipating word usage for example. Also, 
as has been noted, cognitiv ists typically  pay l i t t l e  attention to problems 
involving the ethnographer as "the instrument of observation," preferring 
to stress matters of technique.
When discussing the structure of theories in  the social sciences,
Walter Wallace (1971:92) writes:
. . . i n  the sciences we want to  know not only how things 'have worked* 
in the past, not only how things 'w ill work* in the future, but both-- 
more than th a t, we want to know both in one statement. In short, we 
want to know how things 'must work,*. . .th is  simultaneous backward and 
forward reach of theory may be considered the primary manifestation of 
the way science pursues necessity ...
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The theories of cognitive organization in  a p a rticu la r domain as 
developed by cognitiv ists in  terms of appropriate response a re , however, 
en tirely  s ta tic . That in  i t s e l f  is  no crime except that the manner of 
validation inplies that language is  a s ta tic  phenomenon, a presumption 
that could hardly be defended. I f  correct informant response and 
appropriate anticipation argue the correctness of the theory in  general, 
the correctness of the theory in  terms of future application would also 
depend on future informants giving the same set of responses. This 
would seem most unlikely especially given a goodly amount of time between 
the f i r s t  instance of validation and subsequent testing  of the theory of 
cognitive organization by means of language. Further, there would be no 
way to argue the re trod ictive  power of the theory, unless an assunption 
concerning language as a s ta tic  phenomenon could be supported.
A problem related  to  cognitiv ist validation procedures is
suggested by Weatherall (1969:176) when he sta tes: "...hypotheses become
acceptable i f  they are supported su ffic ien tly  often and never refuted."
In other words, i t  is  not enough that a theory be supported in  observation
unless the clear p oss ib ility  of i t s  refu ta tion  also ex ists and is  stated.
I t  cannot be known how a theory is  righ t i f  i t  is  not also possible to
say how i t  could be wrong. Popper (1959:40-41), in his The Logic of
Scientific  Discovery, writes:
I shall not require of a sc ien tific  system that i t  shall be capable 
of being singled out, once and for a l l ,  in a positive sense; but I 
shall require that i t s  logical form shall be such that i t  can be 
singled out, by means of empirical te s ts , in  a negative sense; i t  must 
be possible for an empirical sc ien tific  system to be refuted by ex­
perience. Thus the statement ' I t  w ill ra in  or not rain  tomorrow' w ill 
not be regarded as enpirical, sinply because i t  cannot be refuted; where­
as the statement ' I t  w ill ra in  here tomorrow' w ill be regarded as 
empirical.
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A particu lar delineation o£ some cognitive organization can be re ­
futed, according to the cogn itiv ists , i f  i t  f a i ls  to  allow the ethnographer 
to  make appropriate anticipations of verbal behavior. However, the basic 
assumption that cognitive processes are discoverable in language cannot be 
refuted using cognitiv ist validation c r i te r ia ,  because of the many a lte r ­
native logical orderings which can allow the ethnographer to  make the same 
anticipation. There is  nothing in tny formulation of cognitiv ist "theory," 
nor in related validation techniques, that sta tes how the ultim ate cogniti­
v is t  orientation (cognition through language) could be fa ls if ie d . I ts  
immunity to potential fa ls if ica tio n  is  an tith e tica l to the sc ien tic ity  
which the cognitivists claim. Cognitivist validating procedures merely 
allow them to  sta te  that they have or have not foimulated a set of rules 
which permit them to  use words in a sense "equivalent" to native word use. 
Nothing can be said concerning cognitive processes or th e ir  approximations! 
Where, then, is  the "cognitive" in cognitive anthropology? The only 
cognitive processes that are even vaguely outlined by cognitive methods 
are the ethnographers.
A further critic ism  of the extravagant claims of cognitive anthro­
pology is  summed up in  Harris' (1968:591) phrase, "The Science of T rivia." 
Berreman (1966:351) vhen discussing the accomplishments of cognitive 
research writes:
None of these descriptions, whatever th e ir  v irtues, can in themselves 
be called s ig n ifican t...th ey  rem.ind of M ills' warning that many socio­
log ists have gotten to the point Wiere they overlook what is  important 
in th e ir  search fo r what is  v e rif ia b le .. .many have worked so hard on 
what is  t r iv ia l  that i t  comes to appear important.
Kaplan (1964:406) makes a similar kind of statement when writing 
of the future of behavioral science.
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Many behavioral sc ien tis ts , I am afra id , look to  methodology as a 
source of salvation: th e ir expectation is  that i f  only they are 
w illing and obedient, though th e ir  sins are like  scarle t, they shall 
be as vhite as show. Methodology is  not turned to only as and when 
^ e c if ic  methodological d iff ic u ltie s  arise  in the course of particu lar 
inquiries: i t  is  made a l l  encompassing, a fa i th  in which the tormented 
inquirer can hope to  be reborn to a new l i f e .  I f  there are such 
illusions, i t  has been my purpose to be disillusioning. In these 
matters, the performance of Üie r i tu a l leaves everything unchanged, 
and methodological precepts are like ly  to be as ineffective as moral 
exhortations usually are...There are behavioral sc ien tis ts  who, in 
the ir desperate search for sc ien tific  s ta tu s , give the impression 
that they don't care what they do i f  only they do i t  righ t: sub­
stance gives way to form. And here a vicious c irc le  is  engendered; when 
the outcome is  seen as enpty, th is  is  taken as pointing a l l  the more 
to the need for a be tter methodology. The work of the behavioral 
sc ien tis t might well become methodologically sounder i f  only he did 
not try  so hard to  be so scien tific!
Pelto (1970:74) adds: "Given that the f ie ld  work was carefully 
done, and the resu lts are sound, one wonders what theoretical use other 
anthropologists w ill make, for example, of descriptions of Tzeltal f i r e ­
wood or ingredients for making beer among the Subanun." In a similar 
vein, Harris (1968:592) writes:
I t  would appear on balance, however, that the net contribution to 
substantive theory is  less than vhat usually resu lts from equivalent 
labor in-puts. For example, Conklin's conclusion that the Hanunoo's 
terminological specialization in cousin terms re flec ts  payment of 
fines in accordance with degree of incest scarcely requires the 
elaborate descriptive apparatus with which i t  is  juxtaposed.
Hammer (1968:523) continues:
I am pleased when Conklin te l ls  us that the decisive division among 
American units of monetary exchange is  between 'coins' and 'b i l l s ' 
or when Haugen shows us that Icelandic noror, a u s tir , suor, and vestr 
do not always mean the cardinal directions north, east, south, and 
west, but may also mean 'in  the direction leading ultim ately to the 
north (east, south, west) quarter of the is land ,' but we hardly need 
the elaborate terminology and conplex methodological apparatus which 
has grown ip  around componential analysis to t e l l  us these things.
The product of the cognitivists is  indeed tr iv ia l  when i t  is  con­
sidered that the champions of the fie ld  have been active for the la s t  ten 
to fifteen  years and have agreed fervently with Sturtevant's (1964:101)
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statement; "ethnoscience shows promise as the New Ethnography required to 
advance the viiole of cultural anthropology."
The question of cultural homogeneity, generally assumed by the 
cognitiv ists, has drawn critic ism  from Pelto and Harris. Pelto (1970:75) 
writes:
I t  is  assumed tha t there is  one 'r ig h t ' description o f, or logical 
organization of, a given semantic domain, and that a l l  or most of the 
members of a given society 'knov' tha t particu lar system. The 
component ia l  analysts do not generally explore the significance of 
variation  from person to person in organization or cognitive domains... 
Txie ethnoscientists, therefore, are seldom concerned with de ta ils  of 
sajipling and representativeness in the cultures they study. Their 
published descriptions are set fo rth  as the single 'b e s t ' unitary 
system derivable from the given culture. In the area of nonverbal 
behavior the assumptions of cu ltu ral homogeneity and unambiguity 
become strained even more than they were in the matter of folk 
taxonomies.
Harris (1968:590) continues th is  theme:
I f  permitted to  develop unchecked, the tendency to write ethnographies 
in  accord with emic rules of behavior w ill resu lt in an unintentional 
parody of the human condition. Applied to our own culture i t  would 
conjure up a way of l ife  in which men tip  the ir hats to  ladies ; youths 
defer to  old people in public conveyances; unwed mothers are a ra r ity ; 
c itizens go to the aid of law enforcement o ff ic e rs .. . television 
repairmen fix  television sets.
As Pelto and Harris point out, the cognitivist faces the problem 
of in tracu ltu ral variations. By what c r i te r ia , and how, do the cognitiv ists 
conclude that a particu lar informant is  representative of his group?
This question is  never raised, and i t  is  significant! As contemporary 
perceptual psychology has demonstrated, there is  a mass of variables 
affecting d iffe ren tia l responses from the same sample to  perceptual and 
cognitive cues. There is  a vast body of lite ra tu re  in psychology which 
f la tly  denies the assunçtion of cultural homogeneity made by the 
cognitiv ists.
'iTie excessively id ea lis t theory of human behavior f ilte re d  through 
a computer model has also led the cognitiv ist to assume unambiguity as a
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basic feature of human cognitive processes. Logical exhaustiveness of a 
domain is  a sought a fte r  feature of formal modes of analysis but th is  
does not argue that i t  is  a necessary feature of cognition. With regard 
to  his analysis of Anerican kinship terms, Schneider (1965:291) refe rs to 
the "fuzzy boundary and fadeout principle" of th is  domain in  American 
culture. Harris (1968:587) has noted; "None of the attempts to  define 
basic cognitive features of American kinship terminology has thus far 
made concessions to the possib ility  that ambiguity is  one of the sa lien t 
characteristics of th is  domain." I t  should also be noted tha t ambiguity, 
paradox and contradiction are basic in such human endeavors as a r t ,  poetry, 
and philosophy.
A rch-eticist, Marvin Harris (1964;1968), has been a major c r i t ic
of cognitive anthropology. Some of his criticism s appear well founded.
Harris (1968:570) sta tes:
The pairing of structural resu lts with emics and nonstructural 
resu lts  with e tics accords with the history of lingu istics . But 
there is  no reason to suppose that th is  equation must hold for non­
linguist ic  phenomena. There are structures in an atom, a molecule, a 
c e ll, and an organism, the description of none of which depends upon 
emic operations. Why should we not also assume that there are 
sociocultural systems whose structures can be exposed independently 
of procedures modeled a fte r phonemic analysis.
Harris has also pointed out the inplications for cognitive 
anthropology of the rare instance when several cognitive oriented re ­
searchers independently attacked the same domain with cognitiv ist 
methods and assumptions. American kinship terminology was analyzed by 
Wallace and Atkins (1960), Romney and D'Andrade (1964), and Goodenough 
(1965). None of the three analyses completely agreed. I f  intersubjective 
testing  can be u tilized  as a means to assess the sc ien tif ic  v a lid ity  of a 
research method, cognitive anthropology in th is  case fa iled . Harris 
(1968:588) notes :
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. . . th e  fa ilu re  of American ethnologists to  agree on the analysis of 
th e ir own native terminology, the evident tendency among ethno- 
semanticists to  accept the cognitive expertize of the well-informed 
informant, and the fa ilu re  to accomodate the p oss ib ility  of 
functional ambiguity suggests tha t the ethnosemanticists must take a 
more c r i t ic a l  look a t th e ir basic assumptions.. .At the very le a s t, the 
d iff ic u ltie s  and shortcomings of the treatment of American terminology 
provide a firm basis for skepticism regarding the attempt to  push 
the study of major terminological systems into numerous refinements 
which are possible i f  terms for kin types representing a l l  shades of 
ambiguity and psychological and social significance are jammed into 
the same frame.
P elto 's  (1970:74) general c ritique  of cognitive anthropology
re la tes to the fact that the cognitiv ists offer " ...n o  comprehensive
statement of theory in  connection with which th e ir methodological
practices are invoked...." Pelto (1970:74) sta tes:
...we are struck with the question ’But what theoretical problems 
are the componential analysts attempting to solve?' I t  would appear 
that the method has some pertinence to the general problems of des­
cribing folk taxonomic systems. However, as proponents of a new 
kind of taxonomic system for analysis of a l l  cultural problems, the 
componential analysts (and other foimal semantic analysts) have provided 
l i t t l e  in  the way of a general theoretical framework, and they 
appear to  believe tha t accurate description of semantic domains is  a 
useful end in i ts e l f .  (Most of the works in componential analysis 
are programmatic papers on the new research methods, and provide 
only p a rtia l descriptions of the quite limited semantic domains with 
which they concern themselves).
Sturtevant (1964:123) notes another d ifficu lty  with the
cogn itiv is ts ' program:
Ethnoscience raises the standards of r e l ia b il i ty , va lid ity , and ex­
haustiveness in  ethnography. One resu lt is  tha t the ideal goal of a 
conplete ethnography is  farther removed from practical attainment.
The fu ll  ethnoscientific description of a simgle culture would require 
many thousands of pages published a fte r  many years of intensive 
f ie ld  work based on ethnographic methods more complete and more 
advanced than are now available.
I would only note that a more useful program of ethnographic 
methodology should make the ideal of a complete ethnography more a tta in ­
able instead of rendering i t  "farther removed from practical attainment."
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Further, the notion that "Ethnoscience ra ises the standards of r e l ia b i l i ty ,  
va lid ity , and exhaustiveness in  ethnography" is  based on the highly 
questionable validating techniques of the f ie ld .
In my study of cognitiv ist l ite ra tu re  I find the emic/etic d is­
tinc tion , a major conceptual underpinning of cognitive anthropology, most 
problematic. Cognitivists attempt to  derive emic descriptions of certain  
domains and to  eliminate ethnographer bias. The problem is  tha t a l l  
observation is biased, i . e . ,  e tic . Without e tic  d istinctions and a p rio ri 
perceptual se ts , an ethnographer would not recognize a native, le t  alone 
his mind, or his cognitive processes. To perceive that th is  quantity 
is  a man and not a tree , to perceive that th is  man rather than tha t man 
is  a native, to perceive that he demonstrates behavior, to perceive that 
his behavior i l lu s tra te s  cognitive processes, to  perceive that these 
processes may be logical, to  perceive that a certain  technique rather 
than some other technique w ill demonstrate the logical structure of his 
cognitive mode, and to perceive that a particu lar cognitive delineation 
is  valid involves e tic  d istinc tions, i . e . ,  " ...d is tin c tio n s  judged 
appropriate by the community of sc ien tif ic  observers" (Harris, 1968:575).
I t  would be logically  and epistemologically impossible to  derive "emics" 
from the above basic series of perceptual operations. To claim that 
emically valid  descriptions are achieved by cognitiv ist techniques is  an 
affirmation of fa ith  and mysticism rather than sound rational demonstration.
The frustra ting  irony of cognitive anthropology is  tha t i t  contains 
in i t s  basic tenets the s tu ff of i t s  own destruction. I t  follows Sapir in 
basing i t s  program on the assumption of the hold language exhibits over 
class perception and discrimination, and then ignores that premise by con­
sidering "etics" to be culture-free features of the rea l world. Cognitivists
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would view as " s tif lin g  to  ethnoscientific analysis" (Sturtevant, 1964: 
105), Mirdock's (1945:125) assumption that "cu ltu res .. .have in  common... 
a uniform system of c la ss if ic a tio n ...a  single basic plan," and then 
u til iz e  Aristotlean logic as the basis for a coimion descriptive language 
of a l l  human systems of c lassifica tion . Cognitivists acknowledge the 
quest ion-dependent-answer thesis of Collingwood and others (ly ie r, 1969: 
141) but ignore the entire  basic thesis when they claim emic va lid ity  for 
an analysis the source of which is  founded in an e tica lly  delineated 
domain.
The overall theoretical frairework of cognitive anthropology is  
d iff ic u lt to  assess because as Pelto (1970:74) notes above, i t  is  largely 
nonexistent. I t  would be most accurate to evaluate cognitive anthropology 
as a "point-of-view" immune to fa ls if ica tio n  and verifica tion , couched in 
a Newtonian conception of nature and science, which has been dated in 
terms of sc ien tif ic  thought and endeavors since the 19th century.
VI
CONCLUSION
Arthur S. Eddington (1881-1944) was an outstanding English astrono­
mer whose major sc ien tific  achievements were in the fie lds of astrophysics 
and re la tiv ity  theory. He was E instein 's chief assistan t on a t r ip  to 
West Africa in 1919 to observe the solar eclipse. An experiment carried 
out during that eclipse proved that ligh t from a d istan t s ta r would be 
bent as i t  passed the sun. This experiment helped to confirm the 
general theory of re la tiv ity . "Eddington's name is  well known to the 
general public because of his attempts to reconcile re la tiv ity  with more 
trad itional beliefs held by man" (Brody § Capaldi, 1968:37).
Eddington's account of his two tables offers an elementary ex­
position by a genius of theoretical physics of a basic problem faced by 
men doing science. Sinçle, i t  is the problematic relationship between 
"social rea lity "  and "sc ien tific  rea lity ."  In his The Nature of the 
Physical World (1928:ix-xii), Eddington writes:
I have se ttled  down to the task of writing these lectures and 
have drawn up my chairs to  my two tables. Two tables! Yes, there 
are duplicates of every object about me--two tab les, two chairs, 
two pens...One of them (tables) has been fam iliar to me from 
e a rlie s t years. I t  is  a commonplace object of that environment vhich 
I c a ll the world. How shall I describe it?  I t  has extension; i t  is 
comparatively permanent; i t  is  coloured; above a ll  i t  is  su b stan tia l... 
I t  is  a thing; not like  space, which is  a mere negation; nor like 
time, idiich is--Heaven knows what!
Table No. 2 is  my sc ien tific  table. I t  is  a more recent ac­
quaintance and I do not feel so fam iliar with i t .  I t  does not belong 
to the world previously mentioned--that world which spontaneously 
appears around me when I open my eyes. There is  nothing substantial 
about my second table. I t  is  merely a ll  empty space--space pervaded,
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i t  is  true, by fie lds of force, but these are assigned to  the 
category of ’influences*, not of ’th in g s '.
I need not t e l l  you that modem physics has by delicate  tex t 
and remorseless logic assured me tliat my second sc ien tific  tab le is  
the only one whidi is  rea lly  there--where ever ’there’ may be. On 
the other hand I need not t e l l  you that modem physics w ill never 
succeed in exorcizing that f i r s t  table--strange compound of ex- 
tem al nature, mental imagery and inherited prejeduce--which lie s  
v isib le  to my eyes and tangible to  my grasp.
Eddington, a t the outset of his introduction to theoretical 
physics, presents the so c ia l/sc ien tific  re a lity  problem. For him i t  is  
a basic foundation for the understanding of high level sc ien tific  theory 
and theory building. Cognitivists acknowledge th is  d istinction  in  one 
version of the emic/etic d ifferen tia tion , then loose i t  to ta lly  with 
th e ir emic theoretical emphasis; ”Yes there are a t least two d is tin c t 
rea lity  levels which the anthropologist must deal with,” and ”No, there 
is  only one.” Logically the cognitiv ists cannot have both without 
running the risk  of continued contradiction. As was noted in the pre- 
ceeding chapter, in tem al contradiction must be cited as one of the 
major negative characteristics of cognitive anthropology.
Heisenberg (in Brody 5 Capaldi, 1968:53) has noted that ’’...sc ience  
is  not concemed with nature i ts e l f ,  but with nature as man describes and 
understands i t . ” The cognitivists s tress the study of how man describes 
and understands nature, but what they apparently do not see is  that for 
the anthropologist man is the natural phenomenon which is  sc ien tifica lly  
studied. I t  may sound like  a cold and Byzantine statement, but for the 
anthropologist doing science the ’’rea l” nature of man is  not the central 
goal of inquiry but rather how anthropology as a science can be tte r des­
cribe and understand man in anthropological terms. For anthropologists 
interested in the progress of theory in the f ie ld , man and h is behavior 
are manipulatable data, no more, no less. To be concemed with formally
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and sc ien tif ica lly  delineating the "rea l cognitive structures" of a given 
people, for exangle, is  to confuse two d ifferen t universes of discourse. 
Science does not deal with the re a l, i t  deals with the valid ; i t  does 
not deal with fac ts , i t  deals with data. I see resistence to  th is  notion 
(man as data, not fact) as very sim ilar to  the popular outcry raised 
against Darwinian theory in  the 19th century. The code of "social rea lity "  
could not to le ra te  the grave status change which Darwin's theory (science 
rea lity ) dictated. Man was stgposed to  be special in the realm of nature, 
not ju s t another animal. Of course, in  " sc ien tif ic  re a lity ,"  man is  data, 
not social fac t; he does not have status problems. According to Darwinian 
theory, man is  ju s t another animal.
In terms of the social re a lity /sc ie n tif ic  re a lity  d istinc tion , how­
ever, the humanistic face of anthroix)logy re ta ins i t s  place along with 
the cool face of anthropology as a science. The anthropologist as 
humanist and teacher is  a transla to r. He must be capable of rendering 
the language of the sc ien tif ic  re a lity  of anthropology into the social 
rea lity  in which the anthropologist finds himself. This is  what the 
humanistic anthropologist actually  does, though he may not rea lize  i t .  
Realizing i t ,  and controlling i t ,  however, is  the essence of the 
anthropologist's a rt.
The major problem here, and I find i t  a glaring one, is  that the 
anthropologist typ ically  has l i t t l e  in te res t in research into the 
sc ien tific  aspects of the social re a lity  in  which he finds himself. Too 
often, he, like  ordinary mortals, accepts the social re a lity  into which he 
was bom with his mother's milk and rare ly  considers what must stand as 
one of anthropology's major contributions to human thought, the recognition 
of the special and re s tr ic tiv e  lens socially  transmitted as a culture in
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a particu lar time in a particu lar place. Siiiply, the anthropologist 
is  a cultural product too!
The effect of personal bias in  anthropological l ite ra tu re  has 
been noted only in  those instances in  which intersubj ec tiv ity  has 
occurred in a particu lar area of study. Two such classic  encounters 
happened in the independent studies of the Mexican v illage  of Tepoztlan 
by Robert Redfield in  the 1920's and Oscar Lewis' study some seventeen 
years la te r ;  and with the differing versions of Pueblo culture offered 
by Ruth Benedict, Laura Thompson, Esther Goldfrank, and Dorothy Eggan.
Regarding the Lewis/Redfield differences, Lewis (1951:428-429)
writes :
The impression given by Redfield's study of Tepoztlan is  that of a 
re la tive ly  homogenous, iso lated , sirootKLy functioning and well- 
integrated society made up of a contented and well-adjusted people.
His picture of the village has a Rcusseauan quality which glosses lig h t­
ly  over evidence of violence, disruption, cruelty , disease, suffering 
and maladjustment. We are told l i t t l e  of poverty, economic problems, 
or p o litica l schisms. Throughout his study we find an emphasis upon 
the cooperative and unifying factors in  Tepoztecan society.
Our findings, on the other hand, would emphasize the underlying 
individualism of Tepoztlan in stitu tions and character, the lack of 
cooperation, the tensions between v illages within the municipio, 
the schisms within the v illage , and the pervading quality of fear, 
envy and d is tru st.
Redfield (1960:135) in reply notes :
The greater part of the explanation for the differences between the 
two reports on th is  matter of Tepoztecan l i f e  and character is  to be 
found in differences between the two investigato rs.. . I think that i t  
is  simply true th a t . . . I  looked a t certain  aspects of Tepoztecan l i f e  
because they both interested and pleased me.
The d iffe ren tia l accounts of Pueblo l i f e  began in 1934 with Ruth 
Benedict's Patterns of Culture. In that book the Pueblo people were 
characterized as restrained and moderate in a l l  things. According to 
Benedict, they attempted to avoid violence, quarrels, and warfare. Laura 
Thompson rendered a similar p o rtra it of the Pueblo people. In la te r  studies
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of the Pueblo lifeways (particularly  Zuni and Hopi), Esther Goldfrank and 
Dorothy Eggan portrayed the Pueblo culture as traumatic, v io lent, and 
repressive.
Bennett (1956:211-212) studied both versions of Pueblo culture 
and concluded:
The differences in viewpoints...cannot be explained en tirely  e ither 
on the basis of sc ien tific  goodness or badness, nor on the basis of 
publication d ifferen tia ls . Underneath both these factors l ie s  what 
I have already suggested may be a genuine difference in value 
orientations and outlook in  the feeling about the reaction toward 
Pueblo society and culture in the ligh t of values in Anerican 
culture brought to the sc ien tific  situation  by the anthropologist... 
Scien tific  anthropology i s . . .in^licated in an on-going process in 
our culture, and from th is  level of observation, i t  is  nonobjective 
and cu ltu ra lly  determined.
The preceeding examples cited  instances \dien the ethnographer, 
cool purveyor of the native l i f e ,  was caught with his/her humanity 
showing. Since re la tive ly  few ethnographic studies are , or can be, 
intersubjactively assessed i t  is  staggering to  contemplate the nature of 
the biases which have produced the great lib ra rie s  of ethnographic 
accounts which form the basis of ethnological theory.
The implication of the above to a consideration of cognitive 
anthropology is  seen mainly in the cognitiv ists’ naive attempt to 
eliminate ethnographer bias. This is  a fu t i le  direction! A model of 
a human as a social creature could be ideally constructed upon the system 
of h is perceptual sets of biases. A more practical attack to the question 
of ethnographer bias would be one in which bias is  acknowledged as the 
noim of perception and which sets out to expose bias and structure i t  in 
terms of rational thought and description. Contrary to what cognitiv ists 
seem to think, the rea l cannot be formally, ra tionally , or sc ien tifica lly  
"bottled" for the edification of future generations of anthropologists.
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Cognitivists in th e ir  search for descriptive purity  and "reality" 
have boxed themselves into a paradigm based on a Newtonian conception of 
the universe; a universe which contains an inherently ra tional order d is­
coverable by sc ien tific  techniques. This is  the popular reality-view  of 
the culture of the cognitiv ists. What the cognitiv ists do not realize is  
that Newton’s universe was effectively blown away by the f i r s t  quiver of 
re la tiv ity  theory in  the la te  19th century. Contemporary science no 
longer seeks the rea lly  rea l: i t  seeks the theoretically  valid .
The cognitivist stance is  set in a social re a lity  which is  based 
in  a Newtonian naive realism. Nature and mind are in tr in s ic a lly  rational 
and orderly, according to th is  view, th is  paradigm, th is  methodology.
The cognitivist then views his subject matter through the lens of his 
social re a lity ’s version of ontology and the resu lt is  the measuring of 
another’s com by one’s own bushel. This is  a minor crime to  the 
cognitivist but in  my opinion absolutely inevitable in view of the fact 
tha t a l l  sc ien tis ts  are human.
The most insideous and pervasive error of cognitiv ist methodology 
is  the search for and the fascination with the " rea l."  Reality, i t  seems 
to me, is  a major concern in the social realm and therefore vhere ever i t  
is  defined i t  is  a culture t r a i t  marked by spatial/temporal features. 
Contemporary physics, the mother of Western man’s ontology, on the other 
hand, has begun to escape the emotion evoking c a ll for re a lity  finding.
For anthropologists to follow the cognitivist methodology and paradigm 
would be to regress instead of progress in anthropological theory generally.
What factors can be suggested to  account for the r ise  of cognitive 
methodology in American anthropology? In no special order of importance, 
several factors can be mentioned. Colby (1966:6) notes one such factor.
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The current swing away from behaviorism and back to  an in terest in 
cognition is  undoubtedly influenced by the place computers have in  our 
society...The great in te rest in generative grammars and the 
associated terminology.. .may indicate the same influence among 
anthropologists.
In reply to comments on his "Ethnographic Semantics: A Pre­
liminary Survey," Colby (1966:27) adds:
One might characterize the new American emphasis as a conservative 
revolution.. . (a) lim ited outlook is  also indicative of a conservative 
view.. . Conservative also is  the view of culture as a mental code or 
set of ru les. Though th is view is  a ttrac tive  to me, I am not sure 
i t  is  the most f ru itfu l one. I think one reason i t  has caught on is  
that i t  is  mentally assuaging. I t  reduces everything to a se t of 
logical relationships that are clear and unambiguous.
In "The Psychic Unity of Human Groups," Wallace (1968:504) offers 
his vhimsical appraisal of the persistence of in te res t in cognition in 
the social sciences: "Indeed, one may suspect that the social sciences 
have nourished the idea of cognitive sharing for so long, ju s t because 
the world would seem rather a lonely place i f  the w istful dream of 
mutual identification  is  abandoned."
A more practical reason for the appeal of cognitive anthropology 
may re la te  to  the often noted rapid "disappearance" of exotic cultures 
around the world. A native language, the chief avenue of the cogn itiv ist, 
may remain while the more dramatic extrinsic t r a i ts  of a people have d is­
appeared. Thus, the Comanche Indians of southwestern Oklahoma may drive 
pick-up trucks and shop a t the supermarket but re ta in  th e ir native 
language. For a theoretical position that equates language with the core 
of culture, the apparent disintegration of native cultures would not be 
quite so traumatic for the anthropologist so oriented.
A further source of appeal for cognitive anthropology, and one 
which I fee l is  valid , is  that i t  a t  least raises issues dealing with the 
upgrading of standards of ethnographic description. Though I believe that
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th e ir e ffo rts  have been misdirected, I think tha t the introduction of 
new methods of analysis borrowed from many diverse areas can only be 
applauded.
Several further sources of the r is e  of cognitive anthropology 
re la te  to  what Colby above has referred to  as a "conservative revolution." 
The enghasis on rigorous studies of pa rticu lar cultures; the s tre ss  on 
emic studies which a ttençt to  "get inside the skin of the native;" a focus 
on the study of culture defined in  ideational terms; a l l  of these points 
are venerable and trad itio n a l in American anthropology from Boas through 
Sapir, Kluckhohn, Opler, and Benedict.
In conclusion I would like to  answer a major question which I 
raised in  the f i r s t  chapter: Is cognitive anthropology ultim ately 
detrimental to the growth of viable theory in  anthropology? The only 
answer is  a resounding "Yes"! I f  the ultim ate goal of anthropology as a 
science is  to  build a theoretical system re la tin g  i t s  intermeshed subject 
matter, the methodology of cognitive anthropology could only s t i f le  the 
growth of many major areas of anthropological research. Pelto (1970:83) 
notes:
Given the 'tim eless' nature of ethnoscientific methodology, those 
anthropologists whose main concerns are the study of acculturation, 
migration, urbanization, adaptation to national cultures, complex 
socie ties, or other aspects of changing cultu ral patterns are seldom 
able to make extensive use of the techniques of the New Ethnography 
in th e ir  work. Also, those studies that concentrate on in tra ­
cultural differences and conflicts--such as research in factionalism, 
decision-making processes, 'marginal subgroups, ' e tc .--fin d  the 
ethnoscientific paradigm unsuitable for coping with the heterogenieties 
and ambiguities of cu ltural behavior.
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